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Summary 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to lay the empirical foundations for exploring the dynamics 
of democracy, inequality, and redistribution in advanced countries. The thesis consists 
of three main essays: The first essay provides a new measure of democracy that 
captures the dynamics of democracy in developed countries, and the second and third 
essays focus on the dynamic relation between inequality and redistribution. The first 
paper shows that developed democracies are not uniformly democratic across different 
dimensions by constructing the Democratic Performance Index (DPI). The DPI, which 
has eight distinct dimensions of democratic performance, is the result of a conceptual 
and empirical critique of the existing measures of democracy under a middle-range 
conception of democracy. The second and third papers are closely intertwined to 
address a long-standing puzzle of whether more economic inequality leads to more 
redistribution. The second paper investigates the relationship between economic 
inequality and redistribution at the country level. The paper introduces redistributive 
preferences as an intervening factor in the relationship and presents the Gini coefficient 
of perceived social position (perceived Gini) as a country-level measure of perceived 
inequality. The evidence shows that perceived inequality, not actual inequality, is 
significantly associated with redistributive preferences, while preferences for 
redistribution do not translate into redistribution. The third paper examines the role of 
both individuals’ objective or subjective social status and their perceptions of inequality 
in shaping preferences for redistribution. The paper provides new measures of 
perceived actual inequality, personal norms of inequality, and perceived injustice. The 
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findings demonstrate that subjective social position has a stronger impact on 
redistributive preferences than objective social position and that individuals’ inequality 
norms play a more crucial role in preference formation than does their perception of 
actual inequality. The concluding section summarises and discusses the findings, 
highlights policy implications, and suggests future areas of inquiry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Does democracy affect economic inequality, or vice versa? Can democracy be 
portrayed as serving a Robin Hood function? Does increased inequality lead to more 
redistribution? These questions still prevail in the field of political economy and have 
produced a myriad of empirical literature on the relationship between democracy, 
inequality, and redistribution. However, there have been no clear and consistent 
findings about the link so far. Even worse is that it is hardly possible to explore the 
association in developed democracies mainly because most measures of democracy are 
not sensitive enough to differentiate amongst established democracies. Furthermore, 
researchers have paid less attention to conceptualising and measuring democracy, 
which is essential for exploring this relationship, despite many problems embedded in 
widely used democracy indices (Munck and Verkuilen 2002).1 
Meanwhile, Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) seminal paper, which has generated a 
large amount of literature on the association between inequality and redistribution that 
has also provided conflicting findings, highlights that an extension of the franchise 
increases redistribution by shifting down the position of the decisive voter (i.e., the 
median voter). This mechanism implies that expanding electoral democracy has an 
                                           
1 There is another strand to investigate the linkage using types of democracy, such as social 
democracy or Christian democracy, rather than indices of democracy (e.g., Bradley et al. 2003; 
Hewitt 1977). In a similar vein, welfare regime types are also used as a political determinant of 
inequality and redistribution (e.g., Huber and Stephens 2014). However, in this thesis, this approach 
is not directly discussed. Instead, it is partly addressed in Chapter 2, as other political determinants, 
such as government partisanship and electoral institutions, were used as political control variables 
in the analyses. 
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impact on redistribution. That is, their argument presupposes that democracy, albeit a 
minimalist one, also matters in the relationship between inequality and redistribution; 
however, it has not come into the spotlight in the literature. 
Given this, there remain numerous issues that require further exploration on the 
relationship between democracy, inequality, and redistribution. Amongst these, this 
thesis addresses two important issues. First, the thesis provides a new measure of 
democracy that can capture the dynamics of democracy; second, it approaches the 
dynamics of inequality and redistribution from a new angle that introduces perceived 
inequality. In doing so, the thesis makes a substantive contribution to the field of 
political economy from both the theoretical and empirical perspectives. More 
specifically, this thesis not only presents new empirical measures of democracy and 
perceived inequality, but it also calls into question the conventional redistribution 
theory that predicts a positive effect of actual inequality on redistribution as well as its 
fundamental assumption that objective income position is the most significant 
determinant of demand for redistribution. 
To explore the association between democracy, inequality, and redistribution 
empirically, each variable should be clearly defined and measured in the first place. In 
particular, it is more important to conceptualise and measure democracy since it is far 
less developed in comparison with the conceptualisation and measurement of 
inequality and redistribution.2 Moreover, this thesis narrows down the scope of the 
inquiry to advanced democracies; it is thus critical to construct a valid and reliable 
measure of democracy. 
                                           
2 Apart from this, the issue of conceptualising and measuring perceived inequality, which the 
second and third chapters of this thesis address, has recently secured attention in the study of 
inequality and redistribution. 
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Measuring democratic performance 
There is a lack of consensus on how to define democracy, inequality, and redistribution 
and to what extent and how they are associated. What is worse, if we are interested in 
the linkage in existing democracies, it is more challenging to investigate the relation, 
as existing democracy indices cannot capture clear differences amongst democracies. 
For instance, according to the Polity scores, which is one of the most widely used 
measures of democracy, many established democracies have shown no changes in the 
level of democracy for about a century. With this sort of measure, we cannot identify 
the dynamic relationships between democracy and other variables.  
Most existing indices of democracy are dichotomous measures or ordinal (or 
graded) ones based on a minimalist conception of democracy; the Freedom House and 
Polity indices are ordinal, and the democracy measures developed by Doorenspleet 
(2005) and Acemoglu et al. (2015) are dichotomous, for example. There are numerous 
previous studies on the association between democracy, inequality, and redistribution 
using the indices above. Acemoglu et al. (2015), for instance, investigated the effect of 
democracy on inequality and redistribution with their dichotomous measure of 
democracy. Their findings indicate that the effect of democracy on tax revenues is 
significant but that it has no impact on inequality. Timmons (2010) also demonstrated 
that there is no relationship between democracy and economic inequality by using the 
Freedom House and Polity indices. In addition, Ansell and Samuels (2014) found that 
democracy and income inequality have no positive impact on redistribution, using both 
a dichotomous measure of democracy and the Polity scores. 
However, the above findings about the relationship between democracy, inequality, 
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and redistribution are not applicable to established democracies because the measures 
of democracy employed in those studies do not differentiate amongst advanced 
democracies, as previously discussed. Accordingly, if we would like to examine the 
link in developed democracies, constructing a measure that can distinguish differences 
amongst democracies should be given top priority. The first essay of the thesis was thus 
designed to do this job. 
The first paper suggests a new measure of democratic performance, which has eight 
distinct dimensions, by conducting a conceptual and empirical critique of the existing 
measures of democracy; in this essay, democratic performance is regarded as a 
synonym of the quality of democracy. However, the paper does not combine the 
dimensions for a summary measure of democracy, following a strategy that stops 
forcing distinct dimensions into a unidimensional measure (Bollen and Lennox 1991; 
Foweraker and Krznaric 2000). This inquiry is interested in what is really going on 
within a democracy and how dynamic characteristics of a democracy vary across 
democracies. It is therefore necessary to unfold the concept of democracy and look at 
separate dimensions, as Gleditsch and Ward (1997, 381) suggested, to preserve 
information about systematic variations of each dimension. Furthermore, a summary 
measure of democracy requires a strong theory about how the dimensions of democracy 
are combined, as Coppedge (2002, 37–8) argued, from which a mathematical formula 
can be derived. Nonetheless, most previous measures of democracy aggregate their 
dimensions into a single index without a strong theory; by contrast, this inquiry has 
reservations about that. 
 
Revisiting the standard model of redistribution 
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Building on the first essay, avenues for future research may include a study of the 
relationships between each dimension of democratic performance and structural factors, 
such as inequality and redistribution. However, it is more urgent to investigate the 
association between inequality and redistribution than to look directly at the 
democracy-inequality-redistribution triad. This is because previous research on the link 
between inequality and redistribution has not provided any consistent and conclusive 
evidence of the relationship (see Table 1 in Chapter 2 for more details). In fact, it has 
been a long-standing puzzle whether or not a rise in economic inequality leads to 
further redistribution since Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) influential treatise, which is 
within the Downsian perspective in the sense that its focus is on the median voter and 
voter choice (see Downs 1957; Hacker and Pierson 2014). Thus, addressing this puzzle 
takes precedence over exploring the triad.  
In psychology, meanwhile, there have been evident findings: a mismatch between 
actual reality and its perception and the active role of perceived reality in forming 
individuals’ attitudes or behaviours. These commonly known facts imply that there may 
be a gap between perceived inequality and actual inequality and that perceived 
inequality rather than actual inequality may strongly influence preferences for 
redistribution. Nevertheless, these possibilities have not been sufficiently considered in 
the previous literature on the dynamics of inequality and redistribution. Therefore, the 
second and third papers together take notice of the role of perceived inequality in 
testing the classical redistribution theory, which assumes a close link between actual 
inequality and redistribution. The two essays are closely linked and complementary in 
that the former addresses the redistribution theory at the macro level, whereas the latter 
examines the theory at the micro level. 
Most previous studies on the relationship between inequality and redistribution, 
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however, have not considered preferences for redistribution in their analyses, although 
the redistribution hypothesis that originated from the Meltzer-Richard (1981) model 
regards demand for redistribution as an intervening factor between inequality and 
redistribution. Preferences are basically formed at the individual level, and then they 
can be aggregated at the society level. Thus, on condition that individual preferences 
are considered, micro-analysis should and can be conducted. In addition, the micro-
analysis of the third paper does not ignore macro-level structural factors that may affect 
individuals’ behaviour. 
On the other hand, there are several papers exploring what shapes individual 
preferences for redistribution, but they do not include investigations of the impact of 
inequality perceptions on redistributive preferences (e.g., Alesina and Giuliano 2011; 
Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Guillaud 2013). Some models of redistributive politics 
have examined the role of perceptions of social mobility as a determinant of 
redistributive preferences (Benabou and Ok 2001; Piketty 1995). In a broad sense, 
perceptions of mobility might be a sort of perceptions relating to inequality of 
opportunity. However, it is clearly distinguishable from perceptions of inequality in the 
present inquiry because these perceptions are related to inequality of outcome, such as 
income or social position. In this regard, the third essay fills the gap in the literature by 
focussing on perceptions of wage inequality and providing the new measures of the 
perceptions at the individual level. 
 
Outline of the chapters 
This thesis is organised as follows. The first chapter addresses the issues of 
conceptualising and measuring democratic performance and suggests a middle-range 
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conception of democracy that excludes both the minimalist and maximalist conceptions 
of democracy. As a result, this chapter provides the Democratic Performance Index 
(DPI) as a new measure of democratic quality, covering 30 core democracies and 39 
non-core democracies over the period from 1990 to 2012 (see Appendix 1 in Chapter 
1 for a list of the countries). This index is comprised of eight core dimensions of 
democracy: individual liberties, rule of law, public sphere, transparency, participation, 
representation, competition, and mutual constraints. These dimensions have been 
distilled from the literature on democracy. The DPI can capture subtle differences 
amongst democracies across the dimensions, offering opportunities not only for 
exploring multifaceted characteristics of a democracy but also for investigating the 
dynamic relation between the quality of democracy and socioeconomic structural 
factors. This chapter thus makes an important contribution to the field of democracy 
and comparative political economy by constructing a new measure to gauge the 
multidimensional variations of democracy in developed countries. 
The second chapter revisits the classical redistribution hypothesis by introducing a 
measure of perceived inequality at the country level. This chapter pays attention to the 
role of perceived inequality, which deviates from actual inequality in forming 
redistributive preferences. The inquiry demonstrates that there is a close relationship 
between perceived inequality, rather than actual inequality, and preferences for 
redistribution, whereas preferences for redistribution do not translate into redistribution. 
Redistributive preferences as a mediating factor between inequality and redistribution 
have been largely overlooked in the previous empirical analyses, although demand for 
redistribution are taken for granted implicitly or explicitly in the conventional 
redistributive models. The essay presents a country-level measure of perceived 
inequality, the Gini coefficient of perceived social position (perceived Gini), which was 
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built using data from 16 rounds of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 
1987 to 2014), covering 33 OECD countries. This section contributes to a wider 
discussion in the study of redistributive politics by showing the significant role of 
perceived inequality in preference formation and the lack of a significant link between 
policy preferences and policy outcomes. 
The third chapter explores the theory of redistribution at the individual level and 
presents new measures of inequality perceptions, revealing the importance of 
subjective social position and personal norms of inequality. From a social-
psychological perspective, subjective social status, apart from objective social position, 
is closely associated with policy preferences. This chapter not only ascertains whether 
or not the effect of perceived social position on redistributive preferences is stronger 
than that of actual social position, but it also examines the role of individuals’ inequality 
perceptions, including individuals’ inequality norms to which the previous literature 
has paid little attention, in determining individual preferences for redistribution. This 
chapter provides the empirical measures of perceived actual inequality, personal norms 
of inequality, and perceived injustice. To create these measures, the ISSP micro-data 
were used, and they cover 31 OECD countries over the four waves: 1987, 1992, 1999, 
and 2009. This chapter makes a considerable contribution to the field of micro-
comparative research on redistributive preferences not only by providing evidence that 
contradicts the essential assumption of the standard redistribution theory, which 
contends that objective social position plays a decisive role in shaping support for 
redistribution, but also by highlighting the important role of individuals’ inequality 
norms in preference formation for redistribution.   
To sum up, this thesis contributes to a wider discussion in the field of political 
economy not only by suggesting a measure of democratic performance that can capture 
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the dynamics of democracy in advanced countries. It also introduces the dimension of 
perceived inequality at both the macro and micro levels in testing the dynamic 
relationship between inequality and redistribution; in this respect, the inquiry unites 
political economy and social psychology. Therefore, the current research lays the 
foundations of empirical research on the dynamic link between democracy, actual or 
perceived inequality, and redistribution in developed countries.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Measuring Democratic Performance: A Multidimensional Approach 
 
 
Abstract 
This article constructs the Democratic Performance Index (DPI) as a new measure 
of democratic quality, covering 69 existing democracies over the period from 1990 
to 2012. This index contains eight core dimensions of democracy: individual 
liberties, rule of law, public sphere, transparency, participation, representation, 
competition, and mutual constraints, which have been extracted from the 
democracy literature. To this end, first, this paper reviews previous attempts to 
conceptualise and measure the quality of democracy; second, democratic 
performance is defined under a middle-range conception of democracy that avoids 
both the minimalist and maximalist approaches, in conjunction with a 
multidimensional framework. There is no doubt that democracy is multifaceted, 
but theoretical grounds are not yet sufficient to combine all the dimensions into a 
summary measure of democracy. Thus, this inquiry stops aggregating the 
distinguishable dimensions and preserves information about systematic variations 
of underlying dimensionality. The DPI is better suited than other measures of 
democracy for exploring existing democracies not only because it can capture 
subtle differences amongst democracies across various dimensions, but also 
because it overcomes several important issues of conceptualisation and 
measurement embedded in the previous measures. 
Keywords: democratic performance; quality of democracy; measures of 
democracy; dimensions of democracy; Democracy Barometer; Varieties of 
Democracy  
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Introduction 
After the third wave of democratisation, students of democracy started devoting a great 
deal of attention to the democratic performance of existing democracies. According to 
a conventional approach, existing democracies can also be divided into established and 
non-established ones, and it is believed that democratic performance of established 
democracies is uniform as well as superior to that of non-established ones. In fact, 
according to the Polity scores, one of the most widely used democracy indices, many 
established democracies have had the maximum level of democracy for about a century 
without any variations. The level of democracy in the US has been fixed at the 
maximum value of 10 since 1871, for instance. 
Even if all established democracies are highly democratic, however, we cannot 
exclude the possibility that they are democratic in different ways. If we use a more 
sensitive measure of democracy with distinct dimensions, the variations of democratic 
performance across various dimensions might be detected not only in non-established 
democracies but also in established democracies. Campbell (2008, 8) also emphasised 
the importance of distinguishing between existing democracies ‘for the purpose of 
mutually learning from democracies, innovating democracies, and developing 
democracies further’. The problem is that most existing measures of democracy are not 
sensitive enough to capture dissimilarities amongst democracies. 
Democratic performance has been mainly interpreted in three different ways: 
regime endurance or longevity, government efficacy, and a measure of the quality of 
democracy (Foweraker and Landman 2002, 45). This inquiry, however, takes the third 
approach because considering democratic performance as a synonym of democratic 
quality corresponds to the object of the inquiry. Regarding the assessment of 
democratic performance, there have been both quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
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The democracy assessment framework of the International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), for example, is one of the representative 
qualitative tools (Beetham et al. 2008). Yet, this inquiry aims to evaluate democratic 
performance quantitatively for cross-national comparative research. Although it is 
difficult to figure out a perfectly objective way of designing ‘a single framework for 
gauging democratic quality’, as Diamond and Morlino (2004, 22) argued, recent 
attempts to measure democratic performance laid the groundwork for a more valid and 
reliable measure of democratic performance. 
To develop a well-established framework and a measure for the assessment of 
democratic performance, it is necessary to deal with the issues of conceptualisation of 
democracy in the first place. A range of measurement issues should thereafter be 
addressed. In general, as Munck and Verkuilen (2002) pointed out, researchers have 
not paid enough attention to the problems of conceptualisation and measurement of 
democracy. Even worse, in the case of democratic performance across diverse 
dimensions, there has been sparse attention paid to these issues. Responding to this, 
this inquiry provides, first, a multidimensional framework for democratic performance 
based on a middle-range conception of democracy; second, it provides a new measure, 
the Democratic Performance Index (DPI), as a product of this framework. In other 
words, the DPI is the outcome of the conceptual and empirical critique of the existing 
measures of democracy, or more specifically, the Democracy Barometer (DB). 
The next section discusses how to conceptualise democratic performance. The 
different levels of conception, principles, and dimensions of democracy are illuminated. 
A consolidated framework to evaluate democratic performance is then presented. The 
subsequent section focusses on several measurement issues, such as selection of 
indicators, validity, and aggregation. In doing so, this chapter presents the DPI as 
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having the eight dimensions of democratic performance: individual liberties, rule of 
law, public sphere, transparency, participation, representation, competition, and mutual 
constraints. This index covers 30 core democracies and 39 non-core democracies over 
the period from 1990 to 2012 (see Appendix 1 for a list of the countries). We also show 
the potential of the DPI for descriptive and statistical analyses in the next section. The 
final section provides discussions on the remaining issues and implications of this work. 
 
Reconceptualising democratic performance 
In this section, some fundamental issues about the conceptualisation of democratic 
performance are discussed. First, this section addresses whether or not a widely used 
conception of democracy, which is a minimalist one, is appropriate for the aim of this 
article, and several attempts at a middle-range conception of democracy are reviewed. 
Second, the linkage between the concepts, principles, and dimensions of democracy is 
discussed to present a coherent account of the relations between the three different 
levels. Last, in accordance with the concept and principles identified, the appropriate 
dimensions of democratic performance are extracted from the previous studies on 
democracy. Consequently, a new conceptual framework based on multiple dimensions 
is presented to discern the multifaceted characteristics of existing democracies. 
 
A middle road 
Every endeavour to assess democratic performance is, explicitly or implicitly, based on 
a specific conception of democracy. All the definitions of democracy can be situated at 
both ends of the spectrum—from a minimalist conception to a maximalist conception, 
or somewhere in between. Yet, minimalist concepts of democracy have achieved a 
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dominant position in the empirical study of democracy so far (Munck and Verkuilen 
2002, 28). One prominent proponent of the minimalist approach is Adam Przeworski, 
who advocated ‘a “minimalist”, Schumpeterian, conception of democracy, by 
minimalist, Popperian, standards’ (Przeworski 1999, 23). By contrast, Dworkin (2006, 
134) claimed that ‘democracy is a substantive, not a merely procedural, ideal’, which 
is close to the maximalist approach. 
In a broad sense, Munck and Verkuilen (2002, 9) pointed out problems with both 
tendencies: Minimalist definitions of democracy are likely to omit the relevant 
attributes of democracy, while maximalist definitions that have too many attributes are 
accompanied by ‘no empirical referents’ or ‘little analytical use’. With the minimalist 
conception of democracy, for example, it is hardly possible to identify distinctions 
amongst established democracies because minimum requirements for democracy are 
supposed to be fulfilled in every established democracy. Coppedge (2002, 36) also 
pointed out that ‘minimalist definitions provide us with no standard for distinguishing 
the more democratic cases from the less democratic ones’. Regarding the maximalist 
approach, on the other hand, Coppedge (2002, 37) claimed that ‘one should not go 
further into the territory of social and economic democracy and collective citizenship 
rights, which in my opinion would cross the line into maximalism’. For instance, an 
egalitarian conception of democracy regards the distribution of economic resources as 
an important component. In this case, the impact of economic inequality on democracy 
cannot be explored. 
It is therefore necessary to avoid both extremes in conceptualising democracy if 
we are not just interested in either regime stability or political and socioeconomic 
outcomes that are claimed to be part of democracy. This in-between approach is 
indispensable for investigating fine distinctions amongst established democracies in 
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terms of democratic performance.3 There have recently been several attempts to avoid 
both poles, pursuing a middle-range conception of democracy (e.g., Bühlmann et al. 
2012; Diamond, Green, and Gallery 2016; Lauth 2015; Munck 2016). 
To begin with, Diamond, Green, and Gallery (2016, 49) advocated ‘a middle way’ 
in terms of conceptualisation and aggregation, but they just rearranged the components 
and indicators of the existing democracy indices,4 proposing the three dimensions: 
political and electoral rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law (and the functioning of 
government) (Diamond, Green, and Gallery 2016, 63–4). Although they aimed to reach 
a middle-range conception of democracy, the dimensions identified are not 
significantly different from those of a minimalist conception of democracy. 
Next, Lauth (2015) provided a conceptual framework for assessing democratic 
performance. This framework has three principles of democracy and five dimensions 
that are institutions of the democratic process. His approach is distinctively different 
from others in the sense that the dimensions are based on functionality, not attributes; 
however, the relevance of the functional dimensions has never been scrutinised. 
Moreover, the 15-field matrix of democracy, produced by the product of the three 
principles and the five dimensions, was tested in a few case studies conducted by Lauth 
(2015); each field was measured on ordinal scales, but only a few comparable data are 
available. Thus, this matrix is not appropriate for cross-national comparative studies. 
Munck (2016) also offered democratic standards for evaluating a polity that are 
beyond the dimensions of a minimal definition of democracy: government decision-
                                           
3 However, it might not be feasible to reach a consensus on a certain conception of democracy. 
Coppedge et al. (2011, 248) also pointed out that ‘the goal of arriving at a single universally 
accepted measure of democracy is, in some very basic sense, impossible’. Moreover, how narrowly 
or broadly democracy should be conceptualised depends primarily on the purpose of research. 
4 The indices used are the Freedom House, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy 
Index, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), and Polity IV. 
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making and the social environment of politics;5 however, this reconceptualisation has 
yet to proceed to the phase of measurement. Last, unlike the above attempts, Bühlmann 
et al. (2012) provided both a middle-range definition of democracy that incorporates a 
wide range of dimensions and the corresponding measurement, thereby creating the 
DB. On that account, this measure becomes a benchmark on which the DPI builds. 
 
The link between concepts, principles, and dimensions 
To recapitulate, this study introduces a middle-range concept of democracy that avoids 
both the minimalist and maximalist approaches and that is thick enough to capture 
subtle differences of democratic performance amongst established democracies. From 
this point of view, a procedural or electoral component of democracy is not considered 
to be sufficient, and political and socioeconomic outcomes cannot be incorporated into 
the dimensions of democratic performance. The next step is to discuss the relationships 
amongst concepts, principles, and dimensions of democracy for a coherent theoretical 
framework of democratic performance. 
Table 1 summarises the widely used concepts of democracy in recent decades, 
including their principles and dimensions. As discussed above, we can see a broad 
spectrum of concepts between a minimalist and a maximalist one. Unlike other authors’ 
concepts of democracy, Coppedge et al. (2011) offered six different concepts of 
democracy ranging from a minimalist one to a maximalist one: electoral, liberal, 
majoritarian, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian democracy.6 
                                           
5 Most elements of these components are captured in the dimensions of the DB. 
6  They used electoral democracy as a baseline concept of democracy for other concepts of 
democracy that are based on a combination of the electoral democracy and a different component 
of democracy. Additionally, Coppedge et al. (2015b) identified another concept of democracy: 
consensual democracy. 
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Table 1. Concepts, Principles, and Dimensions of Democracy 
Author Concepts  Principles Dimensions 
Altman and Pérez-Liňán 
(2002) 
Polyarchy None Civil rights, Participation, Competition 
Arat (1991) Political democracy Control 
Participation, Inclusiveness, 
Competitiveness, Civil liberties 
Beetham et al. (2008) Political democracy 
Freedom 
Equality 
Control 
Participation, Authorisation, 
Representation, Accountability, 
Transparency, Responsiveness, Solidarity 
Bühlmann et al. (2012) 
Liberal and participatory 
democracy (a middle-range 
concept of democracy) 
Freedom 
Equality 
Control 
Individual liberties, Rule of law, Public 
sphere, Competition, Mutual constraints, 
Governmental capability, Transparency, 
Participation, Representation 
Coppedge, Alvarez, and 
Maldonado (2008) 
Polyarchy None Contestation, Inclusiveness 
Coppedge et al. (2011)a 
Electoral democracy 
Liberal democracy 
Majoritarian democracy 
Participatory democracy 
Deliberative democracy 
Egalitarian democracy 
None 
Competition, Horizontal accountability, 
Vertical accountability, Individual rights, 
Civil liberties, Transparency, Participation, 
Representation, Deliberation, Social rights 
Diamond and Morlino 
(2004) 
Ideal democracy 
Freedom 
Equality 
Control 
Rule of law, Participation, Competition, 
Vertical accountability, Horizontal 
accountability, Political and civil rights, 
Social rights, Responsiveness 
Diamond, Green, and 
Gallery (2016) 
A middle way concept of 
democracy 
None 
Political and electoral rights, Civil liberties, 
Rule of law (and the functioning of 
government) 
Foweraker and Krznaric 
(2000, 2001) 
Liberal democratic 
performance 
Freedom 
Equality 
Accountability, Representation, Constraint, 
Participation, Political rights, Civil rights, 
Property rights, Minority rights 
Freedom House (2015) 
Electoral democracy 
Liberal democracy 
Freedom Political rights, Civil liberties 
Hadenius (1992) Political democracy 
Freedom 
Equality 
Control 
Election, Political freedoms 
Lauth (2015) 
(Expanded) procedural 
democracy 
Freedom 
Equality 
Control 
Procedures of decision, Regulation of the 
intermediate sphere, Public 
communication, Guarantee of rights, Rules 
settlement and implementationb 
Levine and Molina 
(2011a, 2011b) 
Procedural democracy None 
Electoral decision, Participation, 
Accountability, Responsiveness, 
Sovereignty 
Marshall, Gurr, and 
Jaggers (2014) 
Institutionalised democracy None 
Executive recruitment, Executive 
constraints, Political competition, (Civil 
libertiesc) 
Munck (2016) 
A contextualised procedural 
concept of democracy 
Freedom 
Equality 
Access to government offices, 
Government decision-making, The social 
environment of politics 
Vanhanen (2003) Electoral democracy None Competition, Participation 
Notes: a Each concept of democracy has its own dimensions of democracy, but in this table, these dimensions were 
just lumped together; principles that are equivalent to ones in other authors were not presented. b These five 
dimensions are the central institutions of the democratic process, and they are combined with democratic principles, 
thus resulting in a matrix of fifteen fields. c Coded data on civil liberties are not included in the dataset.  
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Regarding the concepts of democracy, as shown in Table 1, there are two distinct 
features relating to the principles and dimensions of democracy. One is that the 
concepts of democracy based on polyarchy or other minimalist definitions of 
democracy do not explicitly present their democratic principles (Altman and Pérez- 
Liňán 2002; Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado 2008; Levine and Molina 2011a, 
2011b; Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014; Vanhanen 2003); this point is discussed later 
in this paper. The other is that a minimalist concept of democracy tends to have fewer 
dimensions than a non-minimalist concept of democracy. It is readily interpretable by 
recalling that a thin and focussed concept of democracy does not contain diverse facets 
of democracy. 
As to the principles of democracy, as can be seen in Table 1, the most commonly 
derived principles from democratic theories are freedom, equality, and control. For 
instance, Diamond and Morlino (2004, 21), whose conceptualisation is close to the 
maximalist approach, argued that the three main goals of an ideal democracy are 
‘political and civil freedom, popular sovereignty (control over public policies and the 
officials who make them), and political equality (in these rights and powers)’. Beetham 
(1999, 5) also highlighted that ‘popular control and political equality are the core 
principles of democracy’, and Beetham et al. (2008, 21) contended that ‘popular 
liberties have been recognized as integral to the democratic principles’. Furthermore, 
Bühlmann et al. (2012) and Lauth (2015) explicitly considered freedom, equality, and 
control as the core principles of democracy.7 To summarise, amongst the middle-range 
or thick concepts of democracy, there is a strong consensus that the key principles of 
democracy are freedom, equality, and control. 
                                           
7 Munck (2016, 5) highlighted that ‘two proposals—those by Lauth and by Bühlmann et al.—are 
explicitly articulated in light of fundamental theoretical principles of democracy’. 
19 
 
A remaining question is whether a minimalist concept of democracy is also based 
on these principles. In many cases, as noted above, they do not explicitly appear in the 
literature, but it does not lead to the conclusion that democratic principles are irrelevant 
to the minimalist conception of democracy. From a theoretical perspective, Kelsen 
(1955, 18), who focussed on a procedural feature of democracy, claimed that ‘freedom 
and equality are the fundamental ideas of democracy’,8 but he did not overlook the 
importance of ‘a permanent control of the government through the democratic process’ 
(Kelsen 1955, 74). Arat (1991), more fundamentally, argued that popular control of 
power is the most important principle of modern democracy. This interpretation 
corresponds to the original meaning of democracy—from the Greek word 
demokratia—that is widely construed as ‘rule by the people’.9 Hadenius (1992, 9), 
who supports the minimalist approach, also formulated a concept of democracy with 
the three principles as follows: ‘Public policy is to be governed by the freely expressed 
will of the people whereby all individuals are to be treated as equals’. There is no doubt 
that any minimalist definitions of democracy are based on, at least, the core elements 
of the three democratic principles: free election, voting equality, and any form of 
popular control. 
Figure 1 summarises the discussion above: First, regardless of the level of 
conception of democracy, freedom, equality, and control are the core democratic 
principles; second, the thicker a concept of democracy, the more extensive dimensions 
it has. This reasoning provides a coherent framework to further the conceptualisation 
                                           
8 Like many other democratic theorists, Munck (2016) also conceived of democracy as a synthesis 
of political freedom and political equality. 
9 However, Ober (2008, 7) interpreted demokratia in a different manner: ‘a demos’ collective 
capacity to do things in the public realm, [and] to make things happen’; he also highlighted that 
democracy is more than ‘just a matter of control of a public realm’. 
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of democracy, and it can be used as a tool to assess existing studies on conceptualisation. 
From this perspective, for example, Bühlmann et al.’s (2012, 521) strategy, which 
deduces nine dimensions directly from the three core principles of democracy, might 
be problematic because the range of dimensions is determined by how broadly 
democracy is conceptualised rather than the democratic principles themselves. 
Although the relevance of the dimensions and their components should be considered 
in accordance with the democratic principles, this is not the same as deducting the 
dimensions from the principles of democracy. 
 
 
Figure 1. Concepts, principles, and dimensions of democracy. 
 
Dimensions of democratic performance 
Regarding the conceptualisation of democracy, Mazzuca (2010, 344) pointed out that 
many attributes or dimensions have been added ‘without any justification other than 
the intuitive correspondence with institutional features that have a positive normative 
value’. Munck (2016, 2) also argued that ‘most conceptualizations are rather ad hoc—
offering a weak rationale for the inclusion and exclusion of conceptual attributes—and 
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even incoherent’. Hence, when introducing a dimension of democratic performance, 
we need to be wary of including a dimension that is extraneous to the democratic 
principles. 
Consequences or causes of democracy should also be excluded from the 
dimensions of democracy; this is self-evident, at least, if we do not follow a maximalist 
approach. For example, Campbell (2008) constructed the Democracy Ranking index 
by mixing a political dimension with broad societal performance dimensions: gender, 
economy, knowledge, health, and environment. On top of this, more caution is needed 
when we include dimensions relating to governance in order not to ‘wind up judging 
democracy partly on the basis of performance criteria that often have little or nothing 
to do with “democraticness”’ (Plattner 2004, 108). Munck (2016, 1) also contended 
that ‘the clearest thinking distinguishes the concepts of governance and quality of 
government from that of democracy’. That is, effective governance should be 
distinguished from democraticness. 
To reduce the risk of an ad hoc approach, it is worth extracting the dimensions that 
have commonly emerged in the literature. This is a method of triangulation, in a less 
strict sense, since, at least, two or three authors agree with the existence of a certain 
dimension. To begin with, Table 1 shows a variety of dimensions of democracy. 
Amongst them, the most common dimensions are contestation (or competition) and 
inclusiveness (or participation). These two dimensions are consistently fundamental to 
the most widely used democracy measures from 1950 to 2000 (Coppedge, Alvarez, and 
Maldonado 2008), and they are firmly based on a democratic theory, Dahl’s polyarchy 
(Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado 2008, 633). Furthermore, Diamond and Morlino 
(2005, xl) affirmed that ‘the most important general finding that emerges from the case 
studies is that competition and participation are engines of democratic quality’. 
22 
 
Accordingly, competition and participation are considered as the very basic dimensions 
corresponding to a minimalist concept of democracy. 
Beyond the two dimensions, recently, there have been several endeavours to 
encompass more dimensions of democracy, as shown in Table 2. From the simple 
content analysis, the 10 dimensions that appear more than once in the literature have 
been identified and listed in the table.10 One thing to note is that the dimension of 
accountability that frequently appears in the literature has not been directly reflected in 
the table. There are two reasons for this: First, the term accountability does not have a 
well-defined meaning, and thus numerous different types or conceptions of 
accountability encompassing other dimensions exist; second, some specific 
components of accountability have already been incorporated in the dimensions of 
competition or mutual constraints.11 Amongst the dimensions in Table 2, however, 
responsiveness and social rights were excluded from the DPI since these are closely 
linked to political or socioeconomic outcomes that are relevant to a maximalist 
approach, as discussed above. Democratic responsiveness is ‘doing what the citizens 
want’ (Powell 2005, 74), and it is a political outcome dimension (Diamond and Morlino 
2005). Social rights are a socioeconomic outcome dimension in which a long list of 
egalitarian policy goals is involved (Diamond and Morlino 2005, xxviii).   
                                           
10 The dimensions that are unique to an author are as follows: governmental capability (Bühlmann 
et al. 2012), authorisation (Beetham et al. 2008), solidarity (Beetham et al. 2008), deliberation 
(Coppedge et al. 2011), and sovereignty (Levine and Molina 2011a, 2011b). On the other hand, 
Munck (2016, 5) listed recurring dimensions indicating the influence of some democratic theorists, 
such as Dahl and O’Donnell: competition, participation, civil rights, responsiveness, vertical and 
horizontal accountability, and the rule of law. 
11 The vertical control of the government (a part of vertical accountability) is implemented through 
competitive elections, and the horizontal and institutional control of the government (a part of 
horizontal accountability) is exerted by mutual constraints of constitutional powers (Bühlmann et 
al. 2012, 524–5). 
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Table 2. Distilling the Dimensions of the DPI 
Author 
Individual 
Liberties 
Rule of Law Public Sphere Transparency Participation Representation Competition 
Mutual 
Constraints 
Responsiveness 
Social 
Rights 
Beetham et al. (2008) 
 
          
Bühlmann et al. (2012) 
           
Coppedge et al. (2011) 
  
         
Diamond and Morlino 
(2004)    
       
Diamond, Green, and 
Gallery (2016)    
       
Foweraker and Krznaric 
(2000, 2001)  
         
Lauth (2015) 
 
          
Levine and Molina 
(2011a, 2011b) 
          
Munck (2016) 
 
          
Note: The basic concepts of the dimensions of democracy defined by Bühlmann et al. (2012) were employed as a benchmark against which other similar dimensions of democracy can be judged. 
The shaded dimensions belong to the DPI. 
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Table 3. The Contents of the Eight Dimensions of the DPI  
Dimension Component Subcomponent 
Individual 
Liberties 
• right to physical integrity 
• constitutional provisions guaranteeing physical integrity 
• no transgressions by the state 
• mutual acceptance of right to physical integrity by citizens 
• right to free conduct of life 
• constitutional provisions guaranteeing right to freedom of conduct of life 
(religion and movement) 
• freedom of conduct of life (religion and movement) 
• effective property rights 
Rule of Law 
• equality before the law 
• constitutional provisions for impartial courts 
• effective impartiality of the legal system 
• quality of the legal system 
• constitutional provisions for judicial professionalism 
• confidence in the justice system 
• confidence in the police 
• effective independence of the judiciary 
Public Sphere 
• freedom to associate 
• constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom to associate 
• degree of association (economic interests) 
• degree of association (public interests) 
• freedom of opinion 
• constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of speech 
• media offer 
• political neutrality of press system 
Transparency 
• no secrecy 
• disclosure of party financing 
• political corruption (public sector, executive, legislative, and judicial) 
• provision for transparent 
political process 
• freedom of information 
• informational openness 
• willingness for transparent communication 
Participation 
• equality of participation 
• suffrage 
• non-selectivity of electoral participation 
• non-selectivity of alternative participation 
• effective participation 
• constitutional provisions for direct democracy 
• rules facilitating participation 
• effective non-institutionalised participation 
Representation 
• substantive representation  
• structural possibilities for inclusion of preferences 
• no distortion (disproportionality between vote and seat distributions and 
congruence between political positions among voters and party 
positions) 
• descriptive representation 
• no legal constraints for inclusion of minorities 
• political power distribution across social groups, gender, 
socioeconomic position 
Competition 
• competitiveness of elections 
• formal rules for competitiveness 
• closeness of electoral outcomes 
• low concentration of seats 
• openness of elections 
• low legal hurdles for entry 
• effective contestation 
• effective access to resources 
Mutual 
Constraints 
• checks between three powers 
• balance of checks between executive and legislative powers 
• balance between executive and legislative powers 
• judicial review 
• vertical checks of power: 
• degree of federalism 
• subnational fiscal autonomy 
Note: The basic concepts of the dimensions and their components and subcomponents defined by Bühlmann et al. 
(2012) were used in building the DPI; several subcomponents of the DB were modified according to the discussions 
in this chapter, however. 
 
Table 3 presents a list of components and subcomponents of the eight dimensions 
of the DPI. The basic concepts of the eight dimensions and their key elements of the 
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DPI follow Bühlmann et al.’s (2012) approach. Since there is not enough room to 
elaborate each dimension and its contents, we refer to Bühlmann et al.’s (2012, 523‒6) 
for a short description of the dimensions and their components of the DPI. In building 
the DPI, apart from the methods of standardisation and aggregation as well as the 
rearrangements or modifications of several subcomponents, which will be discussed in 
the following sections, most of the indicators in the DPI came from the DB. A full 
description of all the indicators can be found in the codebook of the DB (Merkel et al. 
2014a) or the V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015c) for the variables in Appendix 2. 
 
Table 4. The Relation Between Principles and Dimensions of Democracy 
 
The DB 
 
The DPI 
Freedom Equality Control Freedom Equality Control 
Individual 
Liberties 
right to physical 
integrity / 
right to free 
conduct of life 
  
right to physical 
integrity / 
right to free 
conduct of life 
  
Rule of Law 
equality before 
the law / 
quality of the 
legal system 
  
 
 
 
 
equality before 
the law 
quality of the 
legal system 
Public Sphere 
freedom to 
associate / 
freedom of 
opinion 
  
freedom to 
associate / 
freedom of 
opinion 
  
Transparency 
 
 
 
 
no secrecy / 
provisions for 
transparent 
political process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
no secrecy / 
provisions for 
transparent 
political process 
Participation 
 
 
 
 
equality of 
participation / 
effective 
participation 
 
 
 
 
 
equality of 
participation / 
effective 
participation 
 
Representation 
 
 
 
 
substantive 
representation / 
descriptive 
representation 
 
 
 
 
 
substantive 
representation / 
descriptive 
representation 
 
Competition 
 
 
 
 
 
competitiveness 
of elections / 
openness of 
elections 
 
 
 
 
 
competitiveness 
of elections / 
openness of 
elections 
Mutual 
Constraints 
 
 
 
 
 
checks between 
three powers / 
vertical checks of 
power 
 
 
 
 
 
checks between 
three powers / 
vertical checks of 
power 
Governmental 
Capability 
 
 
 
 
 
government 
resources / 
efficient 
implementation 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: The subcomponents of each component of the DPI are listed in Table 3. The codebook of the DB (Merkel et 
al. 2014a) provides a detailed description of each component and its subcomponents and indicators of the DB. 
26 
 
 
The eight dimensions of the DPI are also illustrated in Table 4, which shows the 
differences between the DB and the DPI in terms of how the democratic principles 
relate to the democratic dimensions. The main purpose of the table is to show that the 
relations between the dimensions and the principles of the DB are not supported from 
the conceptual perspective. In the DPI, the range of dimensions is determined by the 
level of the conception of democracy, as discussed earlier, while the dimensions of the 
DB are directly derived from the democratic principles. Each dimension of the DB is 
thus connected to only one principle, but each dimension is not necessarily relevant to 
only one of the principles, like in the DPI, if we dismiss the deductive way of thinking 
and focus on the conceptual closeness between the dimensions or their components and 
the principles of democracy. 
More specifically, the DPI is conceptually different from the DB in three main ways. 
First, regarding the rule of law, in principle, it is relevant to all three principles of 
democracy (Diamond and Morlino 2005, xv; Lauth 2015, 19; O’Donnell 2004, 32). 
Particularly, equality before the law, which is a component of the rule of law dimension, 
is closely associated with the principle of equality, not freedom. Lauth (2015, 9) also 
stressed that the principle of equality includes equality before the law (legal equality). 
The other component of the rule of law dimension, the quality of the legal system 
including an independent justice system, can be regarded as a condition for the 
principle of control rather than freedom. 
Second, as for the dimension of transparency, both of its components are more 
likely to be part of the principle of control rather than equality. The subcomponents of 
the transparency dimension are disclosure of party financing, absence of corruption, 
freedom of information, informational openness, and transparent communication; as 
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Lauth (2015, 9) pointed out, these are considered as basic conditions for controlling the 
democratic political process. 
Third, the DPI does not have the dimension of governmental capability since it is 
judged to be an extraneous dimension for democratic performance. In the DB, its first 
component, government resources, is comprised of time horizon, public support, and 
governmental stability; however, these are not exclusively relevant to a democratic 
polity. The second component, ‘conditions for efficient implementation’, also has 
nothing to do with democraticness. Particularly, one of its subcomponents, ‘no anti-
government action’, is not congruent with the other two subcomponents (non-
selectivity of alternative participation and effective non-institutionalised participation) 
of the participation dimension, in which participating in legitimate demonstrations is 
considered as a part of democratic practice. Furthermore, another subcomponent, 
‘independence of central bank’, is problematic because ‘the literature does not establish 
that more independence is necessarily better than less’ (Debelle and Fischer 1994, 196). 
 
Measuring democratic performance 
Apart from how to conceptualise democracy, Munck and Verkuilen (2002, 15–27) 
detailed a variety of issues about measuring democracy (e.g., the selection of indicators 
and measurement level, validity, reliability, and replicability) and how to aggregate 
them. They concluded that existing indices of democracy, such as the Freedom House 
and Polity IV, have not addressed the challenges of measurement and aggregation well. 
Meanwhile, Bühlmann et al. (2012, 520) claimed that the DB was designed to meet 
these challenges and that it overcame the drawbacks of prior indices of democracy. 
However, as discussed in the previous section, the conceptualisation of the DB has 
some shortcomings. The DPI has thus been proposed. 
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In this section, the measurement issues of the DB are discussed, and remedies for 
the problems identified are suggested to construct the DPI. First, the domain of 
democratic performance is defined. Second, how to choose appropriate indicators is 
addressed. Third, an alternative method that can manage the aggregation of categorical 
indicators is introduced. Fourth, the measurement validity of the DB is scrutinised, and 
some elements of the DB are corrected to formulate the DPI. Last, aggregation and 
multidimensionality issues are discussed. 
 
Domain of democratic performance 
There is an important issue of the reference or domain of democratic performance that 
should be clarified. On the one hand, several scholars argued that what makes 
democracy possible should be distinguished from what makes democracy more 
democratic (Altman and Pérez-Liñán 2002; Diamond and Morlino 2004; Levine and 
Molina 2011a, 2011b; Mazzuca 2010). On the other hand, Munck (2016, 2) claimed 
that there is ‘one single overarching concept—quality of democracy is equated to 
democracy—seen as applicable to all countries’. The former approach can be called a 
separated one, while the latter is an integrated or unified approach, on which Bühlmann 
et al. (2012), Coppedge et al. (2011), and Lauth (2015) are based. 
This contrast has much in common with the controversy surrounding dichotomous 
versus continuous measures of democracy. Bollen and Jackman (1989, 618), who are 
strong advocates of the continuous approach, contended that ‘democracy is always a 
matter of degree’. This inquiry also follows the integrated approach to democratic 
performance. Yet, this point does not really matter insofar as whether or where to draw 
a line between democracies and non-democracies is not involved. To put it differently, 
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if the domain of democratic performance is restricted to widely recognised existing 
democracies, in practice, there is no point in differentiating between the two approaches. 
One thing to note is that the DB relies on the existing democracy indices to distinguish 
established (core) democracies from non-established (non-core) ones (see Appendix 
1).12 
 
Selection of indicators 
Regarding the selection of indicators, Munck and Verkuilen (2002, 15) highlighted the 
importance of using multiple indicators for a conceptual dimension to avoid potential 
biases or measurement errors associated with single indicators. It is therefore necessary 
to be wary of systematic biases if we use single indicators, and each measure should be 
cross-checked, using multiple sources. For instance, in Foweraker’s Liberal 
Democratic Performance and Vanhanen’s Polyarchy Index of Democracy (see also 
Table 5), each dimension draws simply on a single indicator; by contrast, the 
dimensions, components, and subcomponents of the DB consist of multiple measures. 
Additionally, in the DB, not only the existence of formal or constitutional provisions 
(de jure aspects) but also their actual performance (de facto aspects) is considered in 
selecting indicators to avoid institutional fallacies. 
                                           
12 Arbitrary or ad hoc judgements exist in a dividing line between established democracies and 
non-established ones. For example, Blake and Martin (2006) called a democracy a consolidated one 
if the Political Rights (PR) score of a country in the Freedom House is 2 or below and has lasted 
for 20 continuous years. Henisz and Mansfield (2006) imposed the following criteria on a stable 
democracy: A combined Polity IV score is 7 or above, a combined average Freedom House score 
is less than 3, and these scores have been maintained for the past five years. For the DB, Merkel et 
al. (2014b, 6) identified a country as an established democracy if it has a combined average Freedom 
House score of 1.5 or below and a Polity IV score of 9 or above over the 1995–2005 period; this 
study follows these criteria for practical reasons when it refers to the domain of established 
democracies. 
30 
 
In relation to this, there is another issue about whether or not objective indicators 
are better than subjective ones. For example, the DB is constructed using objective 
indicators (official statistics or representative surveys), excluding subjective ones 
(expert assessments); on the other hand, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) employs 
both subjective and objective indicators but adopts a multiple-rater system to guarantee 
high-quality subjective indicators. In fact, the contrast between subjective and objective 
indicators should not be overstated, as Munck and Verkuilen (2002, 16) argued, because 
the selection of objective indicators itself cannot avoid subjective judgments. That is, 
there is no way to remove subjective judgements completely. 
In this respect, the Vanhanen’s democracy index and the DB, which rely entirely 
on objective indicators, are also not immune from the issue of subjectivity, although 
they claim that they have overcome the problem of subjective assessments. On the other 
hand, drawing solely on objective measures can even become a disadvantage because, 
according to Bollen (1993, 1210), subjective measures have the potential to capture 
key traits of democracy that objective measures are likely to miss.13 In sum, the DB 
has significant strengths in terms of the construction of the measures at each level, but 
it could not make the most of reliable subjective indicators that may offer more diverse 
and abundant information. In the DPI, however, some indicators based on expert 
assessments have been employed to capture more comprehensive pictures.14 
 
How to handle categorical indicators 
                                           
13 In case of repressive practices, for example, they do not tend to be objectively recorded, while 
expert assessments are more likely to detect them (Bollen 1993, 1210). 
14 In Appendix 2, all the variables of the DPI, except ones for constitutional provisions of direct 
democratic institutions, are based on expert assessments. 
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In practice, when categorical indicators, which mostly relate to institutional conditions, 
are simply normalised even if the problematic issue discussed in Appendix 3 does not 
exist,15 the fewer categories they have, the more weight their minimum values lose, 
and the more weight their maximum values gain. For example, it remains doubtful 
whether or not the minimum in a three-category variable is comparable to the minimum 
in a six-category variable because, in the three-category variable, the minimum is a 
generic negative response to the question, while the minimum in the six-category 
variable is a highly negative response to the question. That is, if categorical indicators 
with different numbers of categories are normalised, their minimum or maximum 
values are treated as being the same even though their latent values are not likely to be 
equivalent. 
More fundamentally, a question remains as to whether each ordinal or dichotomous 
value can be transformed into a continuous score. In principle, assigning a continuous 
value to a category by linear interpolation is not an excellent strategy since—as Stevens 
(1946, 679) stated, ‘The linearity of an ordinal scale is precisely the property which is 
open to question’. In a strict sense, an ordinal or dichotomous scale cannot be simply 
treated as an interval scale. Accordingly, as in the DB, calculating an arithmetic mean 
between the normalised scores of categorical indicators that have different categories 
seems to be problematic. 
Alternatively, categorical indicators can be appropriately aggregated by a latent 
trait (latent correlation) modelling, such as polychoric correlation models (Kolenikov 
and Angeles 2004, 2009), which can also deal with tetrachoric, biserial, and polyserial 
correlations. This polychoric method performs a principal component analysis based 
                                           
15 In this chapter, normalisation refers to min-max transformation, and standardisation indicates 
transformation in z-scores. 
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on a polychoric correlation matrix instead of a Pearson correlation matrix.16 In the DPI, 
all the categorical indicators were aggregated by using this method.17 
 
Improvement of content validity 
Next, we turn to the issue of measurement validity. Valid measurement basically means 
that indicators ‘meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the corresponding concept’ 
(Adcock and Collier 2001, 530). For assessing measurement validity, Adcock and 
Collier (2001, 538–43) provided a framework that has three types of measurement 
validation: content validity, convergent/discriminant validity, and 
nomological/construct validity. Amongst them, nomological/construct validation does 
not seem to be relevant to the assessment of the democratic performance measures since 
causal hypotheses are not well established in this domain of research. 
The content validity of the democratic performance measures, in terms of the 
relevance to the democratic principles, is examined in the previous section; Table 4 
presents the results. Additionally, at the subcomponent level, the five significant parts 
of the DB were modified to make the subcomponents of the DPI more relevant and 
representative. First, the subcomponent, ‘effective independence of the judiciary’, was 
relocated from the component, ‘equality before the law’, to the other component, 
‘quality of the legal system’. The functioning of an independent justice system is an 
                                           
16 The Polychoric PCA module for Stata conducts this analysis. 
17 In both the DB and the DPI, there are four subcomponents based on indicators that have different 
measurement scales: One is ordinal and the other is interval; their correlation is called polyserial. 
With these scales, item response theory (IRT) models, a type of latent trait modelling designed for 
categorical variables, cannot be employed. To use IRT models, it is necessary to convert an interval 
indicator into an ordinal one, losing some information. However, if we introduce the polychoric 
method that can deal with every combination of binary, ordinal, and interval indicators, we can 
produce continuous scores without losing any information. 
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essential condition for effective control over office holders rather than legal equality 
(Lauth 2015, 9). Moreover, judicial independence is vital to the idea of separation of 
powers, on which the dimension of mutual constraints under the principle of control is 
based. 
Second, the subcomponent, ‘absence of corruption’, was replaced by the political 
corruption index (v2x_corr) developed for the V-Dem (see Appendix 2). An indicator 
of the subcomponent, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), captures perceptions of 
the extent of corruption in the public sector, and the other indicator captures the risk of 
corruption between politics and business. Namely, this subcomponent partly reflects 
overall corruption. By contrast, the political corruption index of the V-Dem 
incorporates all aspects of corruption, including public sector, executive, legislative, 
and judicial corruption. Additionally, the CPI has been published since 1995, while the 
political corruption index covers a far more extended period. 
Third, the two indicators of the subcomponent, ‘effective institutionalised 
participation’, were removed. To begin with, voter turnout was excluded because 
‘turnout is conceptually distinct from liberal democracy’ (Bollen 1993, 1210). 18 
Furthermore, although low voter turnout may be, as Lijphart (1997) argued, closely 
related to unequal electoral participation, inequality in voter turnout in terms of 
education, income, gender, and age is properly captured in the subcomponent, ‘non-
selectivity of electoral participation’.19 Thus, voter turnout is neither a conceptually 
                                           
18 Bollen (1993, 1209) also claimed that ‘we cannot say that higher voter turnout means higher 
levels of liberal democracy’. Moreover, in this indicator, there is a systematic bias owing to 
compulsory voting regulations that some countries adopt. To reduce the bias, for instance, 
penalising countries with compulsory voting was introduced in the Economist Intelligent Unit (EIU) 
Democracy Index, but this type of correction is too arbitrary. Besides, it is argued that mandatory 
voting is not compatible with the liberal conception of democracy. 
19 If a voter turnout rate were 100%, there would be no voter turnout inequality; in a compulsory 
voting system, however, the voter turnout rate is around 90%, and its gaps between groups show 
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relevant indicator nor a better proxy for unequal participation. Next, the other indicator, 
‘effective use of direct democratic instruments’, was discarded. In principle, referenda 
that are a form of direct democracy have the potential to complement representative 
democracy, thus promoting democracy. In practice, however, these are an established 
institution that only a few countries frequently use. 20  Accordingly, it might be 
meaningful to compare the countries where referenda are rarely or never used with the 
countries where referenda are often used; otherwise, there is no point in introducing 
this indicator. Moreover, the number of national referenda per year does not reflect the 
level of democracy,21 as the frequency of referenda depends on political contexts that 
are extraneous to democratic performance. 
Fourth, the subcomponent, ‘constitutional provisions for direct democracy’, was 
relocated from the component, ‘substantive representation’, to the component, 
‘effective participation’, since the use of direct democracy is closely linked to 
enhancing political participation (Childers and Binder 2012; Tolbert, Bowen, and 
Donovan 2009). This subcomponent is also a counterpart to the subcomponent, ‘rules 
facilitating participation’, in that the former represents non-electoral participation de 
jure, while the latter represents electoral participation de jure. Moreover, one indicator 
of the subcomponent, ‘constitutional provisions for direct democracy’, which indicates 
the sum of the points for the existence of four direct democratic institutions, was 
                                           
significant variations, while turnout itself has slight variations. Accordingly, the turnout inequality 
measures are not greatly influenced by a systematic bias that a compulsory voting system produces 
in the turnout data. 
20 In the DB, amongst 70 countries, only four countries (Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Switzerland) 
have more than five observations of referenda during the period from 1990 to 2012, whereas 46 
countries never had referenda during the same time span.   
21 In this indicator, the logarithm of the number of referenda was used to reduce the effect of an 
additional referendum in the same country-year, but it does not change the essential point discussed 
above. 
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replaced by a new composite measure developed for the V-Dem, which is based on four 
categorical indicators relevant to direct popular votes; each indicator has one more 
category than each element of the previous indicator in the DB, thereby creating more 
distinction. 
Last, the two subcomponents, ‘adequate representation of women’ and ‘effective 
access to power for minorities’, were replaced by a new subcomponent, ‘political 
power distribution’, which is composed of the three indicators developed for the V-
Dem: ‘power distributed by social groups’, ‘power distributed by gender’, and ‘power 
distributed by socioeconomic position’. The aggregation of these indicators captures 
actual political representation more comprehensively than the combination of the 
subcomponents of the DB that focus on gender and ethnic minority groups. 
Furthermore, the considerable proportion of the observations in several indicators of 
the DB, which were substituted in constructing the DPI, was missing and thus imputed 
rather arbitrarily.22 
 
Convergent/discriminant validity 
With respect to measurement validity, the remaining work aims to test 
convergent/discriminant validity by looking at empirical associations between the 
measures of the dimensions. In general, correlations between a new measure and 
previously established measures were examined to test this (Adcock and Collier 2001, 
540). However, there are neither indicators that can be taken as a standard of reference 
                                           
22 For example, in the indicator of the DB, ‘proportion of female representatives in the government’, 
missing values constituted more than half of the data points, but they were simply imputed by values 
from the nearest year. Another indicator, ‘political discrimination of minority groups’, had missing 
values from 2007 to 2012 across all the countries, which were replaced by the values of 2006, and 
15 countries’ data were completely missing; rough estimates were assigned, however. 
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nor well-established indices for the dimensions of democratic performance identified 
in this study. 
For the sake of illustration, contestation and inclusiveness, which are the two 
persistent dimensions of democracy extracted from the widely used indices of 
democracy through a principal component analysis (Coppedge, Alvarez, and 
Maldonado 2008), can be compared to the competition and participation dimensions of 
the DPI. The analysis shows that they are moderately correlated (𝑟 = . 30 and .33, 
respectively).23 This result is within the range of expectation not only because their 
systematised concepts are not identical, but because Coppedge, Alvarez, and 
Maldonado’s (2008) dimensions are based on heterogeneous composite indices 
incorporating part of the other dimensions of the DPI, such as individual liberties and 
public sphere. 
In addition, it is worth looking at the correlations between the dimensions (see 
Appendix 6). To summarise, in both the DB and the DPI, the dimension of individual 
liberties shows relatively strong correlations with the other dimensions, while both the 
participation and competition dimensions are weakly correlated with the others, and 
the dimension of mutual constraints is hardly associated with the others. 
Notwithstanding a few strong correlations, overall associations between the dimensions 
appear to be weak or moderate, thus providing discriminant validity to some extent. 
More importantly, the three dimensions under the principle of control in the DB 
(competition, mutual constraints, and governmental capability) are not correlated to 
each other at all. This fact raises a serious question whether these dimensions can be 
                                           
23 The competition and participation dimensions of the DB are also moderately correlated with the 
contestation and inclusiveness measures (𝑟 = .28 and .36, respectively). 
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grouped into the principle because they should be, at least, interconnected to a certain 
degree if they represent the same principle. This evidence contradicts the deductive 
logic of the DB. Consequently, aggregating these dimensions into the principle of the 
DB cannot be empirically supported. 
This type of validity can also be explored at the component level. In the 
conventional guidelines for construct measurement, it is believed that within-construct 
correlations must be greater than between-construct correlations, and some scholars 
have argued that high within-construct correlations are desirable. By contrast, Briggs 
and Cheek (1986, 114) claimed that moderate inter-correlations (from .2 to .4) would 
be optimal. However, it has been demonstrated that within-construct correlations do 
not always exceed between-construct indicator correlations (Bollen and Lennox 1991, 
308–9). Bollen and Lennox (1991) conclude that high correlation is superior to 
moderate or low ones for effect indicators of a single latent variable, and that the 
magnitude and direction of correlations do not matter for causal indicators.24 In the 
DPI, the correlations between the components of each dimension are relatively 
moderate or strong (𝑟 = .21 to .57), except for the correlation between the components 
of mutual constraints (𝑟 = −.26) (see Appendix 7). From this analysis, we can assume 
that there is a trade-off between horizontal and vertical checks of power, which needs 
more discussion.25 
 
How to aggregate 
                                           
24 Bollen and Lennox (1991, 306) elucidated that a causal indicator is a term to describe the fact 
that the indicator determines a latent variable rather than attributing any other meanings to it; see 
also Bollen (1989, 222–3). 
25 The within-dimension correlations of the DB have another negative correlation in the dimension 
of representation (𝑟 = −.13), in addition to the dimension of mutual constraints (𝑟 = −.24). 
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Compared to other measurement issues, researchers have paid less attention to 
aggregation rules. Munck and Verkuilen (2002, 27) claimed that ‘the challenge of 
aggregation is undoubtedly a weak point of many existing democracy indices’. Treier 
and Jackman (2008) pointed out that ‘various indicators of democracy are combined in 
seemingly arbitrary ways, without any formal or explicit justification of the procedure’ 
(201) and argued that ‘there seems to be no settled method for aggregating indicators 
of democracy, or for evaluating justifications of these rules’ (202). Thus, the way in 
which the indicators, subcomponents, and components of the DPI are aggregated needs 
to be clarified here. 
Table 5 shows a range of aggregation rules of the six existing datasets.26 In the 
case of the DB, the aggregation procedure at each level of aggregation is explicit (see 
Merkel et al. 2014b, 10–1), but it is not free from arbitrariness. In the DPI, each 
subcomponent value is calculated by additive aggregation using the arithmetic means 
of the standardised indicators, except for the subcomponents that have dichotomous or 
ordinal indicators, whose scores are computed by the polychoric method. Basically, this 
is justified by the fact that each subcomponent uses multiple sources to avoid biases or 
errors embedded in single indicators; full compensability between different sources can 
therefore be assumed. The DB also conjectures full compensability at this level, but all 
the indicators of each subcomponent in the DB are indiscriminately averaged under the 
strong assumption that categorical indicators can be treated as interval ones.  
                                           
26  Additionally, the V-Dem offers various components of democracy that constitute different 
models of democracy, leaving room for a high level of aggregation or different ways of aggregation 
to researchers. Nevertheless, its aggregation rule provided for each model of democracy is based 
on a mix of addition and multiplication, and the rule for each component of democracy, except for 
the electoral component of democracy, is either an arithmetic mean or a Bayesian factor analysis 
(Coppedge et al. 2015c, 43–9). These aggregation methods are also not immune to arbitrariness. 
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Table 5. Aggregation Rules of the Existing Datasets on Democratic Performance 
Dataset Dimensions Measurement Level 
Aggregation Rule 
Country Year 
  Component Level          Dimension Level 
Arat (1991, 136–66) 
Participation 
Inclusiveness 
Competitiveness 
Civil liberties 
Ordinal 
Ratio 
Ordinal 
Interval 
Addition 
None 
Addition 
None 
Formula using 
multiplication, 
addition, and 
subtraction 
152 1948–1982 
Democracy Barometer 
Individual liberties 
Rule of law 
Public sphere 
Competition 
Mutual constraints 
Governmental capability 
Transparency 
Participation 
Representation 
Interval 
Interval 
Interval 
Interval 
Interval 
Interval 
Interval 
Interval 
Interval 
Geometric mean 
Geometric mean 
Geometric mean 
Geometric mean 
Geometric mean 
Geometric mean 
Geometric mean 
Geometric mean 
Geometric meana 
Geometric mean* 70 1990–2012 
Liberal Democratic Performance 
Accountability 
Representation 
Constraint 
Participation 
Political rights 
Civil rights 
Property rights 
Minority rights 
Ordinal 
Interval 
Ordinal 
Ratio 
Ordinal 
Ordinal, interval, ratio 
Ordinal 
Ordinal, ratio 
Noneb 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 40 1970–1998 
Freedom House 
Political rights 
Civil liberties 
Ordinal 
Ordinal 
Addition 
Addition 
Arithmetic mean 205 1972–2014 
Polity IV 
Executive recruitment 
Executive constraints 
Political competition 
Ordinal 
Ordinal 
Ordinal 
Code assignment 
None 
Code assignment 
Weighted additionc 162 1800–2014 
Polyarchy Index of Democracy 
Competition 
Participation 
Ratio 
Ratio 
None 
None 
Multiplication 187 1810–2000 
Notes: Cross-sectional or categorical (regime type) datasets were not included. a To be more exact, this is a variation of geometric mean, which was employed at the principle level as well. The 
formula reads as follows: [∏ (𝑋𝑡 + 500)
𝑛
𝑡=1 ]
1
𝑛 − 500 (Merkel et al. 2014b, 10). b Aggregation was not attempted even at the level of components. c Weighted addition for DEMOC and AUTOC 
is based on the component variables, not the dimensions.
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As to the aggregation rule for the components, the DB performs arithmetic 
averaging again, while the DPI introduces a different rule since each subcomponent 
represents a distinct aspect of their component. In the DPI, on the one hand, the 
subcomponents are grouped into de jure and de facto ones, which are not completely 
substitutable; on the other hand, the subcomponents of each component are not 
fundamentally different from each other, and thus a full non-compensatory logic cannot 
be applied. Alternatively, geometric aggregation, which is ‘an in-between solution’ 
between full compensability and full non-compensability (OECD 2008, 104), was 
employed, instead of additive aggregation based on full compensability. By the same 
token, this rule was also applied to the aggregation of components for the dimensions 
of democratic performance in the DPI. 
With the issue of aggregation, it is necessary to raise a question about the widely 
dispersed assumption that ‘it is appropriate and desirable to move up to the highest 
level of aggregation, that is, to a one-dimensional index’ (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 
27). In this paper, the aggregation process does not go beyond the dimension level. The 
following section explains the reason why the above assumption is not retained here. 
 
Multidimensionality 
There is a consensus amongst students of democracy that democracy is multifaceted or 
multidimensional, although there is no agreement about the conceptualisation of 
democracy, as discussed above. Regarding how to cope with multidimensionality of 
democracy, there are two distinct measurement strategies (Coppedge 2012, 29–30; 
Diamond, Green, and Gallery 2016, 48): One is to stop aggregating the distinguishable 
dimensions; the other is to proceed to create a summary measure of democracy, 
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combining all the dimensions. From the perspective of the former, Foweraker and 
Krznaric (2000, 780) claimed that component scores of dimensions should be kept ‘as 
separate as conceptual clarity will permit’. Bollen and Lennox (1991, 308) also argued 
that ‘if many facets mean many dimensions, then each dimension should be treated 
separately with its own set of effect indicators’. 
In fact, however, the two strategies discussed above should not necessarily be 
mutually exclusive. Each strategy has advantages and drawbacks, and which approach 
is appropriate depends heavily on a given research question. As in this inquiry, if we 
are interested in what is really going on within a democracy, it is useful to unfold the 
concept of democracy and look at each dimension (Gleditsch and Ward 1997, 381). 
This is mainly because we may lose information about systematic variations amongst 
the cases or underlying dimensionality when we proceed to a higher level of 
aggregation (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 22). In addition, this approach suffers less 
from the aggregation issue, which is fraught with many problems; we cannot see the 
forest for the trees, however, if we completely avoid all levels of aggregation. 
Well-developed measures for each dimension of democracy are also a prerequisite 
for an appropriate summary index of democracy, although constructing this summary 
measure requires a strong theory about how the dimensions of democracy are combined, 
from which a mathematical formula can be derived (Coppedge 2002, 37–8). In this 
regard, it appears that the dimensions of the DB are rather mechanically aggregated 
into the three principles of democracy. This aggregation has been shown to be doubtful, 
according to the reconceptualisation of the DPI, as can be seen in Table 4. Accordingly, 
the aggregate measure of democracy in the DB, using these principles of democracy, 
might also be problematic. On the other hand, the DPI’s reconceptualisation has yet to 
offer theoretical justification for aggregating the dimensions of democratic 
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performance. In principle, complete independence amongst the dimensions does not 
exist because each dimension is supposed to be derived from the same conception of 
democracy. However, it is challenging work to figure out how, exactly, they are 
interconnected. 
 
The potential of the DPI 
  
(a) Germany (b) Poland 
  
(c) Sweden (d) The United States 
Figure 2. Comparison of democratic performance between four countries across eight 
dimensions. Note: The graphs used the DPI dataset for Germany, Poland, Sweden, and 
the United States for the years 1992, 2002, and 2012. 
 
The different shapes of the democratic performance across countries and over time are 
clearly illustrated by the radar charts of Figure 2, in which the axes indicate the eight 
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dimensions of democracy. The four countries (Germany, Poland, Sweden, and the 
United States) were selected to represent each country group (Western Europe, Post-
communist Europe, Nordic countries, and Anglo-Saxon countries). In these countries 
for the same years, for instance, the Polity scores show the highest level of democracy, 
except for Poland in 1992, which implies that there is no distinction in terms of the 
level of democracy. As Figure 2 obviously illustrates, however, the levels of democratic 
performance and the main features in the dimensions of the DPI considerably differ 
across countries and over time. 
 
  
(a) Competition (b) Participation 
Figure 3. Time trends of the dimensions of competition and participation in four 
countries. Note: The graphs used the DPI dataset for Germany, Poland, Sweden, and 
the United States over the period 1990‒2012. 
 
Additionally, Figure 3 displays the developments of the competition and 
participation dimensions across the four countries between 1990 and 2012. To illustrate 
the variations over time, the two dimensions were chosen because these are central 
components to the quality of democracy (Diamond and Morlino 2005, xl). In the 
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dimension of competition, for example, the United States shows a far lower level of 
democratic performance than the other three countries; Sweden has a higher score of 
participation than the others. Overall, the DPI has the potential to serve as a tool for the 
cross-national and longitudinal comparisons of democratic performance. 
 
   
(a) (b) (c) 
   
(d) (e) (f) 
Figure 4. Correlations between democratic performance and socioeconomic variables. 
Notes: The graphs used the competition and participation dimensions of the DPI for 30 
core democracies over the period 1990–2012. Market Gini is the Gini coefficient before 
taxes and transfers. Absolute redistribution is the gap between market Gini and net Gini. 
Economic development is expressed as the logarithm of real GDP per capita. In the 
graphs (d), (e), and (f), observations in Hungary and South Africa were excluded as 
they are outliers. The shaded area around the regression line shows the 95% confidence 
interval.   
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We now consider how socioeconomic variables most commonly tied to democracy 
are correlated with the dimensions of competition and participation in the DPI. 
Regarding the socioeconomic variables, first, economic development is represented by 
the logarithm of real GDP per capita based on prices that are constant across countries 
and over time; the data were calculated by using the GDP data taken from the Penn 
World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015). Second, market Gini represents the 
Gini coefficient before taxes and transfers, and third, absolute redistribution is defined 
as the difference between market Gini and net Gini; the data were collected from the 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt 2016). 
Figure 4 depicts the different relationships between these variables: Market Gini 
has a strong negative link with both dimensions (𝑟 = −.34 and −.46, respectively); 
absolute redistribution is positively related to competition (𝑟 = .37), but it has no 
relationship with participation; and economic development is positively correlated with 
both dimensions (𝑟 = .15 and .33, respectively). 
We move one step further beyond the preceding correlation analysis to figure out 
what inferences we can draw from using the DPI as well as comparing the measure 
with other similar indices in empirical analyses. To this end, the three widely used 
variables above were employed as main independent variables in the panel data 
analysis, and time dummies were included in the fixed effects estimations of each panel 
to eliminate time-related shocks from the errors. In Panels A and B of Table 6, the 
competition and participation dimensions of the DPI are dependent variables. In Panels 
C and D of Table 6, for the sake of comparison, the participation function of the DB 
and the participatory component index (v2x_partip) of the V-Dem were employed as 
alternative dependent variables to the participation dimension of the DPI. In doing so, 
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we hope to show how the inferences depend on the measure of democracy examined; 
however, these tests should be treated with caution because this analysis is not a full-
scale study on causal factors for democratic performance. 
 
Table 6. Determinants of Competition and Participation 
 core non-core core non-core 
(1) fe (2) be (3) fe (4) be (1) fe (2) be (3) fe (4) be 
 Panel A: competition (DPI) Panel B: participation (DPI) 
market Gini -0.132 -0.694 0.610 0.228 -0.179 -0.275 -0.425 -0.177 
(0.207) (0.173)*** (0.237)** (0.142) (0.208) (0.141)* (0.175)** (0.101)* 
absolute 
redistribution 
-0.087 0.710 -0.064 0.193 -0.221 -0.017 0.441 0.188 
(0.222) (0.174)*** (0.314) (0.136) (0.513) (0.141) (0.215)** (0.135) 
economic 
development 
-0.095 -5.781 1.834 1.037 -6.861 3.112 -2.769 0.209 
(3.698) (2.393)** (1.990) (1.385) (4.189) (2.092) (1.528)* (1.331) 
time dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
R-squared 0.083 0.478 0.123 0.282 0.141 0.369 0.282 0.196 
observations 675 675 596 596 638 638 695 695 
countries 30 30 29 29 28 28 32 32 
 Panel C: participation (DB) Panel D: participation (V-Dem) 
market Gini -0.581 -0.426 -0.984 -0.363 0.276 -0.308 0.015 0.121 
(0.346) (0.336) (0.391)** (0.240) (0.290) (0.275) (0.276) (0.223) 
absolute 
redistribution 
0.390 0.038 0.957 0.309 -0.132 -0.070 -0.288 0.753 
(0.688) (0.337) (0.557)* (0.320) (0.317) (0.275) (0.516) (0.297)** 
economic 
development 
-9.228 6.641 -3.458 2.293 1.520 2.501 3.931 -0.620 
(4.286)** (5.003) (3.604) (3.143) (4.860) (4.090) (2.436) (2.923) 
time dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
R-squared 0.259 0.252 0.405 0.195 0.154 0.133 0.274 0.274 
observations 638 638 695 695 638 638 695 695 
countries 28 28 32 32 28 28 32 32 
Notes: In each panel, Columns (1) and (3) report fixed effects estimations with robust standard errors clustered by 
country in parentheses, and Columns (2) and (4) report between effects estimations with standard errors. The period 
fixed effects and constant terms are not reported. In the fixed effects estimations, R-squared (within) is reported; in 
the between effects estimations, R-squared (between) is reported. See Appendix 1 for a list of core and non-core 
democracies. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
The findings from Panels A and B indicate that the cross-sectional effects of market 
inequality, redistribution, and economic development on competition are significant in 
core democracies, while the within-country effects of the variables on participation are 
considerable in non-core democracies. The results from Panels B, C, and D for core 
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democracies show that the between-country effect of market inequality is significant 
only on the participation of the DPI and that the within-country effect of economic 
development is significant just on the participation of the DB. In brief, the effects of 
the variables significantly differ across the different measures of participation as well 
as the different dimensions of democracy. 
    
Figure 5. Comparison of country rakings between the DB and the DPI. Notes: As of 
2012, country rankings of the 28 core countries for each dimension were used; amongst 
the 30 core countries, Luxembourg and Malta were not included because of missing 
data in the above dimensions of the DPI. Countries located on the diagonal line have 
the same ranking in both the DB and the DPI. 
 
Additionally, the comparison of country rankings for each dimension illustrates 
considerable differences between the DB and the DPI. Notably, in the dimensions of 
participation, representation, and transparency, there exist large discrepancies in their 
rankings, as shown in Figure 5 (see also Appendix 5 for the other dimensions including 
transparency). For example, in the rankings of participation, Ireland is ranked 17th in 
the DB but 7th in the DPI, and the rankings of representation show that Czech Republic 
is ranked 24th in the DB but 11th in the DPI. These discrepancies are a product of 
different approaches or methods that the DPI employs, compared to those of the DB. If 
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we look at the transformed (normalised for the DB and standardised for the DPI) scores 
of each indicator before aggregating them, we can observe that the changes in the 
rankings depend heavily on whether to use min-max normalization, which permits 
comparisons in absolute terms, or standardisation in z-scores, which allows us to do 
relative comparisons. However, the normalisation process of the DB has serious 
drawbacks, and thus an alternative standardisation strategy was introduced for the DPI 
(see Appendix 3 for a more detailed explanation). 
Furthermore, there are three additional reasons why the DPI is a more valid 
measure than the DB. First, every dimension of the DPI employs a more well-suited 
aggregation tool dealing with categorical indicators and a more fitting aggregation rule 
in building both the components and dimensions of the DPI, as discussed and justified 
earlier. Second, the DPI has better content validity due to the rearrangement of some 
inconsistent components or subcomponents of the dimensions in the DB (rule of law, 
transparency, participation, and representation), as discussed. Third, in the dimensions 
of transparency, participation, and representation, the DPI uses the more relevant and 
comprehensive indicators developed for the V-Dem, as discussed, instead of several 
indicators from the DB (see Appendix 2). 
Taken together, the DPI can describe different shapes of democratic performance 
across advanced democracies as well as developing democracies. This new measure 
can also contribute to comparative democracy studies by enabling statistical analyses 
on the causes and consequences of democracy, which can draw different inferences 
from inferences using other existing measures of democracy. The distinguishing 
features of the DPI, including a more valid approach to constructing the index, are of 
particular value to empirical research on democratic performance in modern 
democracies. 
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Discussion and conclusion 
This article has examined an extensive range of the conceptualisation and measurement 
issues of democracy, thereby creating a new measure of democratic performance with 
eight distinct dimensions. The DPI is better equipped than other measures of democracy 
for empirical research on existing democracies, as the new measure was designed to 
capture subtle differences amongst democracies across various dimensions, and several 
non-negligible problems of conceptualisation and measurement of the existing 
measures were addressed for creating the DPI. However, it would have been impossible 
to construct this measure without the DB, which was employed as a benchmark against 
which a better way of conceptualising and measuring democratic performance could 
be sought. The DB provides detailed information about its dataset, including raw data 
that were mainly used in constructing the DPI in combination with several indicators 
invented for the V-Dem. Thanks to the transparent policy and replicability of the DB, 
we could scrutinise and challenge the choices that generated the DB to produce a more 
valid measure of democratic performance. 
Regarding the dimensions of democracy, Munck (2016, 10) argued that 
‘conceptualizations rarely make theoretical arguments, based on deductive thinking, 
for the inclusion and exclusion of conceptual attributes and about the relationship 
among attributes’. In this respect, the conceptualisations proposed by Bühlmann et al. 
(2012) and Lauth (2015) are distinctive from other prior attempts in that they tried to 
conceptualise the dimensions of democracy in a systematic and deductive manner. 
Particularly, the reconceptualisation of democratic dimensions for the DPI rests largely 
on Bühlmann et al. (2012). However, the deductive approach of the DB itself does not 
guarantee the appropriateness of its concept tree that indicates the direct linkages 
50 
 
between the principles and the dimensions of democracy, as previously discussed. The 
conceptual framework of the DPI, as shown in Table 4, is the outcome of criticism of 
the DB in terms of conceptualisation. 
There remains much room for development in how democratic performance and 
its dimensions are conceptualised. Even amongst scholars who pursue any middle 
ground between a minimalist approach and a maximalist approach towards the 
conception of democracy, there might be no general agreement on the dimensions to 
include but also on how to define them. It would not be surprising, considering that 
debates over dimensions that are referred to as those of a minimalist definition of 
democracy are still on-going. Nonetheless, as illustrated in Table 2, a consensus on the 
range of dimensions, at least, to some degree, can be found in the recent literature, 
resulting in the eight dimensions of the DPI. However, the way in which each 
dimension is formulated considerably varies by author. 
The DPI and its framework have the potential to be instruments to further the 
theoretical and empirical study of democracy. Priority may be given to the following 
topics for future research, for instance. First, the DPI shows various facets of 
democracy as well as their dynamics, and it challenges conventional beliefs that 
established democracies are uniformly superior to non-established democracies in 
terms of democratic performance in each dimension. As illustrated in Appendix 4, 
overall levels of competition and mutual constraints in non-established democracies 
are higher than in established democracies, albeit slightly. This empirical evidence 
needs to be explained theoretically in future work if the features are not due to a few 
influential cases. 
Second, the theoretical and empirical literature on democratic performance in 
existing democracies is at an early stage, and hence there are no well-established 
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hypotheses, let alone empirical evidence, about the causes and consequences of 
democratic performance. However, a multidimensional measure of democratic 
performance developed in this inquiry can be the groundwork for investigating the 
relationships between democratic performance and important socioeconomic factors in 
the political economy. The simple panel data analysis reported in Table 6 shows the 
potential of the DPI for future comparative democracy research. 
Last, the framework of the DPI illuminates the close link between a middle-range 
concept of democracy and its dimensions, both of which are related to democratic 
principles. This approach can be applied to an investigation into political inequality, 
which has become a growing concern even in advanced democracies. Political 
inequality is a counterpart of one democratic principle, political equality, but there is a 
dearth of empirical research on it, owing to the difficulties of its conceptualisation and 
measurement. For example, Dubrow’s (2015) strategy tackling this issue is close to a 
maximalist approach that encompasses equality of outcomes whose empirical referents 
are rare. However, if a middle road between a minimalist concept of political inequality, 
such as voting equality, and a maximalist concept of political inequality, including 
equality of outcomes, is pursued, which is the same approach as in the DPI, it would 
be feasible to formulate a middle-range concept of political inequality with its empirical 
measures. The dimensions or components of the DPI might also help construct a 
measure of political inequality. 
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The DPI dataset and supplementary materials 
The DPI dataset and supplementary materials are available at 
http://doi.org/10.3886/E101244V2. 
 
Appendix 1. Countries in the DB and DPI datasets 
Core countries (n = 30)a Non-core countries (n = 40)b 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Costa Rica 
Cyprus 
the Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
the Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
the United Kingdom 
the United States 
 
Albania 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Chile 
Colombia 
Croatia 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Estonia 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
India 
Israel 
Kosovoc 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Montenegro 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Romania 
Serbia 
Slovakia 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Notes: a The selection criterion for the core countries is a combined and averaged Freedom House score of 1.5 or 
below and a Polity IV score of 9 or above over the 1995–2005 period. b The selection criterion for the non-core 
countries is a combined and averaged Freedom House score of 3.5 or below and a Polity IV score of 6 or above 
during the same time span (Merkel et al. 2014b, 6). c Kosovo was not included in the DPI owing to missing data. 
  
53 
 
 
Appendix 2. List of variables substituted  
Dimension The DB The DPI 
Transparency 
Corrup 
 
 
 
CPI 
Assessment of 
corruption within the 
political system 
 
Overall extent of 
corruption in the 
public and political 
sectors 
v2x_pubcorr Public sector 
corruption index 
v2x_corr: 
aggregated 
by arithmetic 
mean v2x_execorr Executive corruption 
index 
v2lgcrrpt Indicator for 
legislative corruption 
v2jucorrdc Indicator for judicial 
corruption 
Participation 
Dirdem Constitutional 
provisions of four 
direct democratic 
institutions 
v2ddvotcon Constitutional 
changes popular vote 
Dirdem: 
aggregated 
by Polychoric 
PCAa v2ddlegpl Plebiscite permitted 
v2ddlegci Initiatives permitted 
v2ddlegrf Referenda permitted 
Representation 
Womrep 
 
 
 
Womgov 
 
 
 
Poldismin 
 
 
 
Minpower 
Proportion of female 
representatives in 
parliament 
 
Proportion of female 
representative in 
government 
 
Index of political 
discrimination of 
minority groups 
 
Access to central 
power by ethnic 
minority groups 
v2pepwrsoc Power distributed by 
social group 
REP_DR2: 
aggregated 
by geometric 
mean v2pepwrgen Power distributed by 
gender 
v2pepwrses Power distributed by 
socioeconomic 
position 
Notes: All the indicators of the DPI listed above, except for Dirdem and REP_DR2, came from the V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 2015a). a The Polychoric PCA module for Stata performs a principal component analysis based on 
a polychoric correlation matrix. 
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Appendix 3. Normalisation of the DB versus standardisation of the DPI 
The DB employs the ‘best/worst-practice’ scaling method, by which the lowest value 
for all indicators, including both interval and ordinal or dichotomous ones, within the 
blueprint sample (330 country-year observations for the 30 core democracies) was 
rescaled to 0, and the highest value was rescaled to 100 (Merkel et al. 2014b, 6). The 
values of other country-years were rescaled in accordance with this scale; values below 
0 imply poorer democratic performance than the poorest performance within the 
sample, whereas values above 100 signify better performance than the best in the 
sample. In this respect, Merkel et al. (2014b, 7) claimed that the DB has ‘the relative 
scale without fixed minima and maxima’. However, this is not the case for many ordinal 
indicators as well as all the dichotomous ones, which have no further categories with 
the potential to be alternative minima or maxima. 
Moreover, some minimum values of ordinal indicators that have three categories 
were rescaled to −100, which is likely to cause a systematic bias. For instance, the 
indicator, ‘Constrel’, has three categories; the category ‘0’ indicates that religious 
freedom is neither mentioned in the constitution nor guaranteed by a binding treaty, 
and a score of −100 is assigned to this category. In the same subcomponent, the other 
indicator, ‘Constfreemov’, is dichotomous; the category ‘0’ also shows that freedom of 
movement is neither mentioned in the constitution nor guaranteed by a binding treaty, 
but a score of 0 is assigned to it. In this case, it is reasonable that the category ‘0’ in 
both indicators has a similar level rather than having significantly different scores 
(−100 and 0) whose difference is the same as the scores between the category ‘0’ and 
the category ‘1’, which indicates constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of 
movement. 
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This inconsistency comes from the fact that the ‘best/worst-practice’ scaling 
method was mechanically applied to all the indicators regardless of the level of 
measurement. The best alternative is to introduce fine-grained interval indicators so 
that they can easily be normalised or standardised; however, it is not feasible, at least, 
in the immediate future. The remaining alternative is, on the one hand, to get rid of the 
boundary restricted to the blueprint sample; on the other hand, researchers could deal 
with categorical indicators more appropriately, thus generating continuous scores at the 
subcomponent level to be standardised. Accordingly, at the subcomponent level of the 
DPI, it can be ensured that all the aggregate scores are continuous. 
Before aggregating the subcomponents, however, it is necessary to bring all the 
variables into the same unit. There are two conventional approaches to this. One is to 
use min-max normalisation. The DB’s method is a variation of this normalisation. The 
other is to compute z-scores with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. In 
general, each approach has pros and cons, but for the DPI, the latter approach is more 
appropriate for these reasons: First, it avoids introducing aggregation distortions that 
stem from differences amongst the means of interval indicators and subcomponents; 
second, when we use z-scores, unlike min-max normalisation, new data are not 
bounded because each z-score is relative to the other units. Moreover, from the 
comparative perspective, in which an absolute standard rarely exists, this approach is 
more reasonable. 
Nonetheless, z-scores can be rather cumbersome to handle because half of them are 
expected to be negative. The DPI hence employs a linear transformation of a z-score 
with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10, which is called the T-score (see 
Neukrug and Fawcett 2014, 133), to solve the problem of negative numbers and allow 
geometric averaging that requires positive values. A T-score is calculated from a z-score 
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by using this formula: 
 
𝑇 = (𝑧 × 10) + 50 
  
Despite this transformation, a few extreme outliers emerged, whose values were 
zero or below. In these cases, they were recoded to 0.1 before proceeding to geometric 
aggregation; in the normalisation process of the DB, however, this winzorisation for 
the outliers was not carried out, thereby causing some distortions. According to the 
rules above, each interval indicator was standardised before aggregating the indicators 
into the subcomponents, and each aggregate score of a subcomponent produced by 
polychoric correlation models was standardised before aggregating the subcomponents 
into the components. 
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Appendix 4. Descriptive statistics for dimensions of democratic 
performance 
The DB observations mean std. dev. min max skewness kurtosis 
Core 
INDLIB 686 81.15 13.12 -15.08 100.13 -1.81 11.72 
RULEOFLAW 686 66.18 15.05 23.73 96.43 -0.23 2.38 
PUBLIC 686 40.19 16.28 0.75 68.23 -0.17 1.71 
TRANSPAR 686 63.15 16.16 18.58 91.42 -0.45 2.42 
PARTICIP 686 50.60 10.05 22.81 77.53 0.06 2.90 
REPRES 686 54.91 9.62 28.84 79.98 0.20 2.52 
COMPET 686 59.03 13.55 22.40 82.77 -0.69 2.87 
MUTUCONS 686 50.14 13.20 27.89 76.53 0.46 2.04 
GOVCAP 686 68.04 9.60 29.36 87.33 -0.43 2.67 
Non-core 
INDLIB 790 58.95 13.71 1.66 92.33 -0.62 3.74 
RULEOFLAW 721 31.58 15.42 -4.85 75.09 0.19 2.85 
PUBLIC 545 28.17 13.44 0.09 59.20 0.59 2.20 
TRANSPAR 708 39.08 14.77 -11.09 75.81 -0.05 2.71 
PARTICIP 757 47.87 9.69 22.48 71.49 -0.09 2.38 
REPRES 711 41.60 7.19 21.18 59.61 0.23 2.79 
COMPET 658 59.58 12.10 22.84 85.44 -0.09 2.72 
MUTUCONS 685 50.39 14.37 26.28 101.37 1.02 3.24 
GOVCAP 735 50.54 9.40 19.45 78.11 -0.07 3.47 
Total 
INDLIB 1476 69.27 17.41 -15.08 100.13 -0.53 3.53 
RULEOFLAW 1407 48.45 23.05 -4.85 96.43 -0.01 2.11 
PUBLIC 1231 34.87 16.22 0.09 68.23 0.22 1.74 
TRANSPAR 1394 50.93 19.59 -11.09 91.42 -0.02 2.27 
PARTICIP 1443 49.17 9.96 22.48 77.53 0.00 2.70 
REPRES 1397 48.13 10.77 21.18 79.98 0.44 2.74 
COMPET 1344 59.30 12.86 22.40 85.44 -0.46 2.88 
MUTUCONS 1371 50.26 13.79 26.28 101.37 0.78 2.77 
GOVCAP 1421 58.99 12.91 19.45 87.33 -0.06 2.40 
The DPI observations mean std. dev. min max skewness kurtosis 
Core 
INDLIB 686 53.57 4.73 10.53 59.93 -3.07 25.15 
RULEOFLAW 686 54.36 5.17 41.96 64.72 0.01 2.16 
PUBLIC 686 51.55 4.81 37.22 61.11 0.01 2.12 
TRANSPAR 640 53.70 4.76 41.05 62.57 -0.48 2.53 
PARTICIP 640 50.10 4.64 24.49 59.58 -1.59 10.22 
REPRES 640 53.35 4.25 40.51 63.77 0.07 3.08 
COMPET 686 49.52 5.72 34.34 59.66 -0.83 3.15 
MUTUCONS 686 49.25 4.24 38.75 57.67 -0.05 2.45 
Non-core 
INDLIB 789 46.11 4.89 13.00 57.27 -1.63 10.92 
RULEOFLAW 721 45.40 3.98 35.03 56.73 0.05 2.91 
PUBLIC 545 47.51 3.62 36.57 55.93 0.29 2.19 
TRANSPAR 775 46.32 4.77 32.51 59.42 0.16 3.62 
PARTICIP 746 49.05 4.12 38.89 58.42 -0.17 2.18 
REPRES 797 46.23 3.88 33.58 56.73 -0.10 3.37 
COMPET 658 49.73 5.31 17.04 60.00 -0.64 4.86 
MUTUCONS 685 49.70 4.57 39.62 65.20 0.92 3.21 
Total 
INDLIB 1475 49.58 6.09 10.53 59.93 -1.13 7.50 
RULEOFLAW 1407 49.77 6.42 35.03 64.72 0.30 2.41 
PUBLIC 1231 49.76 4.77 36.57 61.11 0.32 2.31 
TRANSPAR 1415 49.66 6.02 32.51 62.57 -0.02 2.39 
PARTICIP 1386 49.54 4.40 24.49 59.58 -0.89 6.42 
REPRES 1437 49.40 5.38 33.58 63.77 0.16 2.84 
COMPET 1344 49.62 5.52 17.04 60.00 -0.75 3.89 
MUTUCONS 1371 49.47 4.41 38.75 65.20 0.50 3.01 
Notes: The core countries are 30 established democracies, and the non-core countries are 40 (or 39) other 
democracies (see Appendix 1). Each sample consists of country-year (from 1990 to 2012) observations.  
58 
 
Appendix 5. Comparison of country rakings between the DB and the DPI 
 
Notes: As of 2012, country rankings of the 30 core countries for each dimension were used. Countries located on the 
diagonal line have the same ranking in both the DB and the DPI.    
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Appendix 6. Correlations between dimensions 
The DB INDLIB RULEOFLAW PUBLIC TRANSPAR PARTICIP REPRES COMPET MUTUCONS GOVCAP 
  INDLIB 1.00         
 RULEOFLAW 0.63 1.00        
  PUBLIC 0.55 0.36 1.00       
  TRANSPAR 0.56 0.70 0.22 1.00      
  PARTICIP 0.17 0.31 0.04 0.22 1.00     
  REPRES 0.60 0.63 0.39 0.49 0.36 1.00    
  COMPET 0.18 0.03 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.10 1.00   
  MUTUCONS -0.09 0.01 -0.13 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.00 1.00  
GOVCAP 0.57 0.77 0.31 0.53 0.35 0.60 -0.06 -0.04 1.00 
The DPI INDLIB RULEOFLAW PUBLIC TRANSPAR PARTICIP REPRES COMPET MUTUCONS  
  INDLIB 1.00         
 RULEOFLAW 0.62 1.00        
  PUBLIC 0.52 0.43 1.00       
  TRANSPAR 0.57 0.68 0.22 1.00      
  PARTICIP 0.22 0.24 0.11 0.11 1.00     
  REPRES 0.60 0.68 0.46 0.61 0.37 1.00    
  COMPET 0.23 0.06 0.15 0.22 0.09 0.22 1.00   
  MUTUCONS -0.12 0.01 -0.09 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.03 1.00  
Note: Coefficients printed in bold are significant (p < .01). 
 
   
60 
 
Appendix 7. Correlations between components of dimensions 
The DB 
INDLIB RULEOFLAW PUBLIC TRANSPAR PARTICIP REPRES COMPET MUTUCONS GOVCAP 
IL_PHIN IL_SELFU RL_EQL RL_QUAL PS_FRAS PS_FROP TR_NOSEC TR_PTPP PAR_EQPA PAR_EFPA REP_SR REP_DR CO_COMP CO_OPEN MC_CHECK MC_VERT GC_GORE GC_CEIM 
INDLIB 
IL_PHIN 1.00                  
IL_SELFU 0.49 1.00                 
RULEOFLAW 
RL_EQL 0.49 0.64 1.00                
RL_QUAL 0.32 0.58 0.76 1.00               
PUBLIC 
PS_FRAS 0.31 0.45 0.36 0.34 1.00              
PS_FROP 0.52 0.46 0.29 0.24 0.63 1.00             
TRANSPAR 
TR_NOSEC 0.30 0.32 0.47 0.48 -0.00 -0.00 1.00            
TR_PTPP 0.44 0.60 0.66 0.61 0.40 0.34 0.41 1.00           
PARTICIP 
PAR_EQPA -0.10 -0.08 -0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.21 -0.01 -0.04 1.00          
PAR_EFPA 0.31 0.31 0.45 0.42 0.16 0.09 0.17 0.38 0.28 1.00         
REPRES 
REP_SR 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.07 -0.12 0.09 -0.10 0.01 -0.09 0.08 1.00        
REP_DR 0.45 0.57 0.62 0.61 0.47 0.33 0.31 0.66 0.18 0.43 -0.13 1.00       
COMPET 
CO_COMP 0.26 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.20 0.13 0.17 -0.02 0.15 -0.05 0.17 1.00      
CO_OPEN 0.26 -0.03 -0.00 -0.04 0.13 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.38 1.00     
MUTUCONS 
MC_CHECK 0.01 -0.19 -0.21 -0.33 -0.17 -0.04 -0.19 -0.21 -0.06 -0.27 -0.13 -0.13 0.03 0.09 1.00    
MC_VERT -0.16 0.11 0.14 0.13 -0.02 -0.04 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.20 0.08 0.13 -0.02 -0.05 -0.24 1.00   
GOVCAP 
GC_GORE 0.19 0.27 0.33 0.44 0.16 0.16 -0.01 0.24 -0.01 0.22 0.01 0.40 -0.02 -0.21 -0.10 0.02 1.00  
GC_CEIM 0.44 0.61 0.75 0.70 0.34 0.22 0.44 0.63 0.10 0.50 0.08 0.57 0.07 -0.03 -0.34 0.14 0.36 1.00 
The DPI 
INDLIB RULEOFLAW PUBLIC TRANSPAR PARTICIP REPRES COMPET MUTUCONS   
IL_PHIN IL_SELFU RL_EQL RL_QUAL PS_FRAS PS_FROP TR_NOSEC TR_PTPP PAR_EQPA PAR_EFPA REP_SR REP_DR CO_COMP CO_OPEN MC_CHECK MC_VERT   
INDLIB 
IL_PHIN 1.00    
IL_SELFU 0.52 1.00    
RULEOFLAW 
RL_EQL 0.50 0.52 1.00                
RL_QUAL 0.37 0.60 0.57 1.00               
PUBLIC 
PS_FRAS 0.21 0.44 0.34 0.42 1.00              
PS_FROP 0.51 0.48 0.30 0.28 0.47 1.00             
TRANSPAR 
TR_NOSEC 0.39 0.41 0.38 0.55 -0.05 0.05 1.00            
TR_PTPP 0.38 0.55 0.47 0.63 0.44 0.29 0.45 1.00           
PARTICIP 
PAR_EQPA -0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.10 -0.14 -0.05 -0.00 1.00          
PAR_EFPA 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.30 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.28 0.25 1.00         
REPRES 
REP_SR 0.15 0.32 0.20 0.28 0.16 0.28 0.05 0.28 -0.09 0.13 1.00        
REP_DR 0.51 0.61 0.55 0.69 0.40 0.36 0.49 0.63 0.24 0.44 0.21 1.00       
COMPET 
CO_COMP 0.28 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.21 0.16 0.19 -0.00 0.03 0.09 0.21 1.00      
CO_OPEN 0.24 0.04 0.05 -0.06 0.01 0.12 0.20 0.07 0.17 0.10 -0.13 0.22 0.37 1.00     
MUTUCONS 
MC_CHECK -0.05 -0.23 -0.10 -0.36 -0.18 -0.03 -0.15 -0.17 -0.03 -0.28 -0.15 -0.22 0.07 0.03 1.00    
MC_VERT -0.13 0.13 0.20 0.15 0.09 -0.05 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.24 0.06 0.19 -0.02 -0.01 -0.26 1.00   
Notes: Within-dimension correlation coefficients are highlighted. Coefficients printed in bold are significant (p < .01).
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CHAPTER 2 
The Redistribution Hypothesis Revisited with Perceived Inequality 
 
 
Abstract 
It is a long-standing puzzle whether or not changes in economic inequality lead to 
changes in redistribution. However, there has been a lack of conclusive evidence 
about this relationship. Moreover, redistributive preferences as an intervening 
factor between inequality and redistribution, which are taken for granted implicitly 
or explicitly in redistribution theories, have been largely overlooked in the existing 
analyses. Besides, recent comparative studies of inequality and redistribution have 
started paying attention to inequality perceptions that deviate from actual 
inequality. Thus, this inquiry aims to reconstruct the classical redistribution theory 
by employing perceived inequality and preferences for redistribution and to test 
the reformulated redistribution hypotheses. One of the most challenging efforts for 
the analysis is to develop a country-level measure of perceived inequality. To this 
end, the Gini coefficient of perceived social position (perceived Gini) was first 
created by using data from 16 rounds of the International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP 1987 to 2014), covering 33 OECD countries. The empirical 
results show robust evidence that perceived inequality, not actual inequality, is 
significantly associated with redistributive preferences, while preferences for 
redistribution do not translate into any type of redistribution. 
Keywords: redistribution; redistributive preferences; perceived inequality; 
perceived Gini; market inequality; Meltzer-Richard model  
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Introduction 
Is Robin Hood, a heroic outlaw who robs from the rich to give to the poor, reappearing 
in modern democracies? If so, does his band exert more power in a more unequal 
society? Put differently, does a government, portrayed as the popular folk figure above, 
play an active role in redistributing economic resources to reduce the gap between the 
rich and the poor? Are redistributive efforts increasing as the gap is widening? In recent 
decades, these questions have been at the heart of the politics of inequality and 
redistribution, but there have been no clear-cut answers to them so far. Many political 
economists have tried to solve the puzzle of redistribution under the assumption that 
actual reality straightforwardly translates into its perception and then interacts with 
other structural factors, following a materialist approach. However, well-known facts 
in psychology have recently secured attention in the study of inequality: First, there is 
a mismatch between actual reality and its perception; second, the perceptual world 
rather than the real world dictates people’s attitudes or behaviours. These evident facts 
have long been ignored in exploring the dynamics of inequality and redistribution. 
This article revisits the classical redistribution theory and provides empirical 
evidence that does not support the standard theory. The long-standing redistribution 
hypothesis, 27  derived from the Meltzer-Richard (1981) model, assumes a close 
association between actual economic inequality and redistribution. This theory 
presupposes that increasing market inequality leads to more demand for redistribution, 
thereby resulting in more redistribution; however, the posited mechanism that support 
for redistribution links inequality to redistribution has not been fully clarified or 
                                           
27 Milanovic (2010) proposed to distinguish the redistribution hypothesis from the median voter 
hypothesis because the former represents a broader hypothesis than the hypothesis based on the 
position of the median voter. 
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explored in previous studies. To test this redistribution theory, many studies have 
simply examined the effect of market inequality on redistribution without taking the 
mechanism into account. By contrast, this paper investigates the role of redistributive 
preferences in connecting inequality and redistribution. On the other hand, research in 
the field of inequality has produced substantial evidence that perceived inequality is 
clearly distinguishable from actual inequality28 and that the former, rather than the 
latter, plays a decisive role in shaping attitudes towards redistribution. 
The primary research question of this paper is whether or not the standard model 
of redistribution is supported when redistributive preferences are considered as an 
intervening factor between actual or perceived inequality and redistribution at the 
country level. To answer this question, one of the critical things is to develop a more 
valid and reliable measure of perceived inequality than previous ones, which is 
comparable to actual inequality in a country. Thus, for this inquiry, the perceived Gini, 
short for the Gini coefficient based on the distribution of perceived social position, was 
constructed. The results of a country-level analysis show that, first, perceived 
inequality rather than actual inequality significantly affects redistributive preferences; 
second, the impact of redistributive preferences on redistribution is negligible. 
Accordingly, provided that public support for redistribution is considered as a linking 
                                           
28 In general, there are four types of (in)equality commonly identified in the literature: ontological 
equality, equality of opportunity, equality of condition, and equality of outcome (Turner 1986, 34–
6). Amongst them, both equality of opportunity, such as social mobility, and equality of outcome, 
such as income (in)equality, are most frequently employed in empirical studies. This classification 
can be applied to perceptions of inequality as well (e.g., perceived inequality of opportunity and 
perceived inequality of outcome). It should be noted that, in the present study, perceived inequality 
is only construed as perceived inequality of outcome rather than perceived inequality of opportunity. 
The latter is a subject for separate research. 
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mechanism between inequality and redistribution, it can be argued that the traditional 
redistribution theory should be completely reconsidered. 
In the remainder of this paper, the classical redistribution hypothesis is redefined 
with the explicit role of redistributive preferences, and the importance of perceived 
inequality is discussed in relation to preferences for redistribution in more detail. Next, 
the alternative redistribution hypotheses incorporating perceived inequality and 
redistributive preferences are developed. The limitations of existing measures of 
perceived inequality are also discussed, and the perceived Gini is presented. The 
hypotheses are then tested with country-level data. Finally, the findings of the empirical 
analyses are provided, and then remaining issues are discussed. 
 
The classical redistribution hypothesis 
In this paper, the classical redistribution hypothesis is construed as meaning that greater 
economic inequality is conducive to greater redistribution. The empirical results of 
testing the redistribution hypothesis have presented conflicting findings, as shown in 
Table 1: Some studies have supported the hypothesis, whereas other studies have found 
no support for it (see also Kenworthy and McCall 2008; Lind 2005). This inconclusive 
evidence makes the heading of the ‘redistribution puzzle’ remain in the literature (Lind 
2005, 124). Furthermore, some scholars who have not found supporting evidence for 
the redistribution hypothesis often refer to the so-called Robin Hood paradox to 
describe the fact that democracies with low levels of inequality redistribute more, while 
democracies with high levels of inequality redistribute less.29 
                                           
29 Lindert (2004, 15) defines the paradox in this way: ‘History reveals a “Robin Hood Paradox,” in 
which redistribution from rich to poor is least present when and where it seems most needed’. 
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Table 1. Recent Studies Testing the Classical Redistribution Hypothesis 
Dependent variable Independent variable Findings Source 
absolute redistribution 
market Ginia positive Alemán and Woods (2018) 
wage inequality not significant Finseraas (2008) 
market Gini positive Gründler and Köllner (2017) 
market Gini positive Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005) 
market Gini positive Mahler (2008) 
market Gini positive Scervini (2012) 
relative redistribution 
market Gini positive Gründler and Köllner (2017) 
wage inequality not significant Iversen and Soskice (2006) 
market Gini not significant Luebker (2014) 
wage inequality not significant Lupu and Pontusson (2011) 
social expenditure 
market Gini positive Barnes (2013)c 
Ginib negative de Mello and Tiongson (2006) 
mean-to-median income 
ratio 
negative Engelhardt and Wagener (2014) 
median-to-mean income 
ratio 
not significant Larcinese (2007) 
wage inequality negative Moene and Wallerstein (2001, 
2003) 
mean-to-median income 
ratio 
not significant Rodríguiez (1999) 
Notes: a The market Gini represents the Gini coefficient before taxes and transfers. b The Gini coefficient from the 
UNU-WIDER database was used, regardless of how the coefficient was measured. c This study shows that the direct 
measures of the median voter income have little effect on redistribution; that is, it does not support the Meltzer-
Richard model in its original and strict sense, while the main finding buttresses the redistribution hypothesis. 
 
The use of different measures of inequality and redistribution, as well as different 
model specifications, might have contributed to the mixed results. In Table 1, one thing 
to note is that the market Gini, unlike other inequality measures, consistently has a 
positive effect on redistribution, except in the case of Luebker (2014). It is plausible 
that there is a spurious correlation, rather than causality, between market inequality and 
redistribution. Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005, 457–8) also did not exclude the 
possibility that there is no direct causal connection between them. More fundamentally, 
it is rarely questioned whether or not there is a problem in the underlying assumption 
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of the redistribution hypothesis that voters are fully informed of actual inequality and 
correctly realise their position in the income distribution, as in the case of the Meltzer-
Richard model. With this information, according to this hypothesis, voters can calculate 
their economic gains or losses and then have preferences for redistribution.30 
Regarding preferences for redistribution, in previous empirical studies, there is no 
agreement on its role in the relation between economic inequality and redistribution. 
For example, Engelhardt and Wagener (2014, 3) regarded preferences for redistribution 
as ‘mere cheap-talk’ and then just examined the effect of perceived inequality on 
redistribution, while several studies have focussed on the extent to which actual or 
perceived inequality influences redistributive preferences, without considering 
redistribution, as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Studies Employing Redistributive Preferences at the Macro Level 
Dependent variable Independent variable Findings Source 
redistributive preferences 
net Ginia not significant Lübker (2007) 
net Gini not significant Niehues (2014) 
Ginib negative Kelly and Enns (2010) 
perceived society typec positive Gimpelson and Treisman (2015) 
perceived society type positive Niehues (2014) 
social expenditure 
redistributive preferences 
positive Brooks and Manza (2006) 
relative redistribution positive Luebker (2014) 
Notes: a The net Gini indicates the Gini coefficient after taxes and transfers. b The original source of the Gini 
coefficient is not reported. c The perceived society type variable was produced by using an identical survey question 
to those in the study by Niehues (2014) (see Question C in Appendix 1) but employing a slightly different 
aggregation method to create the subjective country average Gini coefficient. 
 
                                           
30  Individuals, in fact, do not construct attitudes towards policies simply by following their 
economic self-interest (Fong 2001). However, there is considerable evidence that the preferences 
gap of redistribution between income groups is significant in European countries (Peters and Ensink 
2015). Additionally, Soroka and Wlezien (2008) showed that lower-income groups’ preferences for 
welfare spending, unlike other spending domains, are distinct from the preferences of the other 
income groups in the United States. 
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In fact, in the Meltzer-Richard model, as well as the conventional redistribution 
hypothesis, public opinion towards redistribution, explicitly or implicitly, plays a 
crucial role in determining redistribution. Meltzer and Richard (1981, 924) emphasised 
‘voter demand for redistribution’ to account for redistribution. Kelly and Enns (2010, 
859) stressed the importance of ‘mass preferences’ for redistribution and placed them 
‘at the heart of the model’. Kenworthy and McCall (2008, 36) formulated the causal 
chain of the redistribution hypothesis by adding inequality perceptions and 
redistributive preferences. 31  Additionally, Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm (2008) 
emphasised the connection between the demand and supply sides of redistribution.32 
Accordingly, testing the redistribution theory essentially requires redistributive 
preferences as a mediator between economic inequality and redistribution; however, 
many researchers have tended to ignore the role of preferences for redistribution or 
only addressed a part of the relationships even when taking the preferences into account, 
as shown in Table 2. Particularly, the effect of support for redistribution on 
redistribution has been rarely explored in comparative studies, except in those by 
Brooks and Manza (2006) and Luebker (2014), who conducted multivariate regression 
analyses and found a significantly positive effect. 33  Additionally, Niehues (2014) 
simply conducted a bivariate correlation analysis that indicates no relationship between 
                                           
31  Kenworthy and McCall (2008), however, examined just the over-time patterns of actual 
inequality, inequality perceptions, support for redistribution, and the generosity of redistributive 
programmes, respectively, in eight countries over the 1980s and 1990s. They did not conduct further 
statistical analysis. 
32 Nevertheless, Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm (2008) did not examine the direct relationship between 
the demand side and the supply side of redistribution in their empirical analysis. 
33  Kenworthy (2009), however, cast doubt on the findings of Brooks and Manza (2006) by 
illustrating that there is no association between social policy preferences and public social 
expenditures over time within countries. Additionally, the research method of Brooks and Manza 
(2006) and Luebker (2014) has limitations; both studies simply used pooled OLS with a small 
number of observations: 32 and 56, respectively.   
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redistributive preferences and redistribution. Lupu and Pontusson (2011) also did the 
same analysis but found rather strong correlation between the preferences of the 
middle-income group and redistribution. 
 
Actual inequality versus perceived inequality 
Recent research on perceptions of economic inequality has revealed that there is a 
significant gap between actual inequality and perceived inequality. Several studies 
based on cross-national comparisons have provided evidence for this (e.g., Bublitz 
2016; Engelhardt and Wagener 2014; Gimpelson and Treisman 2015; Kuhn 2015b; 
Niehues 2014).34 Even prior to these studies, some researchers had pointed out that 
contextual inequality, such as income inequality, does not directly translate into 
perceptions of inequality (see Neckerman and Torche 2007, 349–50). Beramendi and 
Anderson (2008, 405–8) also cast doubt on the dominant assumption that people 
perceive actual inequality accurately, which the conventional political economy of 
inequality and redistribution builds on. 
Aside from the fact that voters have incomplete information on actual inequality, 
there are some plausible theories or models to explain the discrepancy between actual 
and perceived inequality. For instance, according to the theories developed in social 
psychology, such as the reference-group hypothesis, people tend to perceive 
themselves as being in the middle of the social hierarchy (Evans and Kelley 2004; 
Kelley and Evans 1995; Merton 1968, chaps. 9–10; Stouffer et al. 1949); moreover, the 
system justification theory postulates that people tend to hold favourable attitudes 
                                           
34 Additionally, there are some empirical studies exploring Americans’ perceptions of inequality 
and its difference from actual inequality: Chambers, Swan, and Heesacker (2014), Eriksson and 
Simpson (2012), Norton and Ariely (2011), and Osberg and Smeeding (2006). 
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towards the status quo (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004). In addition, Bublitz (2016) and 
Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz (2013) provided empirical evidence that low-income 
earners overestimate their income position, while high-income earners underestimate 
their income position. 
If people perceive the level of economic inequality differently from the actual 
inequality level, we cannot predict preferences for redistribution directly from the 
actual level of economic inequality (Gimpelson and Treisman 2015, 21). It is highly 
likely that voters who think the level of inequality is serious and unacceptable, 
irrespective of the level of actual inequality, demand more redistribution. That is, how 
much inequality is perceived rather than how much inequality exists is expected to 
determine preferences for redistribution (Eriksson and Simpson 2012, 741). 
In various regression models, in fact, people’s assessment of inequality is a 
substantive predictor for the support over redistribution (Gimpelson and Treisman 2015; 
Kuhn 2011, 2015a, 2015b; 35  Niehues 2014). Additionally, numerous randomised 
survey experiments have shown clear evidence that correcting misperceptions of 
income position or distribution has a significant impact on shifting opinions towards 
redistribution (e.g., Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz 2013; Karadja, Möllerström, and 
Seim 2014; Kuziemko et al. 2015).36  It has therefore been shown that perceived 
inequality plays a key role in forging redistributive preferences.37 Consequently, actual 
                                           
35 Kuhn’s work presents its evidence at the individual level. 
36 Bublitz (2016), however, provided evidence that correcting the misperceptions does not always 
make a significant difference in the demands for redistribution in each country sample. 
37 Regarding the determinants of individuals’ preferences for redistribution, there are numerous 
studies (e.g., Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm 
2008; Fong 2001; Guillaud 2013; Mosimann and Pontusson 2014; Rueda 2014; see also McCarty 
and Pontusson 2009, 680–7, for a summary of the important literature); however, they do not 
directly address perceived inequality. 
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inequality on which the classical redistribution hypothesis is based can be replaced with 
perceived inequality on condition that redistributive preferences are considered in 
testing the redistribution theory. 
 
The redistribution hypotheses reformulated 
The main hypotheses here belong to the two different sections of the theoretical 
framework discussed above: One is to address the relationship between actual or 
perceived inequality and redistributive preferences, and the other is related to the 
association between redistributive preferences and redistribution. To begin with, the 
following two hypotheses represent two sides of the same coin. As noted above, it is 
assumed that actual inequality has nothing to do with redistributive preferences; on the 
other hand, perceived inequality is expected to have a positive impact on redistributive 
preferences. In other words, the more unequal people find their society regardless of 
the actual level of inequality, the greater redistribution they demand. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Actual inequality will not significantly affect redistributive 
preferences. 
Hypothesis 2: Perceived inequality will positively and significantly affect 
redistributive preferences. 
 
With respect to the controls for redistributive preferences, economic development 
is predicted to be closely associated with the demand for redistribution. Economic 
development is a commonly used control, and previous research suggests that a 
growing economy makes people more supportive of social spending (Durr 1993). 
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Union density is controlled as well because union members are considerably more 
supportive of redistribution than those who are non-union members (Mosimann and 
Pontusson 2014; Rueda 2014). Ethnic fractionalisation is included as a control since 
there is empirical evidence that ethnic diversity negatively affects the support for 
redistribution (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, 133–81; Dahlberg, Edmark, and Lundqvist 
2012). Additionally, a society that has a proportional representation system is expected 
to have more favourable public opinion towards redistribution, as is the case with 
redistribution, as noted below. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Redistributive preferences will positively and significantly affect 
redistribution. 
 
It is plausible to assume that mass preferences influence redistributive policy 
outcomes in modern democracies, following Page and Shapiro’s (1983) seminal paper, 
which presented evidence that opinion changes lead to policy changes.38 Soroka and 
Wlezien’s (2010) extensive work also supported the close link between policy 
preferences and policy outcomes. Moreover, this hypothesis was supported by 
empirical studies in some countries, such as Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States (Brooks and Manza 2006, 817–8). In fact, many studies on the 
redistribution theory, explicitly or implicitly, agree with this assumption; however, it 
has not been fully tested in a cross-national perspective. 
                                           
38 Burstein (2003) also found, by conducting a systematic review of the major literature, that the 
impact of public opinion on public policy is substantial: ‘Three-quarters of the relationships 
between opinion and policy are statistically significant’ (33). 
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Regarding the controls for redistribution, to begin with, a lagged dependent 
variable is used to control for a serial correlation.39 The unemployment rate and the 
share of the elderly control for the need-driven redistributive effects that are considered 
rather automatic compensatory responses to their variations in need;40 in this regard, 
they can also be termed as need variables. Next, according to the earliest proponents of 
the power resources theory, Korpi and Stephens, power resources that influence 
redistribution are mobilised at two points in the distributive process: union strength and 
leftist government (Bradley et al. 2003, 195). Iversen and Soskice (2006) also stressed 
that union density and leftist government are decisive predictors for redistribution. As 
with the negative association between ethnic diversity and redistributive preferences, 
several studies have shown evidence that ethnic fractionalisation has a negative impact 
on redistribution (e.g., Alesina et al. 2003; La Porta et al. 1999). An electoral system 
of proportional representation tends to induce greater redistribution than other electoral 
systems (Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm 2008; Iversen and Soskice 2006; Persson, Roland, 
and Tabellini 2007). Economic development is expected to increase redistribution 
according to Wagner’s law, which predicts that economic progress results in a rise of 
public expenditure (Esping-Anderson and Myles 2009, 643). Economic growth is also 
                                           
39 Whether to include a lagged dependent variable was examined by using the Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data (xtserial command in Stata). As a result, the redistribution equation 
requires a lagged dependent variable because there is a significant serial correlation in the residuals 
from the model estimated without the lagged dependent variable, while the redistributive 
preferences equation does not require the variable.  
40 Several studies have classified redistribution into two types according to different paths: One is 
driven by policy changes (policy-driven redistribution), and the other is the outcome of automatic 
responses produced by the variations of the number of people in need in an existing welfare system 
(need-driven redistribution) (see Huber and Stephens 2014, 260–1; Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005, 
456). 
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hypothesised to boost redistribution by providing the capacity to spend more on 
redistributive policies (Morgan and Kelly 2013).41 
 
Measurement and data 
Perceived inequality measures 
Several ways to measure inequality perceptions have been developed so far, but there 
is no consensus on how to operationalise and measure perceived inequality. 
Schalembier (2015) identified three different measures of perceived income inequality 
at the country level. The first indicator is based on respondents’ answers to the question 
of whether income differences are too large (see Question B in Appendix 1; Table 3). 
The second measure developed by Engelhardt and Wagener (2014) is the perceived 
mean-to-median ratios divided by the actual mean-to-median ratios for each country, 
which is called weighted perceived inequality. The third method invented by Niehues 
(2014) uses the question of choosing one of the five diagrams showing different types 
of society, in which seven bars in different sizes are stacked (see Question C in 
Appendix 1). The size of each bar is weighted and aggregated, and a new bar for each 
class is constructed. A Gini coefficient is then calculated from the size of each bar and 
their assigned values. 
The measures listed above, however, have their own weaknesses. The first measure 
is too crude because respondents can only express how seriously they feel about income 
differences. This measure is closer to an indicator of critical assessment of income 
                                           
41 When redistribution is measured as a relative indicator to GDP, GDP growth that is, in fact, the 
change in GDP needs to be included in the equation as a control variable (Peters and Ensink 2015, 
586). 
74 
 
differences rather than that of perceived inequality. Also, this measure is highly 
correlated with the variable of redistributive preferences (𝑟 = . 84). The other two 
measures share the same limitations in that both survey questions used in constructing 
each measure are based on the categories of people ranked in the social hierarchy; in 
fact, they ask about social stratification rather than income inequality (see Questions A 
and C in Appendix 1). Social stratification cannot be reduced to a single dimension of 
income inequality because its main forms are class structure and social status 
(Goldthorpe 2010); accordingly, these measures should be interpreted with caution 
since they reflect more than economic inequality. 
 
Table 3. Perceived Inequality Measures at the Country Level 
Variable Definition Source 
perceived Gini The Gini coefficient based on the distribution of 
perceived social position on a scale of 1 (bottom) to 10 
(top); see Question A in Appendix 1. 
ISSPa 1987, 1992, 1999, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 
and 2014 
perceived income 
differences 
The percentage of respondents who agree strongly or 
agree with the statement that differences in income are 
too large; see Question B in Appendix 1. 
ISSP 1987, 1992, 1999, 
and 2009 
perceived society 
type 
The average of the Gini coefficients based on diagrams of 
society, weighted by the proportion of respondents who 
chose the diagram; see Question C in Appendix 1. 
ISSP 1992, 1999, and 
2009 
perceived mean-to-
median ratio 
The mean-to-median ratio based on the distribution of 
perceived social position on a scale of 1 (bottom) to 10 
(top); see Question A in Appendix 1. 
ISSP 1987, 1992, 1999, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 
and 2014 
Note: a The International Social Survey Programme. 
 
More specifically, the measure of weighted perceived inequality employed by 
Engelhardt and Wagener (2014) and Schalembier (2015) indicates the degree of under- 
or overestimation of the actual inequality rather than perceived inequality itself. Thus, 
it is appropriate to employ the perceived mean-to-median ratios, not the weighted 
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perceived inequality, as a measure of perceived inequality on condition that we know 
exact mean and median values. In the frequency distribution of the discrete variable 
based on the integer scale of 1 to 10 (see Question A in Appendix 1; Table 3), however, 
only a value of the median class can be estimated; that is, this value does not sharply 
divide the higher half of a population from the lower half.42 Consequently, the ratio of 
mean-to-median becomes a very blunt measure that does not properly reflect the whole 
structure of inequality in a country.43 
As for the third measure, there are three more issues questioning the average Gini 
coefficient produced. First, the different size of each bar in a diagram was designed to 
simply describe a whole picture of perceived type of society, and thus the relative size 
of each bar itself is not supposed to be very meaningful. Second, the assigned values 
for each class on an ordinal scale from 1 to 7 in Niehues’ (2014) method are based on 
an ad hoc decision. Last, the diagrams D and E (see notes in Appendix 1) clearly 
illustrate different types of society, but there is little difference between them in terms 
of the Gini coefficient. On the other hand, Gimpelson and Treisman (2015) employed 
a slightly different aggregation method from Niehues’ (2014) approach to produce the 
average perceived Gini coefficients,44 which is rather simple to calculate and was thus 
used in this study for comparison with other measures, as shown in Table 3. 
                                           
42 For instance, in the ISSP 2014 data (the United States), 37.81% of the respondents put themselves 
on the scale of 6, which is the value of the median class calculated from the density distribution. 
43 It is evidenced in Appendix 3 that the correlation between the perceived Gini and perceived 
mean-to-median ratio is negative (𝑟 =  −.27 ), which indicates the problematic bias in the ratio 
measure. 
44 Unlike Niehues’ (2014) method based on generating a new bar for each class at the aggregate 
level, Gimpelson and Treisman (2015) translated each type of society into the Gini coefficient and 
then calculated average values according to the frequency distribution. 
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To remedy the shortcomings of the existing measures discussed above, a new 
measure of perceived inequality, the perceived Gini, was developed for this inquiry. 
This measure is innovative because it uses the underlying structure of the frequency 
distribution based on the respondents’ perceived social position in a country, which has 
never been fully employed in previous studies.45 This approach is basically the same 
as computing the Gini coefficient using an actual income distribution, but the perceived 
Gini and market (or net) Gini are not directly comparable since they have different 
metrics. The crucial difference is that the perceived Gini is based on the relative 
assessment of a respondent’s social position (see Question A in Appendix 1), whereas 
income surveys on which the actual Gini indices are based ask respondents to report 
their actual incomes, regardless of their relative income levels. 
 
  
 
Figure 1. Frequency distribution of perceived social position and Lorenz curve. 
 
The perceived Gini was computed as follows: First, the area under the Lorenz curve 
(A) is calculated by using the properties of a trapezoid from the distribution of 
                                           
45  To my knowledge, Gründler and Köllner (2017) also constructed the Gini coefficient of 
perceived inequality in the same way, but they only used 4 waves of the ISSP data (1987, 1992, 
1999, and 2009). This study fully exploited 16 rounds of the ISSP to construct the measure, however.  
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perceived social position discussed above; second, the area under the Lorenz curve is 
subtracted from the area under the line of perfect equality (0.5 − 𝐴); third, the ratio of 
the area between the line of perfect equality and the Lorenz curve to the area under the 
line of perfect equality is taken ((0.5 − A)/0.5 = 1 − 2A); and fourth, the perceived 
Gini employed here is found by multiplying 100 ((1 − 2A) × 100). For example, in 
Figure 1, the area (A) is 0.419; the perceived Gini of the United States in 2014 is thus 
16.2. 
To summarise, the perceived Gini is the most suitable measure for perceived 
inequality at the country level amongst existing measures in Table 3, although the 
social hierarchy, which the survey question asks about, implies more than income 
inequality. This measure has 181 three-year-average observations for OECD countries 
(292 country-year observations for OECD countries and 387 observations for all 
countries). The observations of the perceived Gini in OECD countries are illustrated in 
Appendix 4. In most OECD countries, the trend of the perceived Gini is considerably 
different from that of the market Gini. 
Additionally, Figure 2 lists the countries according to the level of the perceived or 
market Gini,46 using its mean value in each country. Nordic countries show a lower 
level of perceived inequality, whereas Post-communist countries show a higher level 
of perceived inequality. The perceived Gini of South Korea is considerably higher than 
that of Iceland, but the two countries are highly and similarly equal countries in terms 
of the market Gini. Portugal is a highly unequal country in terms of both the perceived 
                                           
46 There is a large discrepancy between the means of the market Gini and the perceived Gini: 
46.09 − 17.27 = 28.82. This is mainly due to the different metrics when measuring them. Thus, it 
is not meaningful to directly compare the level of the perceived Gini with that of the market Gini. 
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Gini and the market Gini, but in most countries, the relative level of the perceived Gini 
does not correspond to that of the market Gini. 
 
  
Figure 2. Perceived Gini and market Gini in 33 OECD countries. Note: The graphs 
used data, averaged by country, based on the ISSP 1987 to 2014 and the SWIID over 
the period 1985‒2015 (see Appendix 2). 
 
With respect to the perceived inequality data, all the measures of inequality 
perceptions at the country level were constructed from the International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP) 1987 to 2014 for 33 OECD countries. 47  In constructing the 
measures, weighting factors provided by the ISSP were used to diminish possible 
                                           
47 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Greece and Luxembourg are not 
included amongst 35 OECD countries as of 2018). 
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biases due to the sampling method in each country.48 There are four different measures 
shown in Table 3. First, both the perceived mean-to-median ratios and the perceived 
Gini were computed by using the frequency distribution of self-positioning on a 
bottom-to-top scale (1 to 10); the data were collected from ISSP 1987, 1992, 1999, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 
(ISSP Research Group 2016). Second, the average scores of the perceived fairness in 
income differences were calculated; the data were obtained from ISSP 1987, 1992, 
1999, and 2009 (ISSP Research Group 2016). Third, the perceived society type was 
calculated by averaging the subjective Gini coefficients of each diagram, following 
Gimpelson and Treisman’s (2015) method; the data were taken from ISSP 1992, 1999, 
and 2009 (ISSP Research Group 2016). 
 
Redistributive preferences, redistribution, and actual inequality measures 
Redistributive preferences are defined as the degree of respondents’ agreement to the 
question of the government’s responsibility for reducing income differences, which is 
the most widely used measure of redistributive preferences in empirical studies.49 This 
question is found in the following surveys: ISSP 1985–2010 and the Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Module 4 (see Questions D in Appendix 1);50 their 
                                           
48  Each country-year ISSP survey has its own weighting procedure, and this procedure is 
documented. In many cases, weighting factors are based on age, gender, education, and region.   
49  Alternatively, Tóth and Keller (2011) developed a composite index, the Redistributive 
Preference Index (RPI), which is based on five categorical variables about fair redistribution, job 
provision, free education, social spending, and a government’s responsibility in the 2009 special 
Eurobarometer survey on poverty and social exclusion. However, this measure captures too broad 
a notion of redistributive preferences, and its coverage is relatively limited. Consequently, this index 
was not employed for the current study. 
50 A similar question is also found in the European Social Survey (ESS), but the data were not used 
in the current analyses because its coverage is restricted to European countries. 
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country-year observations cover 34 OECD countries over the period from 1985 to 
2015.51 One thing to note is that each country’s fieldwork dates for a given ISSP or 
CSES module are not always the same as the specific calendar year of the module, and 
the coding of the country-years in the current dataset was thus conducted following the 
actual fieldwork dates for each country. 
To construct a country-level measure of redistributive preferences, in each country-
year, the number of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed with the statement of 
the above question was divided by the total number of respondents. This ratio indicates 
the level of preferences for redistribution in a country-year. This measure was also built 
by using weighting factors to mitigate sampling biases, as in forming the perceived 
inequality measures. The data came from ISSP 1985, 1987, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1996, 
1999, 2000, 2006, 2009, 2010, and the CSES Module 4 (ISSP Research Group 2016; 
CSES 2016). 
Regarding the measures of redistribution, there are two widely used approaches in 
the literature: One is to use absolute or relative redistribution based on the gap between 
the Gini coefficient of market income (pre-taxes and transfers) and the Gini coefficient 
of disposable or net income (post-taxes and transfers);52 the other is to measure social 
spending as a share of GDP. The two approaches have their own pros and cons. For 
                                           
51 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Luxembourg is not included 
amongst 35 OECD countries as of 2018). 
52 When it comes to choosing either absolute redistribution or relative redistribution in examining 
the redistribution theory, opinion is divided. For example, Luebker (2014) claimed that the Meltzer-
Richard model implies relative redistribution, while Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005) adopted an 
absolutist approach by arguing that an absolute measure can remove level effects and that it is easier 
to interpret. 
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instance, the former cannot capture the effect of in-kind redistribution (or publicly 
provided services), 53  and thus the overall redistributive effect tends to be 
underestimated. On the other hand, social spending encompasses both in-cash and in-
kind public expenditures, while the redistributive effect of spending varies according 
to its internal progressiveness, and the effect of taxes is not considered (Mahler 2008, 
163). Thus, the above redistribution measures were alternatively employed for this 
inquiry; the data were taken from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database 
(SWIID) and the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) (Solt 2016; OECD 
2016).54 
Additionally, Figure 3 lists the countries according to the levels of redistributive 
preferences and absolute redistribution, using their mean values in each country. 
Anglo-Saxon countries show a lower level of redistributive preferences, and Nordic 
and Western European countries show a higher level of absolute redistribution. The 
levels of absolute redistribution in Turkey, South Korea, and Chile are significantly 
lower than other countries; however, their levels of redistributive preferences rank 
amongst the highest preferences group. Overall, there is a mismatch between the level 
of redistributive preferences and the level of redistribution. 
With respect to the actual inequality measure, the Gini coefficient of market 
income was used in the main analyses, which is rather standard practice in studies on 
the redistribution theory; Finseraas (2009, 101) also pointed out that the Meltzer-
                                           
53 See Esping-Anderson and Myles (2009, 648–52) for more details about the issues of measuring 
redistribution. 
54 As for social spending, public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP was employed. This 
spending includes both cash benefits and benefits in kind, and the main social policy areas 
considered are as follows: old age, survivors, incapacity-related benefits, health, family, active 
labour market programmes, unemployment, housing, and other social policy areas. 
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Richard model refers to market income inequality. The Gini coefficient of market 
income came from the SWIID.55 Wage inequality and other actual inequality measures, 
such as those in Table 1, were not considered. Wages are only a part of market income, 
and wage distribution is thus different from market income distribution by which a 
more comprehensive level of inequality can be calculated; ratio inequality measures 
also have limitations to reflect the overall level of inequality in the population. 
 
  
Figure 3. Redistributive preferences and absolute redistribution in 34 OECD countries. 
Note: The graphs used data, averaged by country, based on the ISSP 1985 to 2010, the 
CSES Module 4, and the SWIID over the period 1985‒2015 (see Appendix 2). 
 
                                           
55 Jenkins (2015) assesses two secondary income inequality data—the World Income Inequality 
Database (WIID) and the SWIID—and recommends the WIID over the SWIID; however, the use 
of the SWIID is appropriate for the present study since it provides the measures of absolute and 
relative redistribution as well.  
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Control variables 
As for the political control variables, first, left cabinet can be measured as a categorical 
variable with five levels: 1) hegemony of right-wing parties; 2) dominance of right-
wing parties; 3) balance of power between left and right; 4) dominance of social 
democratic and other left parties; and 5) hegemony of social democratic and other left 
parties. In the present model, however, the cumulative variables of the above annual 
measures of left power over the current and previous five years were employed to 
explore their historical effects;56 the original source is the Comparative Political Data 
Set 1960–2013 (Armingeon et al. 2015). Second, electoral system is a dichotomous 
variable with a code of 1 assigned to a proportional representation (PR) system and a 
code of 0 assigned to the other electoral systems. The data were collected from the 
Table of Electoral Systems Worldwide by the International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). 
Regarding the socio-demographic control variables, unemployment rate can be 
measured as a percentage of the total labour force, and elderly population represents a 
share of the population that is aged 65 or older; these two controls were produced from 
the data taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2016), and the 
missing values of the unemployment rate were linearly interpolated. Union density is 
an indicator of union membership as a percentage of total wage and salary earners; the 
data came from Visser (2015), and missing values were also linearly interpolated. 
Ethnic diversity can be quantified by ethnic fractionalisation, which measures the 
probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belong to 
                                           
56 Morgan and Kelly (2013, 677) regarded the use of cumulative measures as standard practice, but 
there is no clear consensus on the length of the entire period. For this study, a five-year time span 
was opted for, considering electoral cycles with which the level of redistribution is likely to change. 
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different groups; its maximum value of 1 means that each person belongs to a different 
group, whereas the minimum value of 0 means that each person belongs to the same 
group; the data were collected from Alesina et al. (2003). 
Last, economic development can be expressed as the logarithm of real GDP per 
capita based on prices that are constant across countries and over time, and economic 
growth can be represented by the yearly percentage growth rate of real GDP at constant 
national prices. These two economic controls were generated by using the GDP data 
taken from the Penn World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015). 
 
Analysis and findings 
Model specification and estimation 
To evaluate the predictions of the hypotheses, the system of two equations is specified 
and estimated below: One is the redistributive preferences equation that explains the 
impact of actual or perceived inequality on redistributive preferences, and the other is 
the redistribution equation that accounts for the effect of redistributive preferences on 
redistribution. Redistributive preferences and redistribution are the dependent variables 
in this system. The interdependence between the two equations exists in that the 
dependent variable of the first equation, redistributive preferences, is an independent 
variable of the second equation. This equation system is deemed recursive under the 
assumption of unidirectional dependency. In the right-hand side of the redistribution 
equation, except the lagged dependent variable, the only variable lagged by one period 
is redistributive preferences because current period’s policy preferences are expected 
to influence policy outcomes for next period (Soroka and Wlezien 2010, 38). 
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In this set of equations, one period indicates three years, and the main analyses 
used three-year-average data, first, to eliminate short-term fluctuations of the covariates 
and second, to capture the mid-term effects of the determinants, considering that the 
levels of inequality and redistribution are rather persistent over time. 57  For each 
country i and time period t, each equation is then written as a function of explanatory 
factors and a set of control factors: 
 
𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡  (𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡)  
+ 𝛽2𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛽4𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 
+ 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                            (1) 
 
𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽3𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛽5𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡   
+ 𝛽7𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡  
                          + 𝛽9𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 
+ 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                            (2)  
 
In each equation, 𝛽0 is the constant term, 𝛿𝑡 represents time fixed effects, and 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term. Time dummies are included to eliminate time-related 
impulses from the errors. This strategy makes the assumption more likely to hold—that 
errors are not correlated across countries. 
                                           
57 Yearly data were also used in a robustness check, which supported the main findings of the 
current study; the results are not reported here, however. 
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Before moving on to estimation techniques, the issue of endogeneity should be 
discussed. In the redistributive preferences equation, the perceived Gini is likely to be 
endogenous to redistributive preferences. It is plausible that those who demand more 
redistribution may rank their social position lower, thus increasing the perceived Gini. 
To mitigate the issue of simultaneous causality, many researchers tend to use 
temporally lagged explanatory variables; however, the recent literature strongly claims 
that this practice is illusory (Bellemare et al. 2017; Reed 2015). Reed (2015) 
recommends the use of lagged endogenous variables as instruments over the doubtful 
practice. With respect to the relationship between the market Gini and redistributive 
preferences, causality might also run in both ways, albeit not simultaneously. It 
certainly takes time for policy preferences to translate into policy outcomes, such as 
actual inequality. In this case, an instrumental variables regression can also be used as 
a more conservative way of estimation.    
In the redistribution equation, it is also reasonable to expect the endogenous 
relation between redistributive preferences and redistribution.58 The causal effect of 
redistributive preferences operates with a one period lag, as discussed earlier, whereas 
reverse causality is contemporaneous because people can immediately adjust their 
preferences by comparing policy outcomes with their preferred outcomes (Soroka and 
Wlezien 2010, 38). In this case, the use of a lagged explanatory variable can be 
sufficiently justified (Bellemare et al. 2017, 34), although this practice does not fully 
address the endogeneity issue. 
                                           
58 The direction of causality between policy preferences and policy outcomes, in fact, has long been 
a subject of debate in the literature (see Steele 2015, 450 for a summary of the discussions). Unlike 
Soroka and Wlezien (2010), Brooks and Manza (2006) claim that there is no immediate policy 
feedback from welfare output to policy preferences; however, they acknowledge that a long-term 
policy feedback effect might exist. 
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Regarding estimation techniques, an instrumental variables approach is mainly 
used to deal with endogeneity. Analyses can be conducted not only for a set of 
equations but also for each equation to fully exploit the instrumental variables approach. 
First, for estimating Equation (1), there are two workable methods: one is to use two-
stage least squares (2SLS) with a lagged endogenous variable as an instrument, 
following Reed’s (2015) recommendation; the other is to conduct an instrumental 
variables regression for a static panel data model (xtivreg command in Stata), using the 
same instrument. A second-lag of an endogenous variable is employed as an instrument 
for two reasons: First, a first lag is highly likely to be correlated with the errors; and 
second, the use of deeper lags significantly reduces the sample size, thereby making an 
analysis not feasible. 
Second, to estimate Equation (2), a system GMM estimator for a dynamic panel 
data model, which is increasingly popular to control endogeneity, is used. This 
estimator was proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and fully developed by Blundell 
and Bond (1998). They assume that good instruments are not available outside the 
immediate dataset, and thus a lagged dependent variable and any other endogenous 
variables are instrumented with internal instruments. Roodman (2009a) provides a 
pedagogic introduction to this estimator and xtabond2 command in Stata. When using 
this estimator, both one-step and two-step estimations can be conducted, but 
Windmeijer (2005) found that the two-step estimation is more efficient than the one-
step estimation although its standard errors tend to be downward biased. Meanwhile, 
he devised a correction for the two-step standard errors, thus making the two-step 
estimation with the corrected errors superior to the one-step estimation (Roodman 
2009a, 97). Accordingly, the current analysis uses two-step system GMM with 
Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. Moreover, we use small-sample adjustments; 
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the forward orthogonal-deviations transform instead of first differencing is employed 
to maximise sample size; and collapsed second-lag instruments are used to limit 
instrument proliferation that cause bias (Roodman 2009b). Additionally, ordinary least 
squares (OLS) is used as a less conservative strategy. The Huber-White sandwich 
estimator that adjusts for clustering over countries is employed with the OLS to address 
heteroscedasticity that causes standard errors to be biased. 
Third, for the estimation of the system of equations, two different estimators can 
be employed. One is to use 2SLS, one of the most widely used estimators for an 
instrumental variables regression. In this estimation, each endogenous variable is 
instrumented with all the exogenous variables; redistribution, a first-lag of 
redistributive preferences, and a first-lag of the perceived or market Gini are considered 
endogenous variables in the system. As in estimating Equation (1), a third-lag of the 
perceived or market Gini is employed as an instrument. An alternative method to 2SLS 
is to use a conditional mixed-process (cmp) estimator developed by Roodman (2011). 
This estimator fits a recursive model without a latent endogenous variable and allows 
mixing of all the model types in a multi-equation system. Furthermore, cmp is 
appropriate for situations in which ‘there is simultaneity but instruments allow the 
construction of a recursive set of equations’ (Roodman 2011, 161). In this estimation, 
the same instrument for a first-lag of the perceived or market Gini as in 2SLS is used. 
 
Empirical results 
Before estimating the empirical models, graphical evidence and the correlation matrix 
in Appendix 3 help understand the relationships between the main variables. Graph (a) 
in Figure 4 shows a very weak correlation between the market Gini and the perceived 
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Gini; however, the correlation is not statistically significant at the 5% level (𝑟 = 0.14). 
This implies that there is a significant gap between market inequality and perceived 
inequality in developed countries. Graphs (b) and (c) in Figure 4 clearly illustrate that 
the bivariate correlation between the perceived Gini and redistributive preferences is 
significant (𝑟 = 0.40),59 but the market Gini has no relationship with the preferences 
( 𝑟 = 0.03) . Graph (d) in Figure 4 shows that redistributive preferences are not 
significantly associated with absolute redistribution (𝑟 = −0.02). Appendix 4, which 
presents a time plot for each OECD country, also presents information confirming that, 
in most countries, there is no over-time association between redistributive preferences 
and absolute redistribution. Similarly, relative redistribution and social expenditure 
have no significant relationships with redistributive preferences (𝑟 = −0.05 and 0.10, 
respectively). 
Table 4 reports the results of the baseline and full models of the redistributive 
preferences equation, using random effects IV estimations and 2SLS estimations.60 
The evidence consistently supports Hypotheses 1 and 2. That is, perceived inequality, 
not market inequality, is significantly and positively associated with redistributive 
                                           
59  The finding of a strong positive association between the perceived Gin and redistributive 
preferences might be largely driven by the cross-country association. One way to check this is to 
draw a plot of country means for the two variables (𝑟 = 0.46). The between-country variation is 
considerable, as predicted, but this does not necessarily mean that the within-country variation is 
negligible. In individual countries, observations are not enough to conduct a fixed effects or time-
series regression (in the simplest fixed effects model, for instance, the average number of 
observations per country is merely 2.4); however, we can look at over-time developments in each 
country instead. Appendix 4 shows a time plot for each OECD country that has more than one 
observation for each variable; in many countries, we can observe a positive over-time association 
between the perceived Gini and redistributive preferences. Accordingly, there is no reason to ignore 
the within-country variation. 
60 Observations within countries are not enough to conduct a fixed effects IV estimation. In the 
simplest fixed effects model, the average number of observations per country is only 2.4, for 
example. 
90 
 
preferences. That is, people prefer more redistribution when perceived inequality 
increases in OECD countries. 
 
  
(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
  
Figure 4. The relationship between perceived and market inequality, redistributive 
preferences, and redistribution. Notes: The graphs used data based on the ISSP 1987 to 
2014 and the SWIID over the period 1985‒2015 (see Appendix 2). The shaded area 
around the regression line shows the 95% confidence interval.   
 
Turning to the control factors in Table 4, ethnic diversity has a negative effect on 
redistributive preferences, while a proportional representation system is positively 
related with redistributive preferences, as predicted. Economic development shows a 
negative relationship with redistributive preferences, except for Column (1), which is 
rather contrary to the expectation that a growing economy leads people to be in favour 
of social spending (Durr 1993). Regarding the strength of the instruments, Table 4 also 
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reports the F-statistic against the null hypothesis that the instruments are irrelevant in 
the first-stage regression. In Columns (4), (5), and (6), the F-statistic is greater than 10, 
which indicates the absence of weak instruments.61  
 
Table 4. Determinants of Redistributive Preferences 
 
redistributive preferences 
(1) IV (re) (2) IV (re) (3) IV (re) (4) 2SLS (5) 2SLS (6) 2SLS 
 Panel A: baseline models 
perceived Gini 2.767  2.461 2.478  2.526 
(0.835)***  (0.807)*** (0.708)***  (0.717)*** 
    [26.18]  [22.34] 
market Gini  0.331 -0.323  -0.043 -0.410 
 (0.628) (0.582)  (0.295) (0.421) 
     [127.91] [56.39] 
R-squared 0.227 0.049 0.256 0.237 0.101 0.256 
observations 68 146 67 68 146 67 
countries 28 34 28    
 Panel B: full models 
perceived Gini 2.766  2.617 2.599  2.617 
(0.986)***  (1.286)** (0.914)***  (0.929)*** 
    [19.09]  [16.99] 
market Gini  0.268 -0.205  0.056 -0.205 
 (0.561) (0.599)  (0.261) (0.394) 
     [90.06] [36.71] 
economic 
development 
1.058 -8.531 -1.607 -1.202 -10.428 -1.607 
(5.036) (4.180)** (8.719) (5.335) (2.884)*** (5.432) 
union density -0.101 -0.076 -0.056 -0.064 -0.106 -0.056 
(0.090) (0.066) (0.108) (0.120) (0.068) (0.123) 
ethnic 
fractionalization 
-0.194 -0.105 -0.232 -0.237 -0.152 -0.232 
(0.098)** (0.094) (0.124)* (0.092)** (0.059)** (0.094)** 
proportional 
representation 
12.692 11.178 11.944 12.359 13.775 11.944 
(4.479)*** (4.924)** (5.080)** (3.527)*** (2.455)*** (3.667)*** 
R-squared 0.434 0.344 0.445 0.448 0.357 0.443 
observations 65 144 65 65 144 65 
countries 27 34 27    
Notes: Columns (1), (2), and (3) report random effects IV estimations with robust standard errors clustered by 
country in parentheses, and Columns (4), (5), and (6) report 2SLS estimations with standard errors in parentheses. 
All regressions include period fixed effects. All the first stages, period fixed effects, and constant terms are not 
reported. A second-lag of an endogenous variable is used as an instrument for the variable in each regression. In 
the 2SLS estimations, the F-statistic associated with the first-stage effect of the instrument on the endogenous 
variable is reported in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                                           
61 Staiger and Stock (1997) suggested that there is a weak instruments problem if the first-stage F-
statistic is less than 10. 
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Table 5. Determinants of Redistribution (Baseline Models) 
 absolute redistribution relative redistribution social expenditure 
 (1) GMM 
(sys)  
(2) OLS (3) GMM 
(sys)  
(4) OLS (5) GMM 
(sys) 
(6) OLS 
redistributive 
preferences (t-1) 
0.043 0.002 0.041 0.005 0.091 0.027 
(0.037) (0.004) (0.035) (0.008) (0.067) (0.020) 
dependent 
variable (t-1) 
1.163 1.005 1.022 0.987 0.838 0.885 
(0.096)*** (0.013)*** (0.080)*** (0.009)*** (0.106)*** (0.078)*** 
economic 
development 
1.273 0.216 2.099 0.658 4.801 0.547 
(1.549) (0.189) (2.552) (0.432) (3.722) (0.530) 
AR (1) p-val 0.150  0.341  0.441  
AR (2) p-val 0.204  0.092  0.302  
Hansen p-val 0.236  0.172  0.023  
Diff-Hansen p-
val 
0.268  0.215  0.205  
instruments 17  17  17  
R-squared  0.983  0.989  0.893 
observations 144 144 144 144 141 136 
countries 33 33 33 33 33 32 
Notes: Columns (1), (3), and (5) report two-step system GMM estimations with Windmeijer-corrected standard 
errors in parentheses, and Columns (2), (4), and (6) report OLS estimations with robust standard errors clustered by 
country in parentheses. All regressions include period fixed effects. All period fixed effects and constant terms are 
not reported. AR (1) p-val and AR (2) p-val report the p-values of the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation. Hansen 
p-val reports the p-value of the test of overidentifying restrictions. Diff-Hansen p-val reports the p-value of the test 
of exogeneity of instrument subsets (GMM instruments for levels). The number of instruments is reported. The 
instrument matrix is restricted to the first- and second-lags and collapsed to prevent instrument proliferation. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 present the results for the redistribution equation with absolute 
redistribution, relative redistribution, and social expenditure as dependent variables. 
The impact of redistributive preferences on each dependent variable was examined by 
using two-step system GMM and OLS estimators. Most importantly, there is no 
significant relationship between redistributive preferences and redistribution, 
regardless of a different type of redistribution and estimation techniques, in both 
baseline and full models. These results strongly suggest that there is little support for 
Hypothesis 3, as opposed to the findings of Brooks and Manza (2006) and Luebker 
(2014) (see Table 2). Regarding the controls for redistribution, economic development 
has a positive effect on redistribution, as expected, albeit not consistently significant. 
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Contrary to the prediction, economic growth negatively affects redistribution, which is 
rather robust to the different measures of redistribution. 
 
Table 6. Determinants of Redistribution (Full Models) 
 absolute redistribution relative redistribution social expenditure 
(1) GMM 
(sys)  
(2) OLS (3) GMM 
(sys)  
(4) OLS (5) GMM 
(sys)  
(6) OLS 
redistributive 
preferences (t-1) 
-0.014 0.008 0.000 0.018 0.022 0.032 
(0.024) (0.007) (0.034) (0.012) (0.035) (0.019) 
dependent 
variable (t-1) 
1.023 0.987 0.946 0.967 0.813 0.738 
(0.116)*** (0.028)*** (0.071)*** (0.019)*** (0.102)*** (0.111)*** 
economic 
development 
0.180 0.311 0.661 0.922 0.476 0.095 
(0.280) (0.152)* (0.662) (0.325)*** (0.548) (0.479) 
economic growth -0.088 -0.071 -0.045 -0.072 -0.141 -0.276 
(0.039)** (0.024)*** (0.060) (0.034)** (0.105) (0.136)* 
unemployment 0.027 0.013 0.017 0.008 0.039 0.031 
(0.052) (0.021) (0.040) (0.029) (0.044) (0.039) 
elderly 
population 
0.014 -0.031 -0.015 -0.070 0.062 0.077 
(0.035) (0.031) (0.081) (0.050) (0.146) (0.092) 
union density -0.002 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.011 0.023 
(0.009) (0.005) (0.014) (0.007) (0.014) (0.017) 
left cabinet 0.013 0.008 0.011 0.020 0.011 -0.028 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.023) (0.017) (0.035) (0.022) 
ethnic 
fractionalisation 
0.001 -0.001 -0.007 -0.005 -0.008 -0.013 
(0.013) (0.003) (0.012) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) 
proportional 
representation 
0.175 -0.177 -0.043 -0.388 -0.183 0.240 
(0.422) (0.178) (0.695) (0.282) (0.828) (0.462) 
AR (1) p-val 0.270  0.600  0.872  
AR (2) p-val 0.353  0.142  0.283  
Hansen p-val 0.134  0.269  0.334  
Diff-Hansen p-val 0.346  0.471  0.684  
instruments 26  26  26  
R-squared  0.975  0.981  0.904 
observations 130 130 130 130 126 123 
countries 28 28 28 28 28 27 
Notes: Columns (1), (3), and (5) report two-step system GMM estimations with Windmeijer-corrected standard 
errors in parentheses, and Columns (2), (4), and (6) report OLS estimations with robust standard errors clustered by 
country in parentheses. All regressions include period fixed effects. All period fixed effects and constant terms are 
not reported. AR (1) p-val and AR (2) p-val report the p-values of the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation. Hansen 
p-val reports the p-value of the test of overidentifying restrictions. Diff-Hansen p-val reports the p-value of the test 
of exogeneity of instrument subsets (GMM instruments for levels). The number of instruments is reported. The 
instrument matrix is restricted to the second-lag and collapsed to prevent instrument proliferation. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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The test statistics for the two-step system GMM estimations given in the lower part 
of Tables 5 and 6 assess the validity of the results. Arellano-Bond tests fail to find 
autocorrelation in the AR (1) and AR (2) residuals. The Hansen J statistic that tests the 
null hypothesis of the exogeneity of the instruments as a group indicates that its p-value 
is significantly different from 0 in each regression. The Difference-in-Hansen tests of 
the validity of the additional orthogonality conditions of system GMM also have p-
values different from 0. Additionally, the number of instruments is kept within less 
than the number of groups, which is a suggested rule of thumb. 
Table 7 provides the results of the estimations for a set of equations with absolute 
redistribution. The results for a system of equations with relative redistribution and 
social expenditure are presented in Appendices 5 and 6. As predicted by Hypotheses 1, 
2, and 3 and evidenced by the current analyses for each equation, all the models 
consistently show that perceived inequality, not actual inequality, is significantly 
associated with redistributive preferences,62 while redistributive preferences do not 
have a significant effect on the different measures of redistribution. 
Regarding the control variables in Table 7 and Appendices 5 and 6, economic 
development negatively affects redistributive preferences, but its effect is rather 
positive on redistribution. The effect of economic growth on redistribution is 
consistently negative. Ethnic fractionalisation has a negative effect on redistributive 
preferences, but this effect is negligible on redistribution. A proportional representation 
system significantly affects the preferences, while it does not influence redistribution. 
The unemployment rate and the share of the elderly, which control for the need-driven  
                                           
62 Considering that conventional standard errors are usually less than robust standard errors, we 
need to be cautious about emphasising the significance of the market Gini in Column (2) of Table 
7 and Appendices 5 and 6.    
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Table 7. Determinants of Redistributive Preferences and Absolute Redistribution 
 (1) 2SLS  (2) 2SLS (3) 2SLS (4) cmp (5) cmp (6) cmp 
 Panel A: redistributive preferences 
perceived Gini 2.856  2.194 1.351  1.382 
(0.843)***  (0.903)** (0.753)*  (0.752)* 
 [12.02]  [13.87] [129.87]  [129.87] 
market Gini  0.730 0.509  0.085 -0.102 
 (0.315)** (0.567)  (0.471) (0.418) 
  [65.87] [27.69]  [1831.43] [1831.43] 
economic 
development 
-1.433 -9.522 -2.718 -5.650 -9.423 -5.854 
(5.680) (2.998)*** (5.562) (5.961) (6.439) (6.019) 
union density -0.027 -0.094 -0.068 -0.047 -0.072 -0.052 
(0.128) (0.068) (0.128) (0.101) (0.098) (0.098) 
ethnic 
fractionalization 
-0.173 -0.108 -0.161 -0.200 -0.163 -0.202 
(0.108) (0.060)* (0.108) (0.089)** (0.087)** (0.087)** 
proportional 
representation 
13.375 17.784 16.026 12.669 13.397 12.882 
(4.091)*** (2.612)*** (4.813)*** (4.363)*** (4.776)*** (4.021)*** 
R-squared 0.506 0.455 0.534 0.490 0.357 0.490 
observations 46 114 46 119 162 119 
 Panel B: absolute redistribution 
redistributive 
preferences (t-1) 
-0.054 -0.001 -0.041 0.001 0.016 0.006 
(0.042) (0.027) (0.035) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
dependent 
variable (t-1) 
1.063 1.017 1.049 0.988 0.971 0.970 
(0.063)*** (0.258)*** (0.054)*** (0.027)*** (0.021)*** (0.022)*** 
economic 
development 
-0.635 0.210 -0.525 0.202 0.402 0.240 
(0.650) (0.288) (0.573) (0.192) (0.073)*** (0.187) 
economic growth -0.165 -0.099 -0.162 -0.064 -0.068 -0.062 
(0.125) (0.036)*** (0.113) (0.027)** (0.021)*** (0.025)** 
unemployment 0.049 0.014 0.040 0.015 -0.004 -0.000 
(0.055) (0.027) (0.048) (0.024) (0.019) (0.021) 
elderly 
population 
0.077 -0.034 0.057 -0.015 -0.044 -0.026 
(0.096) (0.048) (0.084) (0.034) (0.028) (0.035) 
union density -0.013 -0.003 -0.010 -0.001 0.002 -0.000 
(0.016) (0.007) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
left cabinet 0.008 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.005 
(0.031) (0.014) (0.028) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
ethnic 
fractionalisation 
0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 
(0.011) (0.005) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
proportional 
representation 
0.668 0.034 0.459 -0.085 -0.218 -0.086 
(0.785) (0.433) (0.670) (0.203) (0.180) (0.178) 
R-squared 0.971 0.976 0.977 0.975 0.975 0.975 
observations 46 114 46 130 130 130 
Notes: Columns (1), (2), and (3) report 2SLS estimations with standard errors in parentheses, and Columns (4), (5), 
and (6) report cmp estimations with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All regressions 
include period fixed effects. All the first stages, period fixed effects, and constant terms are not reported. A second-
lag of an endogenous variable in Panel A is used as an instrument for the variable in each regression for a system of 
two equations. The F-statistic associated with the first-stage effect of the instrument on the endogenous variable is 
reported in brackets. In the cmp estimations, R-squared and observations are the results of the first-stage. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
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redistribution, as well as union strength and leftist government, which come from the 
power resources theory, do not have significant impacts on redistribution. As for the 
validity of the instruments, like in Table 4, the F-statistic is reported in each regression; 
all the values are greater than 10. 
In sum, the results demonstrate that perceived inequality rather than actual 
inequality is significantly associated with preferences for redistribution, while these 
preferences do not directly translate into redistribution. The findings are robust to 
whether to estimate a single equation or a system of equations as well as the use of 
different measures of redistribution and different estimation techniques.  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Many previous studies trying to explain the size of redistribution, such as that of 
Meltzer and Richard (1981), are based on the premise that policy preferences 
determined by economic situations lead to policy outcomes, which is within a rational 
choice paradigm that expects people to make choices in their best self-interest. This 
study challenges this underlying assumption by providing evidence that perceived 
inequality, not actual inequality, matters substantially in redistributive preferences and 
that preferences for redistribution do not significantly affect redistribution. This 
evidence implies that perceptions that do not simply mirror reality are in a close 
relationship with preferences that do not directly shape reality, which shares a lot in 
common with the conventional criticism of the rational choice theory or neoclassical 
economics. 
The evidence provided by the randomised survey experiments (e.g., Cruces, Perez-
Truglia, and Tetaz 2013; Karadja, Möllerström, and Seim 2014), as discussed, points 
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to the importance of information and the gap between objective social position and 
subjective social position when it comes to shaping preferences for redistribution. This 
study also provides evidence that misperceptions of social position lead to the 
significant difference between market inequality and perceived inequality. However, 
this fact does not necessarily mean that the effect of political information on policy 
preferences is always apparent; we cannot exclude the possibility that, regardless of 
political information, as Bartels’ (2005) study shows, policy preferences are 
disconnected from material self-interest.63 Thus, although it is evident that the overall 
association between perceived inequality and redistributive preferences is significant 
and that correct political information reduces the gap between actual and perceived 
inequality, it should be noted that there are ‘real and profound limits of political 
information as a transforming force when it comes to public opinion about complex 
policy issues’ (Bartels 2005, 25). 
Quite legitimately, one can invite an essential question about the possibility of the 
cross-national comparison of the policy inputs-outputs link. In fact, a large body of 
literature on policy responsiveness focused on the United States (e.g., Erikson, 
MacKuen, and Stimson 2002), but a number of studies also provided evidence for the 
opinion-policy nexus within Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom (see Brooks 
and Manza 2006, 818). This fact suggests the operation of policy responses to policy 
demands across countries beyond the United States, and Brooks and Manza (2006) 
found that policy preferences exert a significant influence over welfare spending 
amongst OECD countries. Also, Soroka and Wlezien (2010) presented the evidence of 
policy responsiveness in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. 
                                           
63 There is abundant empirical evidence that attitudes or behaviours are inconsistent with material 
self-interest in behavioural economics.  
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Furthermore, Baumgartner et al. (2009) observed, in terms of translating voter demands 
into policies, more similarities than differences between the United States, Belgium, 
and Denmark. Accordingly, we can make some generalisable predictions for policy 
responsiveness, although its magnitude and nature might be different across countries. 
The Meltzer-Richard hypothesis does not assert that a majority rule based on direct 
democracy dictates policy outcomes, as conjectured by Milanovic (2000). Meltzer and 
Richard (1981, 924) explicitly assumed that voters choose candidates who favour more 
redistribution or less redistribution, not direct voting for policies. The point is therefore 
not whether the redistribution hypothesis is consistent with decision-making 
mechanisms in representative democracy, but to which extent voters’ preferences are 
equally represented in a democratic political system. However, the current finding that 
policy preferences do not directly determine policy outcomes raises a fundamental 
question about the effectiveness of representative democracy because there is a 
common belief that a good democracy is a polity in which voters’ preferences are fully 
represented (see also Dahl 1971, 1). 
The finding that there is no congruence between changes in preferences and 
changes in redistributive policies in developed democracies presents many challenges 
to take up in future work. To give a few of them, first, we cannot exclude the possibility 
of measurement errors in measuring preferences for redistribution; second, there might 
be no causal link between redistributive preferences and redistributive policies, which 
needs further theoretical explanation;64 third, it is worth examining whether there is 
                                           
64 According to Page and Shapiro (1983, 189), this finding might be one of the cases in which 
policy outcomes are not responsive to the public, demonstrating that democratic responsiveness 
does not always pervade politics. 
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unequal responsiveness to the preferences across different income groups,65 which 
also tests the fundamental assumption of individual’s equal political influence in the 
conventional redistribution theory; finally, we can assume multi-stages and linkages 
between policy preferences and policy outcomes, as Powell (2005) suggested, which 
may make empirical research much more puzzling. 
In future research, the analysis of the historical evidence based on the case studies 
of redistributive policies may also shed light on the role of public opinion or the way 
in which public opinion influences policy outcomes in substantive terms. For instance, 
researchers could investigate whether or not key changes in redistributive institutions 
or policies that are distinguishable from need-driven automatic variations of 
redistribution are preceded and driven by changes in redistributive preferences. If this 
is the case, which contradicts the results of the present statistical analysis, it would be 
necessary to search for an alternative analytical model. Otherwise, we can more 
convincingly dismiss the standard model of redistribution built on redistributive 
preferences as an intervening factor. In this respect, the conclusion of this research is 
rather tentative—that the rational choice theory for redistribution is not supported. 
One of the important tasks in conducting this comparative analysis was to develop 
a measure of perceived inequality. As discussed, there is no consensus on the 
conceptualisation, operationalisation, or measurement of perceived inequality. The fact 
that perceived inequality can be understood at both the individual and country levels—
unlike market inequality, which is only a country-level indicator—makes the situation 
                                           
65 Regarding this policy representation, there have been conflicting findings: For instance, Bartels 
(2008) and Gilens (2012) provided evidence supporting unequal responsiveness, while Soroka and 
Wlezien (2010) presented evidence that policy representation as well as public responsiveness is 
similar across a set of groups—income, education, and party.  
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more complicated. Some measures, such as perceived society type in Table 3, try to 
average individuals’ evaluations of inequality to produce a macro-level measure; 
however, there is no convincing theoretical justification for this type of averaging. A 
more promising strategy is to develop independent measures at each level. The 
perceived Gini based on the frequency distribution of self-positioning on a bottom-to-
top scale is exemplary as a country-level indicator. Measures for individuals’ inequality 
perceptions need to be separately developed; for example, Kuhn (2011) attempted to 
construct subjective inequality measures based on individuals’ estimates of real and 
just wages by using the ISSP data. Additionally, what is worthy of further exploration 
is to identify major factors in shaping people’s views about inequality at the different 
levels. 
Furthermore, the analysis of perceived inequality and redistributive preferences at 
the individual level constitutes an obvious next step and would complement the macro-
comparative analysis of the type presented here. Most existing models or theories of 
redistribution take it for granted that individual preferences for redistribution are 
derived from pure economic self-interest or current income. It is therefore necessary to 
explore whether or not material wealth is the only decisive factor for individuals’ 
preference formation. If it also turns out not to be the case, the classical redistribution 
theory would become more untenable from an empirical standpoint at both the macro 
and micro levels. 
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Supplementary materials 
Supplementary materials are available at http://doi.org/10.3886/E101245V2. 
 
Appendix 1. Survey questions 
Variable Question Source 
perceived Gini / 
perceived mean-to-
median ratio 
A. In our society there are groups which tend to be 
towards the top and groups which tend to be towards 
the bottom. Below is a scale that runs from top to 
bottom. Where would you put yourself now on this 
scale? 
(10 the top, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 the bottom) 
ISSP 1987, 1992, 
1999, 2002, 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, and 2014 
perceived income 
differences 
B. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
following statements? Differences in income in <R’s 
country> are too large. 
(1 Strongly agree, 2 Agree, 3 Neither agree nor 
disagree, 4 Disagree, 5 Strongly disagree) 
ISSP 1987, 1992, 
1999, and 2009 
perceived society type C. These five diagrams show different types of society. 
Please read the descriptions and look at the diagrams 
and decide which you think best describes <R’s 
country>. What type of society is <R’s country> 
today—which diagram comes closest? 
(1 Type A, 2 Type B, 3 Type C, 4 Type D, 5 Type E)a 
ISSP 1992, 1999, 
and 2009 
redistributive 
preferences 
D. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
following statements? It is the responsibility of the 
government to reduce the differences in income 
between people with high incomes and those 
with low incomes. 
(1 Strongly agree, 2 Agree, 3 Neither agree nor 
disagree, 4 Disagree, 5 Strongly disagree) 
ISSP 1985, 1987, 
1990, 1992, 1993, 
1996, 1999, 2000, 
2006b, 2009, and 
2010 / CSES 
Module 4 (2011–
2015)c 
Notes: a See the figure below. b ISSP 2006 does not have the item of ‘3 Neither agree nor disagree’ amongst the five 
items. c The data from the CSES Module 4 were incorporated into the variable of redistributive preferences to 
maximise the number of observations available in the main analyses. 
 
 
Source: ISSP 2009 Social Inequality IV Final questionnaire (August 2008)  
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Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics 
variable  observations mean std. dev. min max 
perceived Gini 181 17.27 3.16 10.91 26.18 
perceived income differences 72 81.24 10.99 58.04 97.06 
perceived society type 55 31.65 3.62 24.21 38.44 
perceived mean-to-median ratio 181 0.98 0.05 0.85 1.10 
market Gini 364 46.09 5.20 29.11 60.63 
net Gini 364 30.57 6.41 18.72 50.90 
redistributive preferences 165 64.70 15.28 28.92 91.91 
absolute redistribution 354 15.49 6.22 0.26 31.90 
relative redistribution 354 33.19 12.50 0.43 52.66 
social expenditure 309 19.15 6.67 0.00 33.33 
unemployment 322 7.80 4.08 0.60 25.97 
elderly population 374 13.87 3.87 3.98 26.34 
union density 325 34.67 22.13 6.50 97.80 
left cabinet 279 12.04 6.36 1.00 25.00 
economic development 335 10.10 0.48 8.55 11.07 
economic growth 330 2.52 2.96 -20.05 10.48 
ethnic fractionalisation 374 24.17 19.31 0.20 71.24 
proportional representation 374 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 
 
  
103 
 
 
Appendix 3. Correlation matrix 
 perceived Gini 
perceived 
income 
differences 
perceived 
society type 
perceived 
mean-to-
median ratio 
market Gini net Gini 
redistributive 
preferences 
absolute 
redistribution 
relative 
redistribution 
social 
expenditure 
perceived Gini 1          
perceived 
income differences 
0.47 1         
perceived 
society type 
0.79 0.69 1        
perceived mean-to-
median ratio 
-0.27 -0.03 0.13 1       
market Gini 0.14 0.10 0.31 0.10 1      
net Gini 0.33 0.17 0.31 -0.10 0.45 1     
redistributive 
preferences 
0.40 0.84 0.53 0.06 0.03 0.03 1    
absolute 
redistribution 
-0.21 -0.07 -0.05 0.18 0.38 -0.67 -0.02 1   
relative 
redistribution 
-0.29 -0.13 -0.17 0.18 0.16 -0.81 -0.05 0.96 1  
social 
expenditure 
-0.32 0.01 -0.20 0.18 0.24 -0.56 0.10 0.81 0.81 1 
Note: Coefficients printed in bold are significant (p < .01). 
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Appendix 4. Inequality, redistributive preferences, and redistribution 
 
Notes: Min-max normalisation was used to bring the measures of perceived and market Gini, redistributive 
preferences, and absolute redistribution into the same unit for a relative comparison over time within each country. 
31 OECD countries that have more than one observation for each variable were plotted. Period 1 corresponds to the 
three years from 1985 to 1987, and period 11 corresponds to the year 2015.  
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Appendix 5. Determinants of redistributive preferences and relative 
redistribution 
 (1) 2SLS  (2) 2SLS (3) 2SLS (4) cmp (5) cmp (6) cmp 
 Panel A: redistributive preferences 
perceived Gini 2.709  2.216 1.323  1.344 
(0.834)***  (0.905)** (0.853)  (0.893) 
 [12.43]  [14.15] [129.87]  [129.87] 
market Gini  0.733 0.441  -0.089 -0.102 
 (0.318)** (0.578)  (0.084) (0.413) 
  [55.47] [21.34]  [1831.43] [1831.43] 
economic 
development 
-1.913 -9.518 -2.763 -5.637 -9.032 -5.957 
(5.639) (2.999)*** (5.561) (6.420) (6.410) (6.585) 
union density -0.036 -0.094 -0.067 -0.050 -0.088 -0.053 
(0.127) (0.068) (0.128) (0.101) (0.082) (0.099) 
ethnic 
fractionalization 
-0.176 -0.108 -0.164 -0.202 -0.167 -0.201 
(0.107) (0.060)* (0.108) (0.089)** (0.089)* (0.089)** 
proportional 
representation 
13.512 17.793 15.731 12.762 13.310 12.996 
(4.065)*** (2.616)*** (4.841)*** (4.367)*** (4.630)*** (3.978)*** 
R-squared 0.512 0.455 0.534 0.490 0.357 0.490 
observations 46 114 46 119 162 119 
 Panel B: relative redistribution 
redistributive 
preferences (t-1) 
-0.054 0.021 -0.052 0.012 0.394 0.018 
(0.053) (0.038) (0.053) (0.030) (0.263) (0.031) 
dependent 
variable (t-1) 
1.010 0.991 1.009 0.966 0.970 0.961 
(0.052)*** (0.021)*** (0.051)*** (0.017)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** 
economic 
development 
-0.622 0.905 -0.608 0.825 4.363 0.869 
(0.827) (0.415)** (0.818) (0.472)* (1.590)*** (0.495)* 
economic growth -0.156 -0.109 -0.156 -0.065 -0.130 -0.066 
(0.171) (0.055)** (0.170) (0.045) (0.047)*** (0.045) 
unemployment 0.049 -0.002 0.047 0.009 0.003 -0.001 
(0.080) (0.042) (0.079) (0.032) (0.034) (0.033) 
elderly 
population 
0.087 -0.089 0.085 -0.056 -0.088 -0.063 
(0.127) (0.070) (0.126) (0.063) (0.052)* (0.065) 
union density -0.012 -0.002 -0.012 0.002 0.036 0.002 
(0.022) (0.010) (0.022) (0.007) (0.042) (0.007) 
left cabinet -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 0.018 0.011 0.018 
(0.041) (0.021) (0.041) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) 
ethnic 
fractionalisation 
0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.007 0.057 -0.007 
(0.015) (0.007) (0.014) (0.006) (0.042) (0.006) 
proportional 
representation 
0.492 -0.323 0.467 -0.306 -5.486 -0.332 
(0.873) (0.580) (0.862) (0.436) (4.546) (0.427) 
R-squared 0.982 0.983 0.982 0.981 0.981 0.981 
observations 46 114 46 130 130 130 
Notes: Columns (1), (2), and (3) report 2SLS estimations with standard errors in parentheses, and Columns (4), (5), 
and (6) report cmp estimations with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All regressions 
include period fixed effects. All the first stages, period fixed effects, and constant terms are not reported. A second-
lag of an endogenous variable in Panel A is used as an instrument for the variable in each regression for a system of 
two equations. The F-statistic associated with the first-stage effect of the instrument on the endogenous variable is 
reported in brackets. In the cmp estimations, R-squared and observations are the results of the first-stage. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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 Appendix 6. Determinants of redistributive preferences and social 
expenditure 
 (1) 2SLS  (2) 2SLS (3) 2SLS (4) cmp (5) cmp (6) cmp 
 Panel A: redistributive preferences 
perceived Gini 2.678  2.237 1.232  1.319 
(0.983)***  (1.138)* (0.613)**  (0.595)** 
 [11.67]  [13.18] [129.87]  [129.87] 
market Gini  0.615 0.205  0.113 -0.161 
 (0.327)* (0.667)  (0.092) (0.346) 
  [50.90] [17.68]  [1831.43] [1831.43] 
economic 
development 
-0.075 -10.607 -0.665 -3.404 -9.065 -3.344 
(5.997) (3.554)*** (5.995) (5.914) (6.215) (5.807) 
union density -0.070 -0.118 -0.110 -0.086 -0.086 -0.092 
(0.163) (0.072) (0.168) (0.102) (0.077) (0.100) 
ethnic 
fractionalization 
-0.238 -0.082 -0.238 -0.212 -0.167 -0.214 
(0.128)* (0.069) (0.131)* (0.086)** (0.086)* (0.084)** 
proportional 
representation 
12.343 18.981 13.899 12.617 13.649 12.794 
(4.533)*** (2.757)*** (5.991)** (4.308)*** (4.726)*** (4.117)*** 
R-squared 0.513 0.471 0.530 0.490 0.357 0.490 
observations 43 106 43 119 162 119 
 Panel B: social expenditure 
redistributive 
preferences (t-1) 
-0.005 0.137 0.006 0.097 -0.639 0.093 
(0.027) (0.106) (0.027) (0.059) (0.428) (0.057) 
dependent 
variable (t-1) 
0.893 0.744 0.881 0.772 0.760 0.783 
(0.056)*** (0.057)*** (0.056)*** (0.074)*** (0.093)*** (0.069)*** 
economic 
development 
0.025 1.299 0.137 0.746 -5.879 0.699 
(0.558) (1.293) (0.560) (0.732) (4.313) (0.744) 
economic growth -0.417 -0.425 -0.410 -0.323 -0.142 -0.330 
(0.109)*** (0.142)*** (0.110)*** (0.120)*** (0.104) (0.120)*** 
unemployment 0.001 -0.056 -0.005 0.085 0.087 0.101 
(0.042) (0.108) (0.043) (0.041)** (0.066) (0.047)** 
elderly 
population 
-0.029 -0.131 -0.044 0.087 0.092 0.094 
(0.082) (0.264) (0.083) (0.070) (0.092) (0.069) 
union density 0.005 0.039 0.009 0.015 -0.040 0.015 
(0.013) (0.017)** (0.013) (0.018) (0.074) (0.017) 
left cabinet -0.020 -0.046 -0.023 -0.019 -0.012 -0.019 
(0.024) (0.044) (0.024) (0.015) (0.019) (0.014) 
ethnic 
fractionalisation 
-0.014 -0.006 -0.013 -0.009 -0.133 -0.010 
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.087) (0.014) 
proportional 
representation 
-0.073 -1.495 -0.237 -0.957 8.967 -1.059 
(0.480) (1.656) (0.479) (1.034) (7.481) (1.100) 
R-squared 0.979 0.862 0.978 0.904 0.904 0.904 
observations 43 106 43 123 123 123 
Notes: Columns (1), (2), and (3) report 2SLS estimations with standard errors in parentheses, and Columns (4), (5), 
and (6) report cmp estimations with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All regressions 
include period fixed effects. All the first stages, period fixed effects, and constant terms are not reported. A second-
lag of an endogenous variable in Panel A is used as an instrument for the variable in each regression for a system of 
two equations. The F-statistic associated with the first-stage effect of the instrument on the endogenous variable is 
reported in brackets. In the cmp estimations, R-squared and observations are the results of the first-stage. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Individuals’ Social Position, Inequality Perceptions, and 
Redistributive Preferences 
 
 
Abstract 
The standard model of redistribution posits that attitudes towards redistribution are 
driven by pure economic self-interest. From a social-psychological perspective, 
however, subjective social status, apart from objective social status, is closely 
associated with policy preferences. This inquiry compares these two different 
approaches and further explores the role of individuals’ inequality perceptions, 
including personal norms of inequality to which researchers have paid little 
attention, in shaping individual preferences for redistribution. For the empirical 
analysis, the new measures of perceived actual inequality, personal norms of 
inequality, and perceived injustice were developed with the aim to overcome the 
limitations of the existing measures of perceived inequality. The International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP) micro-data were used to create the measures, 
which cover 31 OECD countries over the four waves: 1987, 1992, 1999, and 2009. 
The current findings show that the effect of subjective social position is stronger 
than that of objective income position in determining redistributive preferences. 
The results also demonstrate that individuals’ inequality norms play a more crucial 
role in preference formation than does their perceptions of actual inequality, which 
sheds new light on another facet of inequality perceptions at the individual level. 
Keywords: redistributive preferences; perceived actual inequality; personal norms 
of inequality; perceived injustice; perceived social position; perceived Gini  
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Introduction 
Is pure economic self-interest the only decisive factor that drives individual preferences 
for redistribution? What if this self-interest is only one of the driving factors—not the 
most significant one—that shape preferences for redistribution? The empirical answer 
to these questions has important theoretical implications. According to the basic 
assumption of the standard model of redistribution, which is a generalised term of the 
Meltzer-Richard model, objective income position dictates demand for redistribution 
(Meltzer and Richard 1981, 924). If this is not the case, however, the cornerstone of 
the Meltzer-Richard model would be undermined. 
The standard redistribution model assumes a close association between actual 
economic inequality and redistribution through the demand for redistribution at the 
macro level. However, much of the empirical literature analysing the relationship 
between inequality and redistribution ignores preferences for redistribution or even 
identify these preferences with redistribution. If we focus on preferences for 
redistribution rather than redistribution, leaving aside whether or not collective 
redistributive preferences translate into redistribution, it is possible to analyse, at least, 
the mechanism or assumption of the Meltzer-Richard model at the individual level. Of 
course, there are numerous studies examining the determinants of redistributive 
preferences at the micro level; however, their findings show that income position is just 
one of the significant predictors. This evidence does not say anything about the validity 
of the dominance of income position in preference formation. 
On the other hand, many cross-national survey analyses have shown that there exist 
widespread misperceptions of income position or inequality and the substantial gap 
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between perceived inequality and actual inequality. 66  Researchers have also 
demonstrated that perceived inequality rather than actual inequality plays a critical role 
in shaping attitudes towards redistribution (e.g., Gimpelson and Treisman 2015). This 
empirical evidence from the social-psychological literature gives rise to the re-
examination of the classical redistribution model and its fundamental assumption by 
using subjective perceptions of income position and inequality.  
Taken all together, the gap in the literature in terms of the driving factors of 
redistributive preferences can be summarised as a lack of both testing the dominance 
of objective income position and exploring multifaceted inequality perceptions. To fill 
this gap, this inquiry investigates two main points. First, we question whether or not an 
individual’s objective social position is the most decisive predictor of preferences for 
redistribution, as predicted by the critical assumption of the Meltzer-Richard model; to 
do this, the effects of objective income position and subjective social status are directly 
compared. Second, the impacts of inequality perceptions, in addition to social position, 
on individual preferences for redistribution are investigated; to this end, new measures 
of inequality perceptions, named perceived actual inequality, personal norms of 
inequality, and perceived injustice, were developed. 
                                           
66 In addition to several studies that have systematically tested whether the gap exists through cross-
national comparisons (e.g., Bublitz 2016; Engelhardt and Wagener 2014; Gimpelson and Treisman 
2015; Kuhn 2015b; Niehues 2014), there are several studies examining Americans’ perceptions of 
inequality (Chambers, Swan, and Heesacker 2014; Eriksson and Simpson 2012; Norton and Ariely 
2011; Osberg and Smeeding 2006). Even prior to these studies, there were some papers pointing 
out that contextual inequality, such as income inequality, does not directly translate into perceptions 
of inequality (see Neckerman and Torche 2007, 349–50). Beramendi and Anderson (2008, 405–8) 
also cast doubt on the dominant assumption that people perceive actual inequality accurately, which 
the conventional political economy of inequality and redistribution is based on. Furthermore, a 
multitude of randomised survey experiments have provided considerable evidence that correcting 
misperceptions of individual income position or society-level inequality has an important impact 
on changing attitudes towards redistribution (e.g., Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz 2013; Karadja, 
Möllerström, and Seim 2014; Kuziemko et al. 2015). 
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The current empirical results support the following claims. First, subjective social 
position is more important than objective social position in determining redistributive 
preferences, which has to my knowledge not been examined in previous comparative 
studies. Second, the inequality norms that each individual holds matter significantly in 
preference formation, and the effect of personal norms of inequality on preferences for 
redistribution is stronger than that of perceived actual inequality. Third, perceived 
injustice that can be measured as a gap between perceived actual inequality and 
personal norms of inequality is also closely associated with individuals’ redistributive 
preferences. Last, perception of inequality at the country level, rather than market 
inequality, plays an important role in shaping individual preferences for redistribution. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The second section reviews 
the determinants of redistributive preferences. In the third section, social position and 
inequality perception hypotheses are formulated. Subsequently, the measures of 
individuals’ inequality perceptions are explained. The next section summarises the 
findings of the empirical analyses based on the international survey data covering 31 
OECD countries (see Appendix 3). The last section discusses the remaining issues and 
concludes the chapter. 
 
Social position, perceived inequality, and redistributive preferences 
Ever since we observed that people behave in ways that are contrary to their material 
self-interest in many contexts, behavioural economics has been challenging 
neoclassical economics and finding the importance of other-regarding or social 
preferences, such as fairness, reciprocity, and equity. This research has been advanced 
by experimental studies (e.g., Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982; Roth et al. 
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1991), and one of the hot topics in this research is redistributive politics. For instance, 
there is compelling evidence that those who believe that the poor work hard and that 
poverty is beyond the control of the poor tend to support redistribution, but economic 
self-interest, such as actual income, is a poor predictor for redistributive preferences 
(Fong 2001; Fong, Bowles, and Gintis 2005). This strong effect of self- and exogenous-
determination beliefs on support for redistribution can be understood as reflecting 
reciprocity (Bowles and Gintis 2000) or the principle of equity (Kluegel and Smith 
1986). Nevertheless, many scholars still defend the median voter model of 
redistribution under the assumption that economic self-interest is a decisive driver for 
redistributive preferences. Without considering social preferences, however, it is 
difficult to explain why there is substantial support for redistribution even amongst 
high-income individuals in many surveys. The significance of social preferences 
suggests the value of a broader search for driving factors inconsistent with the standard 
redistribution model. 
In a framework of the standard redistribution model, in fact, public opinion towards 
redistribution plays a decisive role in determining redistribution (e.g., Cusack, Iversen, 
and Rehm 2008; Meltzer and Richard 1981; Kelly and Enns 2010; Kenworthy and 
McCall 2008). In principle, testing the standard model requires collective redistributive 
preferences as an intervening factor between economic inequality and redistribution. If 
we take preferences into account, not only country-level analyses but also individual-
level analyses can be conducted. Apart from how responsive policy outcomes are to 
policy preferences, how society-level inequality shapes collective preferences for 
redistribution can be explored in a macro analysis. On the other hand, a micro analysis 
can estimate the effects of both a person’s social status and perceptions of inequality 
on individual preferences for redistribution. One caveat is that conducting this micro-
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level analysis should not be confused with testing the redistribution model itself. This 
analysis relates exactly to examining either the foundational assumption of the 
redistribution model or an individual-level mechanism of the model. 
 
Table 1. The Relation Between Social Position and Redistributive Preferences  
Author Data and sample Independent variable 
Effects on 
preferences 
Alesina and Giuliano (2011) GSS: US, 1972–2004 
WVS: 20–80 countries, 4 
waves 
family income (min 1–max 12) 
income (min 1–max 3) 
negative 
negative 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) GSS: US, 1978–1991 logarithm of current income negative 
Clark and D'Angelo (2013) BHPS: UK, 1991–2008 objective social position on Hope-
Goldthorpe scale 
negative 
Corneo and Grüner (2002) ISSP: 12 countries, 1992 individual gross income negative 
Dallinger (2010) ISSP: 23 countries, 1999 household income (deciles 1–10) negative 
Finseraas (2009) ESS: 22 countries, 2002 household income (min 1–max 12) negative 
Guillaud (2013) ISSP: 33 countries, 2006 family income (quintiles 1–5) 
perceived social position (lower, 
middle, upper) 
negative 
in part negativea 
Karabarbounis (2011) WVS: 14 OECD countries, 
1981–2004 
household income (min 1–max 10) negative 
Mosimann and Pontusson 
(2014) 
ESS: 19 countries, 3 waves 
(2008, 2010, and 2012) 
relative household income (min 1–
max 10) 
negative 
Rainer and Siedler (2008) SOEP: Germany, 2005 logarithm of household income negative 
Steele (2015) ISSP: 38 countries, 2009 income (mean-centred country-
specific deciles) 
negative 
Notes: BHPS (British Household Panel Survey); ESS (European Social Survey); GSS (General Social Survey); ISSP 
(International Social Survey Programme); SOEP (German Socio-Economic Panel); WVS (World Values Survey). a 
The upper class are significantly less inclined to favour redistribution than the middle class, but the effect of the 
lower class is not significant. 
 
Most existing survey studies show that objective income position is a significant 
predictor of redistributive preferences in addition to other important factors; however, 
no researchers have directly examined the effect size of objective social location in 
comparison with that of subjective social position, as can be seen in Table 1. Unlike 
other studies, Guillaud’s (2013) analysis includes both objective and subjective social 
positions, but their effects are not directly comparable, as the variables were measured 
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using different metrics. On the other hand, Finseraas (2009, 96) stated that the finding 
that the demand for redistribution decreases with income is in accord with the Meltzer-
Richard model. To be exact, however, this evidence demonstrates neither the validity 
of the basic assumption of the model nor that of the model itself; this robust finding is 
nothing more than that income is one of the driving factors of redistributive preferences. 
Furthermore, Alesina and Giuliano (2011, 105) argued that the rejections of the 
Meltzer-Richard model, because of scant empirical support at the country level, ‘do not 
imply immediately that people care about something other than their current income’; 
however, this argument has not been fully examined in the existing literature. 
On the other hand, McCarty and Pontusson (2009, 672) cast doubt on the 
underlying assumption of the Meltzer-Richard model that ‘[voters’] preferences can be 
inferred straightforwardly from their position in the income distribution’ and claimed 
that this questionable assumption may contribute to the failure of the model. Brown-
Iannuzzi et al.’s (2015) presented correlational and experimental evidence that 
subjective social status is negatively associated with support for redistribution, while 
objective social status, such as income and education, has no relationship with the 
support. Meanwhile, Bolton (1991) formalised the idea that individuals are not only 
concerned about absolute income they get but also about their relative income position 
compared to others; in this study, objective social position is an absolute measure of 
self-interest, while perceived social position is a relative measure of self-interest. 
In fact, people do not construct attitudes towards policies simply by following their 
economic self-interest (Fong 2001), although it cannot be denied that the preference 
gap of redistribution between income groups is not negligible (e.g., Peters and Ensink 
2015; Soroka and Wlezien 2008; see also studies in Table 1). It is thus reasonable to 
assume that other cognitive factors, such as perceived social position and inequality 
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perceptions, which diverge from pure economic self-interest, also play a role in 
preference formation. 
Unlike individual social position and society-level inequality, it is challenging 
work to conceptualise and measure individuals’ inequality perceptions. However, we 
may ask questions as follows: How unequal a society is perceived and how unequal a 
society should be. In fact, perceived inequality has mostly been construed as 
perceptions of actual inequality in existing studies that recently started paying attention 
to individuals’ perceptions of inequality. Few investigators, on the other hand, have 
focussed on personal norms of inequality that can be defined as perceptions of how 
much inequality is desirable in a society. Kuhn’s (2011, 2015a, 2015b) work might be 
an exception; however, he mainly examined the effects of perceptions of actual 
inequality rather than personal norms of inequality. Individuals have subjective 
perceptions of norms, which seem to be distinct from perceptions of reality, and the 
former ‘can guide individuals’ opinions and behaviors’ (Tankard and Paluck 2016, 
182). However, this presumption has not been robustly tested in previous studies. 
Regarding the determinants of individual preferences for redistribution, numerous 
studies exist (e.g., Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm 2008; Fong 2001; Rueda 2014; see more 
studies in Tables 1 and 2; see also McCarty and Pontusson 2009, 680–7 for a summary 
of the important literature). However, much of the literature does not directly address 
inequality perceptions, although many studies consider psychological factors, such as 
experience or expectation of upward mobility (e.g., Benabou and Ok 2001; Piketty 
1995).67 Table 2 shows recent research focussing on either perceived inequality or 
                                           
67 In a broad sense, perceived upward mobility might also be a form of inequality perceptions in 
terms of inequality of opportunity, but the current inquiry focusses on perceived inequality of 
outcome, such as income or social position, rather than perceived inequality of opportunity. 
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actual inequality as an explanatory variable. Kuhn (2011, 2015a, 2015b) and 
Gimpelson and Treisman (2015) employed perceived inequality measures, and the rest 
of the researchers used net inequality as a contextual variable. Overall, the findings 
show that individual preferences for redistribution are closely related with perceived 
inequality, while net inequality is not consistently associated with redistributive 
preferences. 
 
Table 2. The Relation Between Inequality and Redistributive Preferences 
Author Data and sample Independent variable 
Effects on 
preferences 
Kuhn (2011) ISSP: Switzerland, 1999 
perceived 
inequality 
actual inequality 
ethical inequality 
equalisation of market wagesa 
positive 
negative 
positive 
Kuhn (2015a, 2015b) ISSP: 27 countries (2015a)/23 
countries (2015b), 4 waves 
(1987, 1992, 1999, and 2009) 
inequality perceptionb positive 
Gimpelson and 
Treisman (2015) 
ISSP: 40 countries, 2009 perceived Gini (individual) 
perceived Gini (country 
average)c 
positive 
positive 
Dallinger (2010) ISSP: 23 countries, 1999 
actual 
inequality 
net inequality positive 
Finseraas (2009) ESS: 22 countries, 2002 net inequality positive 
Jæger (2013) ESS: 31 countries, 5 waves 
(2002–2010) 
inequalityd positivee 
Kerr (2014) ISSP: 19 countries, 3 waves 
(1987, 1992, and 1999) 
WVS: 37 countries, 3 waves 
(1990, 1995, and 2000) 
GSS: US, 2000 
net inequality 
 
net inequality 
 
net inequality 
positive 
 
positive 
 
positive 
Kuhn (2015b) ISSP: 23 countries, 4 waves 
(1987, 1992, 1999, and 2009) 
net inequality not significant 
Mosimann and 
Pontusson (2014) 
ESS: 19 countries, 3 waves 
(2008–2012) 
net inequality positive 
Schmidt-Catran 
(2016) 
ESS: 27 countries, 5 waves 
(2002–2010) 
net inequality positive 
Steele (2015) ISSP: 38 countries, 2009 net inequality not significant 
Tóth and Keller 
(2011) 
EB: 27 countries, 2009 net inequality positive 
Notes: EB (Eurobarometer); ESS (European Social Survey); GSS (General Social Survey); ISSP (International 
Social Survey Programme); WVS (World Values Survey). a These are individual perceptions of wage inequality 
measures. b This measure was constructed in the same manner as actual inequality in Kuhn (2011). c These indicators 
were constructed by using Question G in Appendix 1, and they are different from the perceived Gini in the current 
analysis. d Gini (WIID) not specified. e At the level of 27 socio-demographic groups across education, social class, 
and age.  
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There is also a measurement issue that cannot be overlooked. In Table 2, net 
inequality is commonly used as a contextual variable that may affect individual 
preferences; however, the standard redistribution model refers to market income 
inequality, not disposable or net income inequality (Finseraas 2009, 101; Schmidt-
Catran 2016, 127). From the perspective of the standard model, net inequality after 
taxes and transfers cannot be an explanatory variable. Moreover, it is more problematic 
because the gap between market inequality and net inequality is sizable in advanced 
democracies. Accordingly, the effect of market inequality, instead of net inequality, 
was tested for the present analysis. 
In sum, subjective factors in terms of social position and inequality have recently 
started attracting attention in the literature of individual preferences for redistribution, 
but their significance has not been closely analysed. Furthermore, in testing the role of 
income position, the theoretical implications relating to the Meltzer-Richard model are 
not properly addressed in the existing literature. Underdeveloped measures of 
inequality perceptions also hinder the empirical analysis from advancing. Perceived 
inequality measures in Table 2 are critically discussed in more detail below, followed 
by a discussion of alternative measures, after the presentation of the main hypotheses. 
 
Social position and inequality perception hypotheses 
The main hypotheses address, first, the association between individual social position 
and redistributive preferences and second, the relationship between individuals’ 
inequality perceptions and redistributive preferences. It is generally expected that both 
individual social location and perceptions of inequality would matter in shaping 
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preferences for redistribution. However, this inquiry goes one step further and 
hypothesises the relationships, first, by differentiating objective social position from 
subjective social position and second, by classifying inequality perceptions into three 
different dimensions: perceived actual inequality, personal norms of inequality, and 
perceived injustice. 
 
Social position hypothesis 
Hypothesis 1: Because perception of reality matters more than reality itself in 
preference formation, perceived social position will better explain 
variations in preferences for redistribution than objective social 
position. 
 
Hypothesis 1 states that subjective social status will be a better predictor of 
individual preferences for redistribution than objective social status. The assumption 
that support for redistribution may not be just a function of objective income position, 
as opposed to the assumption of the Meltzer-Richard model, led to this hypothesis. 
From a social-psychological perspective, it is plausible that those who think that their 
social position is located at a lower level, regardless of their actual position, are more 
likely to demand redistribution than people who locate their social position at a higher 
level. In other words, an individual’s social position based on self-assessment may play 
a more significant role in forming redistributive preferences than the individual’s actual 
position. Brown-Iannuzzi et al. (2015) also provided empirical evidence that subjective 
social status is more crucial than objective social status in terms of support for 
redistributive policies. 
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Inequality perception hypotheses 
Hypothesis 2: Perceived actual inequality will positively and significantly affect 
individual preferences for redistribution. 
Hypothesis 3: Personal norms of inequality will negatively and significantly 
affect individual preferences for redistribution. 
Hypothesis 4: Perceived injustice will positively and significantly affect 
individual preferences for redistribution. 
 
Hypothesis 2 assumes that the more unequal people find their society with respect 
to the actual level of inequality, the greater redistribution they demand. It is highly 
likely that voters who think the level of inequality is serious and unacceptable, 
irrespective of the level of actual inequality, desire more redistribution. That is, how 
much inequality is perceived rather than how much inequality exists was predicted to 
determine preferences for redistribution (Eriksson and Simpson 2012, 741). Hypothesis 
3 states that the higher an individual’s inequality norms are, the less redistribution the 
individual supports. In other words, people who think that a more unequal society is 
desirable were expected to oppose more redistribution. Hypothesis 4 is derived from 
the previous hypotheses combined. If the cognitive gap between perceived actual 
inequality and personal norms of inequality that an individual perceives widens, the 
individual may be more likely to support redistribution to reduce the perceived 
differential between the reality and the ideal. In fact, this measure was directly inspired 
by Sen’s (2000, 60) argument that ‘people’s attitudes towards, or reactions to, actual 
income distributions can be significantly influenced by the correspondence—or the 
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lack thereof—between (1) their ideas of what is normatively tolerable, and (2) what 
they actually see in the society around them’. Additionally, according to Whitmeyer 
(2004), this indicator may be an application of Jasso’s justice theory. 
With respect to control variables at the individual level, age, sex, education (years 
in school), and union membership were used for the analyses. Age, sex, and education 
are expected to be associated with redistributive preferences; thus, these individual-
level controls are widely present in the literature. It is also assumed that union members 
would considerably more supportive of redistribution than those who are non-union 
members (Mosimann and Pontusson 2014; Rueda 2014). 
Finally, there are contextual variables: perceived inequality, market inequality, 
economic development, economic growth, and ethnic fractionalisation. From the 
distribution of perceived social position in a country, we can estimate the inequality 
structure as a contextual factor that may condition individuals’ preferences for 
redistribution; it can thus be hypothesised that an individual is more likely to support 
redistribution in a country that has a more unequal distribution of perceived social 
position. Similarly, the level of market inequality is predicted to influence individuals’ 
redistributive preferences, which might be inferred from the standard model of 
redistribution. Economic development and economic growth are expected to create a 
more favourable environment for an individual to support redistribution. Ethnic 
fractionalisation is also included as a control since there is empirical evidence that 
ethnic diversity negatively affects support for redistribution (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, 
133-81; Dahlberg, Edmark, and Lundqvist 2012). 
 
Measurement and data 
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Redistributive preferences 
Redistributive preferences as a dependent variable are defined as the degree of 
respondents’ agreement to the question of the government’s responsibility for reducing 
income differences, which is the most widely used measure of redistributive 
preferences in empirical studies.68 This question is found in the various international 
surveys, such as the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), and the European Social Survey (ESS). There are 
two alternative dependent variables, however, based on the same survey question (see 
Question A in Appendix 1). One is a dichotomous variable in which 1 is assigned to 
the answers ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’, while 0 is assigned to the answers ‘neither agree 
nor disagree’, ‘disagree’, or ‘strongly disagree’. The other is an ordinal variable that 
has five original categories from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. The data came 
from ISSP 1987, 1992, 1999, and 2009 (ISSP Research Group 2016) because of data 
availability for the main explanatory variables. 
 
Individuals’ social position and inequality perceptions 
Perceived social position is an ordinal variable based on respondents’ self-positioning 
on a top-to-bottom (10 to 1) scale (see Question C in Appendix 1); the data were also 
collected from ISSP 1987, 1992, 1999, and 2009 (ISSP Research Group 2016). 
Objective social position is also an ordinal variable based on respondents’ actual 
                                           
68  Alternatively, Tóth and Keller (2011) developed a composite index, the Redistributive 
Preference Index (RPI), based on five categorical variables about fair redistribution, job provision, 
free education, social spending, and governments’ responsibility in the 2009 special Eurobarometer 
survey on poverty and social exclusion. However, this measure captures too broad a notion of 
redistributive preferences, and its coverage is relatively limited. Consequently, this index is not 
employed in the current study. 
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household income before taxes and other deductions with a scale of top-to-bottom (10 
to 1); the data came from ISSP 1999, which provides harmonised income categories 
across countries,69 enabling direct comparison between perceived social position and 
objective social position, as they have the same metric. 
 
Table 3. Dimensions of Inequality Perceptions 
 Perception of reality Perception of norms Perception of injustice 
Individual level 
perceived actual inequality 
perceived society type 
personal norms of 
inequality 
perceived injustice 
perceived income 
differences 
Country level perceived Gini   
 
As for inequality perceptions, diverse ways to measure the perceptions have been 
developed so far in the literature, but there is understandably no consensus on how to 
operationalise and measure them since perceptions of inequality might be understood 
in various ways. We can conceive a variety of methods to estimate the way in which 
individuals perceive inequality in their society. It is thus necessary to clarify the types 
of inequality perceptions in the first place. Table 3 shows different dimensions of 
inequality perceptions considered in the present study. Unlike actual inequality based 
on the overall distribution of individuals’ material condition, such as income, 
individuals can have their own perceptions of inequality. These perceptions are not 
necessarily restricted to perceptions of reality. We can also conceptualise not only how 
unequal a society should be (perception of norms) but also how fair the level of 
inequality is (perception of injustice). 
                                           
69 In the ISSP, each country has both household and personal income variables based on country-
specific income categories, but these variables in each round, except for ISSP 1999, were not 
harmonised into variables with 10 income categories. 
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Table 4. The Measures of Individuals’ Inequality Perceptions 
Variable Definition Source 
perceived actual inequality subjective estimate of actual wage for top group divided 
by that of bottom group (see Question D in Appendix 1) 
ISSP 1987, 1992, 
1999, and 2009 
personal norms of inequality personal norms of wage for top group divided by that of 
bottom group (see Question E in Appendix 1) 
ISSP 1987, 1992, 
1999, and 2009 
perceived injustice discrepancy between perceived actual inequality and 
personal norms of inequality 
ISSP 1987, 1992, 
1999, and 2009 
perceived income differences answer to the question of whether differences in income 
are too large (see Question F in Appendix 1) 
ISSP 1987, 1992, 
1999, and 2009 
perceived society type diagram that best describes a society (see Question G in 
Appendix 1) 
ISSP 1992, 1999, 
and 2009 
 
The measures of perceived actual inequality and personal norms of inequality are 
continuous ones, not categorical variables, based on wage estimates across different 
occupations, as can be seen in Table 4. Additionally, the gap between perceived actual 
inequality and personal norms of inequality was measured to assess the level of 
perceived injustice. In fact, this approach used for this inquiry to develop the three 
inequality perception measures is not new. Kuhn (2011, 2015a, 2015b) employed a 
similar method using top and bottom groups’ wage estimates, but he tried to formulate 
individual-level Gini coefficients with the relative size of the bottom group and its wage 
share based on subjective wage estimates for different occupations.70 However, the 
measures developed by Kuhn have some drawbacks. For instance, some subjective 
Gini coefficients have negative values, which go beyond the range of conventional Gini 
coefficients; more fundamentally, a very small number of specific occupations 
employed cannot be a basis for estimating the distribution of the whole population in a 
country that is necessary to calculate the Gini coefficient. 
                                           
70 Kuhn’s framework is in line with Osberg and Smeeding’s (2006) method in the sense that they 
also tried to calculate individuals’ subjective Gini coefficients, but their assumption is simpler and 
more problematic than Kuhn’s—that there is an equal number of people in each occupation. 
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Accordingly, a more reasonable approach is to calculate the ratio of the level of 
wage estimates at the top to the level of wage estimates at the bottom, which is 
analogous to the percentile-ratio inequality measures in the actual income distribution. 
However, due to the highly skewed nature of the original ratios of those estimates, their 
logarithmic transformation was used following Schneider’s (2012) approach.71  To 
produce the measures, the top group consists of these three occupations: a doctor in 
general practice, a cabinet minister in the national government, and the chairman of a 
large national company. The bottom group is an unskilled worker in a factory. We 
selected these four occupations to maximise comparability because these occupations 
appear consistently in all four rounds of the survey: ISSP 1987, 1992, 1999, and 2009. 
Consequently, perceived actual inequality, personal norms of inequality, and perceived 
injustice were computed as follows: 
 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙) = ln (
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝
)  
                                                                             = ln (
1
3 (𝑦𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝑦𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝑦𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛)
𝑦𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 ) 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚) = ln (
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝
)  
                                                                                  = ln (
1
3 (𝑦𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝑦𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝑦𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛)
𝑦𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑
) 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒 (𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖) = ln (
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 ) = ln(𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙) − ln(𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚)  
 
The estimated values of perceived actual inequality are always positive because 
there is no one who thinks that the top group’s wage is less than or equal to the bottom 
                                           
71 Schneider’s (2012) measures are based on Jasso’s (2007) logarithmic-ratio specification of the 
justice evaluation function in which the actual reward is compared to the just reward. 
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group’s wage. The values of personal norms of inequality are mostly positive, but there 
exists a value of zero if a person supports absolute equality in which there is no 
difference in wages between top and bottom groups.72 With respect to the values of 
perceived injustice, a value of zero indicates that wage justice is assessed as being 
perfect, as an individual’s perception of the reality is identical with that of the ideal. 
When a person judges that the level of perceived inequality is lower than it should be, 
the sign of perceived injustice is negative, whereas when a person judges that the level 
of perceived inequality is higher than it should be, perceived injustice has a positive 
sign. 
Additionally, there are two more measures of inequality perception at the 
individual level: perceived income differences and perceived society type. The former 
is based on the response about the degree of income differences in a country (see 
Question F in Appendix 1), which assesses fairness of income distribution by implicitly 
capturing a disparity between perceived reality and perceived norms, although its scale 
is too rough. In this respect, this indicator can be classified as a measure in the domain 
of injustice perception in Table 3. This individual-level measure is an ordinal variable 
that has five categories, from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. The data were 
taken from ISSP 1987, 1992, 1999, and 2009 (ISSP Research Group 2016). However, 
this variable is highly correlated with the dependent variables; thus, it is not used in the 
analyses.73 Perceived society type is also an ordinal variable based on selecting a type 
of society that best describes a society (see Question G in Appendix 1; Type A 
illustrates the most unequal society, while Type E illustrates the most equal society), 
                                           
72 Of the respondents, 989 out of 77,555 (1.28%) favoured absolute wage equality. 
73 Polychoric correlation analysis shows that this measure is highly correlated with the variables of 
redistributive preferences (binary and ordinal) (𝑟 = −0.57 and −0.62, respectively). 
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and the data came from ISSP 1992, 1999, and 2009 (ISSP Research Group 2016). 
However, this measure is not included in the main analyses because it has critical 
limitations that Type E in the survey question is not distinctive from Type D in terms 
of the level of inequality.74 In Table 3, furthermore, there is a country-level measure,75 
the perceived Gini, which is short for the Gini coefficient of perceived social position. 
This measure was estimated in the same way as calculating the Gini coefficient using 
the distribution of income (see Chapter 2 for more details). 
 
Control variables 
As for the individual-level control variables, age, sex, education, and union 
membership were gathered from ISSP 1987, 1992, 1999, and 2009 (ISSP Research 
Group 2016). Regarding the country-level controls, the perceived Gini discussed above 
was calculated by using the distribution of perceived social position on a top-to-bottom 
(10 to 1) scale; the data were collected from ISSP 1987, 1992, 1999, and 2009 (ISSP 
Research Group 2016). The market Gini, short for the Gini coefficient of market 
income, came from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt 
2016). Economic development can be measured as the logarithm of real GDP per capita 
                                           
74 If we calculate the Gini coefficients of each diagram, following Gimpelson and Treisman’s (2015) 
method, the Gini of Type D is 0.20, and the Gini of Type E is 0.21. However, this survey question 
was designed to clearly differentiate between those five types in terms of where the largest group 
of people is located in a social hierarchy. What is worse, those who chose Type E showed the 
second-highest level of aggregate redistributive preferences amongst the five groups. This result 
implies that respondents saw Type E as unequal as a hypothetical type between Type A and Type B. 
In sum, this survey question is problematic when used in the context of inequality rather than the 
majority’s social position. Gimpelson and Treisman’s (2015) perceived Gini based on perceived 
society type was therefore not used for the current analysis. 
75 Several studies have also employed different country-level measures of perceived inequality; 
however, they have obvious shortcomings. For instance, some measures are simply based on 
averaging the values of individuals’ inequality measures. See Schalembier (2015) and Chapter 2 for 
more discussion on the country-level measures of perceived inequality. 
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based on prices that are constant across countries and over time, and economic growth 
refers to the yearly percentage growth rate of real GDP at constant national prices; these 
two economic controls were produced by using the GDP data from the Penn World 
Table (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015). Ethnic diversity can be quantified by 
ethnic fractionalisation that measures the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals from a population belong to different groups; its maximum value of 1 
means that each person belongs to a different group, whereas the minimum value of 0 
means that each person belongs to the same group; the data were collected from Alesina 
et al. (2003). 
 
Analysis and findings 
Two different models were used to test the hypotheses. The first model is a function of 
objective and subjective social positions, using ISSP 1999, to test the social position 
hypothesis. The second model is a function of inequality perceptions to examine the 
inequality perception hypotheses, using ISSP 1987, 1992, 1999, and 2009. Given the 
fact that the dependent variable is binary in the primary analyses, the logistic regression 
was chosen as the baseline modelling framework in estimating each model. In a 
robustness check, the ordered logistic regression for an alternative dependent variable, 
which is an ordinal measure of redistributive preferences, was employed in both models. 
Additionally, the multilevel logistic regression to control for contextual effects at the 
country level was used for the second model. 
There might be questions about endogeneity between perceptions of inequality and 
support for redistribution. It is plausible that those who favour redistribution may 
perceive more inequality and have more equal distributional norms than those who do 
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not support redistribution to rationalise their redistributive preferences. That is, the 
causality between inequality perceptions and redistributive preferences might run in 
both directions. Few researchers have tried to tackle the endogeneity issue by 
introducing instrumental variables, except for Kuhn (2015a, 2015b). In this study, 
following Dustmann and Preston’s (2001) approach, which suggests an instrument at a 
higher level of spatial aggregation, the regional means of the inequality perception 
measures in each country were used as instruments in an extra analysis. Regarding the 
estimation techniques, the probit model with continuous endogenous regressors 
(ivprobit in Stata), a conditional mixed-process (cmp) estimator, developed by 
Roodman (2011), with the probit model, and two-stage least squares (2SLS) were 
alternatively employed, as shown in Table 5 and Appendix 10. 
 
 
(a) objective social position 
 
 (b) perceived social position 
Figure 1. Individuals’ social position and redistributive preferences. Notes: The graphs 
are based on Questions A, B, and C in Appendix 1, using ISSP 1999. The ‘redistributive 
preferences’ bar represents the percentage of the respondents in favour of redistribution 
who answered with ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ in each category from bottom to top (1 
to 10) of the social position measures above. See Appendix 5 for the country-specific 
graphs illustrating the relationship between perceived social position and redistributive 
preferences. 
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Before moving on to the empirical results, Figure 1 presents graphical evidence 
that both objective and subjective social positions significantly matter in terms of 
redistributive preferences. More importantly, the effect of objective social position 
seems to be weaker than that of perceived social position, as Graph (b) shows a steeper 
slope than Graph (a). Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5 clearly support this evidence. The 
remaining columns also consistently indicate that the effect size of perceived social 
position is greater than that of objective social position, as predicted by Hypothesis 1. 
Specifically, Column (3) shows that for a one-unit increase in perceived social position, 
we can see about 17.4% decrease in the odds of an individual being in favour of 
redistribution, and a one-unit increase in objective social position reduces the odds by 
10.9%. Moreover, we can also check the marginal effects of the variables in Column 
(3): Increasing perceived social position by one standard deviation on average 
decreases the probability of the support for redistribution by 5.5%; increasing objective 
social position by one standard deviation decreases the probability by 4.9%.76 This 
finding that the effect of perceived social position is substantively stronger than that of 
objective social position is also robust to an alternative dependent variable, as estimated 
in Appendix 7. 
Graphical evidence in Figure 2 illustrates the relationships between perceptions of 
inequality and redistributive preferences. Graph (a) shows the level of aggregate 
redistributive preferences in percentage across the decile groups of perceived injustice; 
there is a clear increasing trend when the gap between perceived actual inequality and 
personal norms of inequality increases. Graph (b) does not indicate a distinct feature 
                                           
76 These marginal effects were calculated by using mchange command in Stata. Meanwhile, the 
direct comparisons of these impacts should be treated with caution because each variable has its 
own underlying features. 
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compared to other graphs, although redistributive preferences increase slightly in the 
upper deciles of perceived actual inequality. Graph (c) provides a descending trend in 
redistributive preferences when the level of personal norms of inequality goes up; in 
other words, the more inequality people regard as desirable, the less redistributive 
preferences result. 
 
 
(a) perceived injustice deciles 
 
(b) perceived actual inequality deciles 
 
 (c) personal norms of inequality deciles 
Figure 2. Individuals’ inequality perceptions and redistributive preferences. Notes: The 
graphs are based on Questions A, D, and E in Appendix 1, using ISSP 1987, 1992, 
1999, and 2009. The ‘redistributive preferences’ bar represents the percentage of the 
respondents in favour of redistribution who answered with ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ 
in each decile of the inequality perception measures above. See Appendix 6 for the 
country-specific graphs illustrating the relationship between personal norms of 
inequality and redistributive preferences. 
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Additionally, the polychoric correlation analysis was conducted to assess the 
strength and direction of the association between inequality perception measures, 
which are continuous variables, and redistributive preferences, which represent a 
dichotomous variable: 𝑟 = 0.06, −0.18, and 0.22 for perceived actual inequality, 
personal norms of inequality, and perceived injustice, respectively; all the correlation 
coefficients are significantly different from zero. These statistical correlations are 
consistent with the graphical evidence. 
 
Table 5. Comparison of the Effects of Social Position on Redistributive Preferences 
 redistributive preferences (binary) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
objective 
social position 
-0.139  -0.103 -0.096 -0.054 -0.104 -0.059 
(0.020)***  (0.019)*** (0.020)*** (0.012)*** (0.021)*** (0.012)*** 
perceived 
social position 
 -0.204 -0.160 -0.138 -0.080 -0.140 -0.082 
 (0.017)*** (0.015)*** (0.020)*** (0.011)*** (0.020)*** (0.012)*** 
perceived 
actual 
inequality 
   0.505 0.181   
   (0.063)*** (0.280)   
    [9773.73]   
personal norms 
of inequality 
   -0.881 -0.757   
   (0.086)*** (0.189)***   
    [5921.70]   
perceived 
injustice 
     0.659 0.621 
     (0.068)*** (0.247)** 
      [2100.17] 
individual 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
pseudo 
R-squared 
0.117 0.119 0.125 0.149 0.147 0.144 0.143 
observations 15,475 15,475 15,475 11,686 11,686 11,686 11,686 
countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: Columns (1), (2), (3), (4), and (6) report the logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by 
country in parentheses; the constant terms are not reported. Columns (5) and (7) report cmp estimations with the 
probit models and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; the first stages and constant terms are 
not reported. The regional means of the perceived actual inequality, personal norms of inequality, and perceived 
injustice were used as instruments for the cmp estimations with the probit models. In Columns (5) and (7), the F-
statistic associated with the first-stage effect of the instrument on the endogenous variable is reported in brackets; if 
the F-statistic is less than 10, according to the rule of thumb by Staiger and Stock (1997), there is a weak instruments 
problem. Pseudo R-squared and observations are the results of the first-stage. Individual controls include age, sex, 
education, and union membership. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 6. The Effects of Inequality Perceptions on Redistributive Preferences 
 redistributive preferences (binary) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
perceived 
actual inequality 
0.517 0.523 0.582    
(0.065)*** (0.061)*** (0.096)***    
personal norms 
of inequality 
-0.889 -0.904 -0.900    
(0.071)*** (0.070)*** (0.077)***    
perceived 
Injustice 
   0.445 0.458 0.474 
   (0.041)*** (0.035)*** (0.046)*** 
perceived 
social position 
-0.215 -0.198 -0.192 -0.213 -0.200 -0.189 
(0.010)*** (0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.011)*** 
age  0.005 0.004  0.002 0.001 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)***  (0.001)** (0.002) 
sex  0.230 0.220  0.216 0.207 
 (0.027)*** (0.032)***  (0.026)*** (0.029)*** 
education  -0.051 -0.061  -0.049 -0.060 
 (0.007)*** (0.010)***  (0.007)*** (0.009)*** 
union 
membership 
 0.284 0.217  0.279 0.265 
 (0.031)*** (0.044)***  (0.035)*** (0.049)*** 
market Gini   -0.021   -0.027 
  (0.012)*   (0.012)** 
perceived Gini   0.095   0.087 
  (0.023)***   (0.020)*** 
economic 
development 
  0.155   0.134 
  (0.118)   (0.113) 
economic growth   -0.034   -0.037 
  (0.014)**   (0.015)** 
ethnic 
fractionalisation 
  -0.009   -0.012 
  (0.005)**   (0.005)** 
country×year 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
pseudo 
R-squared 
0.130 0.146 0.105 0.116 0.130 0.090 
observations 70,134 56,557 55,065 63,127 51,151 49,797 
clusters 71 67 65 71 67 65 
Notes: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country×year in 
parentheses; the constant terms are not reported. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Because of the dependency, the effect of perceived injustice was explored 
separately in Tables 5 and 6 as well as in Appendices 7‒10. In Table 6, all the columns 
consistently demonstrate that perceived actual inequality and perceived injustice are 
significantly and positively associated with redistributive preferences, while personal 
norms of inequality are significantly but negatively linked to redistributive preferences. 
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These findings buttress Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4, as expected. They are also robust to the 
alternative dependent variable that is an ordinal one, the different estimator of 
multilevel logistic regression, and the instrumental variables estimations, as can be seen 
in Appendices 8, 9, and 10. 
With respect to individual-level control variables, perceived social position, age, 
sex, education, and union membership show strong association with redistributive 
preferences, as predicted. Regarding the contextual variables, the market Gini shows a 
negative association with redistributive preferences in Table 6, albeit not quite 
significant, while its effect is insignificant when the different dependent variable or the 
multilevel logistic regression was used (see Appendices 8 and 9). The perceived Gini 
is significantly linked to preferences for redistribution, as hypothesised. The effects of 
economic development and ethnic fractionalisation are not robust to the different 
estimation models, whereas the effect of economic growth is significantly negative 
across the models. 
Specifically, in Column (1) in Table 6, the results show that an increase of one 
standard deviation in perceived actual inequality, on average, leads to an increase of 
the odds of an individual being in favour of redistribution by a multiple of 1.539; in 
terms of percentage change, in this case, we can say that the odds for an individual to 
support redistribution are 53.9% higher than the odds for the individual being against 
redistribution. Next, for an increase of one standard deviation in personal norms of 
inequality, the odds increase by a multiple of 0.546, which can be converted into its 
corresponding ratio counterpart above 1.0 by taking the inverse of the odds: 
1/0.546 = 1.832. In other words, a variation of one standard deviation leads to a 
change of 53.9% in the odds for perceived actual inequality and a change of 83.2% for 
personal norms of inequality. These relative effect sizes are almost the same as those 
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in Columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 and in Columns (1), (2), and (3) of Appendices 8 and 
9. 
 
  
 
objective 
social 
position 
perceived 
social 
position 
perceived 
actual 
inequality 
personal 
norms of 
inequality 
  
perceived 
social 
position 
perceived 
actual 
inequality 
personal 
norms of 
inequality 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 3. The marginal effects of social positions and inequality perceptions on 
redistributive preferences. Notes: The marginal effects were estimated at a one 
standard-deviation-change of the variables, and the absolute values of the effects were 
used for the sake of comparison. Graph (a) is based on Column (4) in Table 5, and 
Graph (b) is based on Column (2) in Table 6. 
 
Additionally, we can compare the marginal effects of the variables per one standard 
deviation: in the case of Column (1) in Table 6, an increase in perceived actual 
inequality increases the probability of the support for redistribution by 7.7%; an 
increase in personal norms of inequality decreases the probability by 12.0%.77 These 
marginal effects are also almost the same as those in Column (2) in Table 6, as shown 
in Graph (b) of Figure 3. We can thus conclude that personal norms of inequality play 
                                           
77 This finding stands opposite to Kuhn’s (2011, 635) in that the marginal effect of actual inequality, 
which is comparable to perceived actual inequality here, is slightly stronger than that of ethical 
inequality, which is comparable to personal norms of inequality here: An increase of actual 
inequality by one standard deviation (0.095) leads to a rise in the support for redistribution by 
0.32 (= 3.345 × 0.095), while an increase of ethical inequality by one standard deviation (0.108) 
leads to a decrease by −0.30 (= −2.796 × 0.108). 
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a more crucial role in forming individuals’ redistributive preferences than does 
perceived actual inequality. Furthermore, Figure 3 illustrates that the marginal effect 
of the objective social position is the weakest, which contradicts the basic premise of 
the standard model of redistribution, while the marginal effect of the personal norms 
of inequality is the strongest.  
Moreover, the fact that both perceived actual inequality and personal norms of 
inequality are significant implies that the discrepancy between them is also significant, 
which is confirmed in Columns (4), (5), and (6) of Table 6, Columns (6) and (7) of 
Table 5, and all the other relevant models in Appendices 7‒10. When it comes to the 
distribution of perceived injustice, while a small number of respondents agreed that 
wage differences should increase more than their perceptions of actual wage gaps, a 
significant majority of respondents expressed the belief that perceived actual wage 
inequality is higher than the desired level of wage inequality. Amongst 72,863 
observations of perceived injustice in OECD countries, 65,511 (89.91%) observations 
have positive values, 5,412 (7.43%) observations have negative values, and 1,940 
(2.66%) observations have a value of zero, which means that justice is evaluated as 
being perfect. Overall, most people agreed that wage distributions should be more equal 
than they are, but this does not necessarily mean that all of them favour redistribution; 
about 20% even amongst those who believe that their society is the most unjust (10th 
decile group) do not support redistribution, as illustrated in Graph (a) in Figure 2. 
Additionally, perceived social position has a significant and negative impact on 
redistributive preferences in all the columns of Table 6, as hypothesised. This finding 
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is consistent with that of Brown-Iannuzzi et al. (2015) as well as the results in Table 5. 
Graph (b) of Figure 1 also illustrates a clear relationship between them.78 
 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of the distribution of perceived social position with that of 
objective social position. Notes: The density histogram is based on the distribution of 
the responses for Questions B and C in Appendix 1, using ISSP 1999 including 20 
OECD countries. Country-specific density histograms are presented in Appendix 4. 
 
Furthermore, Figure 4 indicates that the distribution of perceived social position is 
clearly different from that of objective social position. This is consistent with a 
noticeable tendency for people to see themselves as being in the middle of the social 
hierarchy, according to the theories developed in social psychology (Evans and Kelley 
2004; Kelley and Evans 1995; Merton 1968, chaps. 9–10; Stouffer et al. 1949).79 It 
                                           
78  The highest level of perceived social position group shows that a greater proportion of 
individuals in this group favour redistribution than that of level 8 or level 9, but it is not meaningful 
because the sample size of that group is very small compared to other groups: In ISSP 1999, 
amongst 103 out of 21,204 respondents (0.49%), 47 individuals (46%) supported redistribution. 
Moreover, it is not surprising that, amongst the top 1% or so of U.S. wealth-holders (83 respondents), 
only 13% favoured redistributive action by government when the same question as Question A in 
Appendix 1 was used (Page, Bartels, and Seawright 2013, 64). 
79  According to a reference-group theory, ‘most people see themselves as average and 
unexceptional. Even very high-status people place many others above themselves and very low-
status people see others even lower. Hence, most people locate themselves near the middle of class 
hierarchy’ (Lindemann 2007, 55). Moreover, Bublitz (2016) and Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz 
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also explains the discrepancy between actual income inequality and perceived 
inequality based on the distribution of subjective social position. 
One thing to note is that the perceived Gini based on the distribution of perceived 
social position is also strongly associated with redistributive preferences. Thus, it turns 
out that both perceived social position and its distributional structure as a contextual 
factor matter in the formation of individual preferences for redistribution. By contrast, 
the effect of market inequality on individuals’ redistributive preferences has a 
consistent negative sign across the different models, although its significance is quite 
marginal or negligible. That is, this empirical evidence does not support the standard 
redistribution hypothesis that an increase in market inequality leads to a rise in support 
for redistribution. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Many previous studies trying to explain redistribution are premised on the idea that 
policy preferences determined by economic situation lead to policy outcomes at the 
society level. This hypothesis implies that an individual’s objective social location 
shapes his or her preferences for redistribution, regardless of whether or not aggregate 
redistributive preferences translate into redistribution. This inquiry challenges this 
individual-level mechanism that is embedded in the conventional redistribution theory 
in the following ways: first, by directly comparing objective social status to subjective 
social status in terms of the effect on redistributive preferences and second, by 
                                           
(2013) presented considerable empirical evidence that low-income earners have positive biases 
(overestimating their income position), whereas high-income earners have negative biases 
(underestimating their income position). 
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demonstrating the significant role of subjective inequality perceptions in preference 
formation. 
The empirical evidence shows that the distribution of redistributive preferences is 
more strongly associated with subjective social status than actual income location, as 
Graphs (a) and (b) in Figure 1 illustrate. The effect of objective social position on 
redistributive preferences is also weaker than that of perceived social position in 
statistical terms, as shown in Table 5 and Figure 3. Accordingly, the premise of the 
standard redistribution model based on the decisive role of actual income is not 
corroborated.  
However, this finding should be interpreted with caution because of the 
measurement errors, such as social desirability bias, in the social position variables 
based on self-reporting. Survey respondents tend to underreport socially undesirable 
activities and overreport socially desirable ones. This bias becomes significant when 
sensitive questions, such as sexual activities and illegal behaviours, are asked. Income 
or wealth questions are also considered to be sensitive and thus yield very high non-
response rates and reporting errors (Juster and Smith 1997; Moore, Stinson, and 
Welniak Jr. 2000). Moreover, there is strong evidence that level of misreporting 
depends on features of the survey design when questions are sensitive (Tourangeau and 
Yan 2007); self-completion mode rather than face-to-face mode encourages 
respondents to answer more honestly, for example. 
Despite the social desirability bias on the self-reported income, since the objective 
income position variable in the ISSP 1999 is based on top-coding and ordinal income 
intervals, the potential of the bias to influence the estimates for redistributive 
preferences can be effectively mitigated (Hariri and Lassen 2017). Also, the effect of 
perceived social position is expected to be less biased than that of objective social 
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position, considering that there is a far lower level of non-response rate and that the 
response rate has a negligible difference between administrative modes of data 
collection in the perceived social position variable,80 which is indirect evidence of a 
low level of social desirability bias.   
We also explored not only the level of wage inequality that individuals perceive 
but also the level of wage inequality that they view as just. Then the link between these 
perceptions of inequality and redistributive preferences was investigated by using the 
new inequality perception measures developed here. The results indicate that both 
individuals’ assessment of actual inequality and their distributional norms significantly 
matter in shaping individual preferences for redistribution. These findings confirm that 
the demand for redistribution is driven not only by pure economic self-interest but also 
by other-regarding preferences; furthermore, the marginal effects of the subjective and 
relative self-interest, perceived actual inequality, and personal norms of inequality are 
stronger than that of objective and absolute self-interest, as discussed above. 
Accordingly, we can conclude that people are self-interested but also concerned 
about the payoffs of others, which implies that support for redistribution is a complex 
phenomenon driven by multiple motivations. Furthermore, this chapter provided 
evidence that subjective self-interest has a stronger impact on support for redistribution 
than objective economic self-interest and that the effect of personal norms of inequality 
                                           
80 Amongst the ISSP surveys used in the main analysis, administrative mode is recorded only in 
ISSP 2009. In the variable of objective social position, the non-response rate of face-to-face mode 
is 19.77% (7,478 observations), and that of self-completion mode is 18.54% (3,228 observations); 
in the variable of perceived social position, however, the non-response rate of face-to-face mode is 
1.67% (630 observations), and that of self-completion mode is 1.69% (294 observations). From the 
facts that the level of non-response rate is very low in the perceived social position variable and that 
the difference between the modes is negligible (0.02%), we can infer that the question asking 
perceived social position is far less sensitive than that on objective social position, thus generating 
more accurate responses.     
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is stronger than that of perceived actual inequality. Considering that the measure of 
subjective self-interest is based on the relative standing of an individual compared to 
others and that personal norms of inequality might be related to social norms or justice 
in some ways, the current study contributes to behavioural economics on other-
regarding preferences as well as redistributive politics by presenting the convincing 
evidence of social preferences in the field beyond laboratory experiments. 
The findings of this study contradict those of Finseraas (2009), which show a 
positive relationship between net income inequality and an individual’s support for 
redistribution. Finseraas (2009, 101) admitted that using net income inequality is an 
‘obvious shortcoming’, but data availability prevented him from employing the market 
income inequality factor that ‘the M-R [Meltzer-Richard] model refers to’. However, 
the impacts of both net inequality and market inequality on individuals’ redistributive 
preferences are not robust in the present analyses.81  
Kuhn (2011, 637) claimed that a close association between subjective inequality 
measures and redistributive preferences provides ‘indirect evidence’ of the link 
between individual perceptions of inequality and redistribution. However, according to 
the empirical evidence supplied in Chapter 2, there is no such indirect evidence because 
support for redistribution does not straightforwardly translate into redistribution. Thus, 
replacing a measure of actual inequality with a perceived inequality measure is not 
enough to rescue the conventional redistribution hypothesis rooted in the positive 
relationship between actual inequality and redistribution. 
The key findings of the current study have grave theoretical and practical 
implications. First and foremost, this study demonstrates that subjective social location 
                                           
81 The results of the effect of market inequality are reported in Table 6 and Appendices 8 and 9, but 
those of net inequality are not reported here. 
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is more influential than objective social location in forming preferences for 
redistribution. This evidence undermines the underlying mechanism of the Meltzer-
Richard model by highlighting a stronger predictor of attitudes towards redistribution 
than pure economic self-interest. In the existing literature, there have been attempts to 
find other significant factors, not only individual current income, for redistributive 
preferences. For instance, the effect of individual mobility experience from Piketty’s 
(1995) learning model has empirical support (e.g., Guillaud 2013; Pfarr 2012); however, 
prior studies, except for some experimental research (e.g., Brown-Iannuzzi et al. 2015), 
did not challenge the supremacy of current income by providing empirical evidence. 
Second, one of the findings indicating that the perceived Gini, not the market Gini, 
is strongly associated with individuals’ redistributive preferences enhances the 
evidence of the country-level analysis provided in Chapter 2. Taken together, it can be 
said that there is little evidence of a link between actual inequality—the market Gini—
and redistributive preferences at both the country and individual levels, whereas the 
distribution of perceived social position—the perceived Gini—is closely associated 
with both country- and individual-level preferences for redistribution. It is therefore 
argued that the standard model of redistribution derived from the Meltzer-Richard 
model, which relies entirely on actual inequality, is no longer tenable. 
Third, this research reveals that personal norms of inequality are a more significant 
factor than perceived actual inequality in terms of forming redistributive preferences. 
There is insufficient attention to the fact that misperception of inequality is only a part 
of the story that explains preferences over redistribution. In this regard, the findings of 
Bublitz (2016) can be revisited that correcting biased perceptions of income position 
does not consistently change opinions towards redistribution. In the same vein, Bartels 
(2005, 25) pointed out ‘real and profound limits of political information as a 
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transforming force’ when it comes to policy preferences. These empirical results have 
already implied the existence of other cognitive factors that are distinct from perceived 
actual inequality or perceived self-interest; the compelling evidence presented here 
strengthens this perspective. 
Last, with respect to policy implications, the fact that individuals’ inequality norms 
strongly affect policy preferences reminds us of the importance of social interventions 
targeting norm perceptions. Considering that personal norms can be understood as 
being internalized social norms (Thøgersen 2009), a better understanding of the 
personal and social norms of inequality may enable us to figure out a more effective 
way of changing these norms that may make a difference in policy preferences. There 
is no guarantee that policy preferences directly translate into policy outcomes because 
of the complex social and political processes (see Powell 2005); however, there is no 
supply without demand. It is hoped that not only psychologists but also political 
scientists can come to see ‘norm perception as a vehicle for social change’ (Tankard 
and Paluck 2016, 182). 
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Supplementary materials are available at http://doi.org/10.3886/E101258V2. 
 
Appendix 1. Survey questions 
Variable Question Source 
redistributive preferences 
(binary)a / 
redistributive preferences 
(ordinal) 
A. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
following statements? It is the responsibility of the 
government to reduce the differences in income 
between people with high incomes and those with low 
incomes. 
(1 Strongly agree, 2 Agree, 3 Neither agree nor 
disagree, 4 Disagree, 5 Strongly disagree) 
ISSP 1987, 
1992, 1999, 
and 2009 
objective social position B. What will be/was the total annual income of your 
household before taxes for all of 1999? 
(10 the highest, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 the lowest) 
ISSP 1999 
perceived social position / 
perceived Ginib 
C. In our society there are groups which tend to be 
towards the top and groups which tend to be towards the 
bottom. Below is a scale that runs from top to bottom. 
Where would you put yourself now on this scale? 
(10 the top, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 the bottom) 
ISSP 1987, 
1992, 1999, 
and 2009 
perceived 
actual inequality 
 
D. We would like to know what you think people in 
these jobs actually earn. Please write in how much you 
think they usually earn each year, before taxes. Many 
people are not exactly sure about this, but your best 
guess will be close enough. This may be difficult, but it 
is very important. So please try. 
ISSP 1987, 
1992, 1999, 
and 2009 
personal norms of 
inequality 
E. Next, what do you think people in these jobs ought to 
be paid—how much do you think they should earn each 
year, before taxes, regardless of what they actually get? 
(Please write in how much they should earn each year, 
before tax.) 
ISSP 1987, 
1992, 1999, 
and 2009 
perceived 
income differences 
F. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
following statements? Differences in income in <R’s 
country> are too large. 
(1 Strongly agree, 2 Agree, 3 Neither agree nor 
disagree, 4 Disagree, 5 Strongly disagree) 
ISSP 1987, 
1992, 1999, 
and 2009 
perceived society type G. These five diagrams show different types of society. 
Please read the descriptions and look at the diagrams 
and decide which you think best describes <R’s 
country>. What type of society is <R’s country> 
today—which diagram comes closest? 
(1 Type A, 2 Type B, 3 Type C, 4 Type D, 5 Type E)c 
ISSP 1992, 
1999, and 2009 
Notes: a This variable of redistributive preferences is a dichotomous one, in which 1 is assigned to the answers 
‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’. b The perceived Gini is a country-level indicator calculated by using the frequency 
distribution of the responses to this survey question; see Chapter 2 for more details. c See the figure below. 
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Source: ISSP 2009 Social Inequality IV Final questionnaire (August 2008) 
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Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics (individual level) 
variable observations   mean    std. dev.     min     max 
redistributive preferences (binary) 93,519 0.67 0.47 0 1 
redistributive preferences (ordinal) 93,519 3.72 1.16 1 5 
objective social position (ISSP 1999)a 21,959 5.53 2.54 1 10 
perceived social position (ISSP 1999)b 21,959 5.05 1.84 1 10 
perceived social position 96,489 5.17 1.79 1 10 
perceived actual inequality 76,368 2.03 0.83 0.37 5.63 
personal norms of inequality 77,555 1.36 0.68 0 4.48 
perceived injustice 72,863 0.67 0.64 -4.01 5.63 
perceived income differences 94,594 1.88 0.96 1 5 
perceived society type 67,470 2.49 1.15 1 5 
age 97,873 45.87 17.39 1 98 
sex 99,198 1.53 0.50 1 2 
education 86,214 11.89 3.98 1 81 
union membership 82,101 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Note: a b Both variables based on ISSP 1999 were exclusively used in Table 5, Figures 1 and 3, and Appendices 4 
and 7. 
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Appendix 3. Survey country-year observations in the analysis 
Country 
ISSP 1987 ISSP 1992 ISSP 1999 ISSP 2009 
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Australia 1,529 1,378 1,870 1,922 1,530 1,429 1,487 1,283 
Austria 948 858 1,018 0 1,005 1,014 1,019 927 
Belgium . . . . . . 1,100 949 
Canada . . 964 843 954 870 . . 
Chile . . . . 1,503 758 1,490 1,269 
Czech Republic . . . . 1,825 1,579 1,204 1,118 
Denmark . . . . . . 1,498 1,291 
Estonia . . . . . . 983 935 
Finland . . . . . . 853 781 
France . . . . 1,857 1,596 2,765 2,253 
Germany 1,371 1,214 3,353 2,856 1,408 1,037 1,362 1,196 
Hungary 2,542 1,924 1,239 1,015 1,195 844 1,008 840 
Iceland . . . . . . 925 874 
Israel . . . . 1,204 1,152 1,172 961 
Italy 1,027 0 996 943 . . 1,061 912 
Japan . . . . 1,291 516 1,280 508 
Latvia . . . . 1,091 976 1,038 862 
Netherlands 1,594 1,297 . . . . . . 
New Zealand . . 1,194 1,066 1,108 979 914 841 
Norway . . 1,502 1,325 1,250 939 1,438 1,376 
Poland 3,625 1,417 1,616 1,330 1,088 894 1,257 962 
Portugal . . . . 1,144 970 950 608 
Slovakia . . . . 1,082 1,019 1,125 1,044 
Slovenia . . 926 943 912 908 995 837 
South Korea . . . . . . 1,599 1,553 
Spain . . . . 1,174 697 1,177 855 
Sweden . . 749 620 1,135 960 1,125 998 
Switzerland 962 790 . . . . 1,216 1,005 
Turkey . . . . . . 1,541 1,270 
United Kingdom 1,159 996 1,043 900 1,581 1,202 936 790 
United States 1,497 1,222 1,247 1,085 1,120 874 1,543 1,300 
Notes: In each wave, (a) and (b) indicate the numbers of valid observations of the perceived social position 
and personal norms of inequality variables, respectively. Each country’s fieldwork dates for a given ISSP 
module are not always the same as the specific calendar year of the module, and thus the coding of the 
country-years in the country-level control variables was conducted following the actual fieldwork dates. The 
ISSP 1999 data (Switzerland) were not integrated into the international file because the data do not meet the 
required methodological standard. 
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Appendix 4. Country-specific comparison of the distribution of perceived 
social position with that of objective social position 
 
Note: The density histograms are based on the distribution of the responses for Questions B and C in Appendix 1, 
using ISSP 1999 including 20 OECD countries.  
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Appendix 5. Perceived social position and redistributive preferences 
 
Notes: The country-specific graphs are based on Questions A and C in Appendix 1, using ISSP 1987, 1992, 1999, 
and 2009, which were pooled together by country (see Appendix 3). The ‘redistributive preferences’ bar represents 
the percentage of the respondents in favour of redistribution who answered with ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ in each 
category from bottom to top (1 to 10) of the perceived social position measure. 
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Appendix 6. Personal norms of inequality and redistributive preferences 
 
Notes: The country-specific graphs are based on Questions A and E in Appendix 1, using ISSP 1987, 1992, 1999, 
and 2009, which were pooled together by country (see Appendix 3). The ‘redistributive preferences’ bar represents 
the percentage of the respondents in favour of redistribution who answered with ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ in each 
decile of the personal norms of inequality measure. 
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Appendix 7. The effects of social position on preferences (ordinal) 
 redistributive preferences (ordinal) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
objective 
social position 
-0.132  -0.097 -0.093 -0.053 -0.099 -0.056 
(0.022)***  (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.011)*** (0.022)*** (0.012)*** 
perceived 
social position 
 -0.199 -0.159 -0.135 -0.079 -0.137 -0.080 
 (0.020)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.010)*** (0.018)*** (0.010)*** 
perceived 
actual 
inequality 
   0.543 0.438   
   (0.055)*** (0.200)**   
    [9773.73]   
personal norms 
of inequality 
   -0.792 -0.640   
   (0.093)*** (0.203)***   
    [5921.70]   
perceived 
injustice 
     0.641 0.641 
     (0.062)*** (0.200)*** 
      [2100.17] 
individual 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
country 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
pseudo 
R-squared 
0.070 0.072 0.075 0.090 0.088 0.088 0.086 
observations 15,475 15,475 15,475 11,686 11,686 11,686 11,686 
countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: Columns (1), (2), (3), (4), and (6) report the ordered logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered 
by country in parentheses; the cut-points are not reported. Columns (5) and (7) report cmp estimations with the 
ordered probit models and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; the first stages and cut-points 
are not reported. The regional means of the perceived actual inequality, personal norms of inequality, and perceived 
injustice were used as instruments for the cmp estimations with the ordered probit models. In Columns (5) and (7), 
the F-statistic associated with the first-stage effect of the instrument on the endogenous variable is reported in 
brackets, and pseudo R-squared and observations are the results of the first-stage. Individual controls include age, 
sex, education, and union membership. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix 8. The effects of inequality perceptions on preferences (ordinal) 
 redistributive preferences (ordinal) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
perceived 
actual inequality 
0.528 0.535 0.598    
(0.059)*** (0.052)*** (0.090)***    
personal norms 
of inequality 
-0.846 -0.859 -0.871    
(0.065)*** (0.062)*** (0.065)***    
perceived 
injustice 
   0.467 0.477 0.506 
   (0.038)*** (0.034)*** (0.050)*** 
perceived 
social position 
-0.211 -0.196 -0.192 -0.208 -0.195 -0.189 
(0.010)*** (0.011)*** (0.013)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.012)*** 
age  0.004 0.004  0.002 0.003 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)***  (0.001)** (0.002) 
sex  0.181 0.177  0.157 0.153 
 (0.022)*** (0.025)***  (0.021)*** (0.023)*** 
education  -0.046 -0.050  -0.045 -0.048 
 (0.006)*** (0.010)***  (0.006)*** (0.009)*** 
union 
membership 
 0.261 0.191  0.244 0.220 
 (0.025)*** (0.036)***  (0.028)*** (0.041)*** 
market Gini   -0.019   -0.023 
  (0.012)   (0.012)* 
perceived Gini   0.083   0.077 
  (0.024)***   (0.020)*** 
economic 
development 
  0.205   0.193 
  (0.114)*   (0.111)* 
economic growth   -0.033   -0.037 
  (0.013)***   (0.013)*** 
ethnic 
fractionalisation 
  -0.010   -0.011 
  (0.005)**   (0.005)** 
country×year 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
pseudo 
R-squared 
0.080 0.089 0.062 0.073 0.080 0.054 
observations 70,134 56,557 55,065 63,127 51,151 49,797 
clusters 71 67 65 71 67 65 
Notes: Entries are ordered logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country×year in 
parentheses; the cut-points are not reported. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix 9. The effects of inequality perceptions on preferences (multilevel) 
 redistributive preferences (binary) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
perceived 
actual inequality 
0.518 0.525 0.518    
(0.065)*** (0.062)*** (0.062)***    
personal norms 
of inequality 
-0.889 -0.903 -0.894    
(0.071)*** (0.070)*** (0.070)***    
perceived 
injustice 
   0.445 0.459 0.454 
   (0.041)*** (0.036)*** (0.036)*** 
perceived 
social position 
-0.215 -0.199 -0.196 -0.214 -0.200 -0.197 
(0.010)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** 
age  0.005 0.005  0.002 0.002 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)***  (0.001)** (0.001)** 
sex  0.230 0.230  0.216 0.216 
 (0.027)*** (0.028)***  (0.026)*** (0.026)*** 
education  -0.051 -0.051  -0.049 -0.050 
 (0.007)*** (0.007)***  (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
union 
membership 
 0.282 0.283  0.279 0.280 
 (0.031)*** (0.031)***  (0.035)*** (0.035)*** 
market Gini   -0.019   -0.023 
  (0.014)   (0.014) 
perceived Gini   0.100   0.083 
  (0.025)***   (0.025)*** 
economic 
development 
  0.087   0.043 
  (0.160)   (0.163) 
economic growth   -0.029   -0.033 
  (0.017)*   (0.018)* 
ethnic 
fractionalisation 
  -0.007   -0.008 
  (0.005)   (0.005) 
𝜎𝑢
2 
(country×year) 
0.466 0.502 0.343 0.459 0.482 0.345 
(0.082) (0.086) (0.056) (0.082) (0.087) (0.062) 
observations 70,134 56,557 55,065 63,127 51,151 49,797 
clusters 71 67 65 71 67 65 
Notes: Entries are multilevel logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country×year 
in parentheses; the constant terms are not reported. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix 10. Additional analysis using instrumental variables 
 redistributive 
preferences (binary) 
redistributive 
preferences (cont.) 
(1) ivprobit (2) ivprobit (3) ivprobit (4) cmp (5) cmp (6) 2SLS (7) 2SLS 
perceived actual 
inequality 
0.077   0.558  0.485  
(0.128)   (0.168)***  (0.052)***  
   [47247.12]  [500.60]  
personal norms 
of inequality 
 -0.509  -0.859  -0.713  
 (0.102)***  (0.141)***  (0.058)***  
   [24999.88]  [298.34]  
perceived 
injustice 
  0.673  0.653  0.565 
  (0.125)***  (0.116)***  (0.046)*** 
    [8730.58]  [113.40] 
perceived social 
position 
-0.134 -0.116 -0.091 -0.114 -0.111 -0.095 -0.089 
(0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
individual 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
country×year 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald p-val 0.694 0.050 0.003     
pseudo 
R-squared 
   0.145 0.129   
R-squared      0.210 0.165 
observations 58,922 60,029 51,151 56,557 51,151 56,557 51,151 
clusters 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
Notes: Columns (1), (2), and (3) report the probit model with continuous endogenous covariates (ivprobit in Stata) 
and robust standard errors clustered by country×year in parentheses. Columns (4) and (5) report cmp estimations 
with the probit model and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Columns (6) and (7) report 
2SLS estimations with standard errors in parentheses. All the first stages and constant terms are not reported. The 
F-statistic associated with the first-stage effect of the instrument on the endogenous variable is reported in brackets. 
Individual controls include age, sex, education, and union membership. Wald p-val reports the p-value of the Wald 
test of exogeneity of the instrumented variables; the null hypothesis is that there is no endogeneity. In the cmp 
estimations, pseudo R-squared and observations are the results of the first-stage. * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis breaks fresh ground in the empirical research of the linkage between 
democracy, inequality, and redistribution by providing a new approach towards 
conceptualising and measuring democracy and shedding new light on the role of 
inequality perceptions in determining redistributive preferences. The association 
between democracy, inequality, and redistribution is one of the most significant topics 
in the field of political economy, but its empirical study is underdeveloped, particularly 
for developed democracies. This is not only because there are difficulties in the 
conceptualisation and measurement of democracy but because a simple premise is 
prevalent—that policy preferences determined by pure economic self-interest lead to 
policy outcomes, which keeps empirical research from exploring beyond the bounds of 
a rational choice perspective. The main three chapters of the thesis were designed to 
overcome these limitations and to offer the empirical foundations for further 
exploration of the democracy-inequality-redistribution triad. 
 
Summary and discussion of the findings 
Chapter 1 addressed the conceptualisation and measurement issues of democratic 
quality by employing a middle-range conception of democracy that avoids both the 
minimalist and maximalist approaches. In doing so, the DPI as a new measure of 
democratic performance was constructed. This index contains the eight core 
dimensions of democracy: individual liberties, rule of law, public sphere, transparency, 
participation, representation, competition, and mutual constraints. However, these 
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dimensions were not aggregated into a summary measure of democracy in order to 
avoid masking effects amongst the dimensions. There is also a lack of a strong theory 
of how to combine them. The DPI can be used to capture a shade of difference amongst 
advanced democracies across distinct dimensions, thereby contributing to empirical 
research on the dynamics of democracy. 
The empirical evidence from Chapter 2 casts doubt on the standard model of 
redistribution that assumes a significant and positive impact of market inequality on 
public support for redistribution as well as redistribution. Furthermore, the assumption 
that preferences for redistribution directly translate into redistribution was not 
empirically supported. However, it is evident that perceived inequality, which has been 
largely overlooked in the comparative study of inequality and redistribution, has a 
significant impact on preferences for redistribution in OECD countries. 
In Chapter 3, the focus was on the role of individuals’ subjective social position 
and inequality perceptions in determining redistributive preference. The new measures 
of perceived actual inequality, personal norms of inequality, and perceived injustice 
were invented for the empirical analysis. The evidence shows that the effect of 
subjective social position on support for redistribution is stronger than that of objective 
social position, and that individuals’ inequality norms play a more crucial role in 
preference formation than does their perception of actual inequality. 
Each chapter is independent but linked to one another in some ways. First, the main 
variables of the first and second chapters can be used in cross-national analyses 
investigating the linkage between democracy, inequality, and redistribution. The 
relationships between the eight dimensions of democratic performance and other 
relevant variables might be further examined if theoretical arguments are solid enough 
to be empirically tested, although a summary measure of democracy has not been 
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provided. Second, the second and third chapters are closely interrelated since they 
confirm the strong linkage between perceptions of social position and inequality, not 
actual income position and inequality, and redistributive preferences at both the country 
and individual levels, thus challenging the conventional model of redistribution and its 
basic assumption. 
The main chapters of the thesis together contribute to the advancement of macro- 
and micro-comparative studies in the field of political economy not only by providing 
more developed empirical measures of democracy and perceived inequality than 
previous ones but also by casting new light on the role of perceived inequality in 
redistributive politics. However, there remain limitations or issues that need to be 
addressed. Here are a few examples. First, the conceptualisation of democracy and 
inequality perceptions will still matter because there might be no conclusive way of 
conceptualising these concepts. It is hoped that these essays will serve as a catalyst for 
a wider discussion about that. Additionally, if the eight dimensions (individual liberties, 
rule of law, public sphere, transparency, participation, representation, competition, and 
mutual constraints) or the three principles of democracy (freedom, equality, and control) 
from Chapter 1 should be aggregated into a summary measure of democratic principles 
or democracy, it is important to note that there must be valid theoretical justifications 
for how to combine the dimensions or principles. 
Second, there should be more discussion on the measurement of both actual and 
perceived economic inequalities. Even though the issue of income underreporting has 
been considered, all studies indicate that income is far less concentrated than wealth 
(Davies and Shorrocks 2000, 664). However, there is currently a dearth of comparable 
cross-national data on wealth. Moreover, in Chapter 2, the perceived Gini calculated 
from the distribution of individuals’ subjective social position does not purely capture 
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the perception of economic inequality. Social stratification does not simply reflect an 
economic dimension, but class structure and social status are involved in its formation 
(Goldthorpe 2010). In addition, in Chapter 3, perceived actual inequality and personal 
norms of inequality are measures of wage inequality. Wage is just a part of income, and 
thus there is a gap between wage inequality and income inequality, not to mention 
wealth inequality. 
Third, the Gini coefficient using the distribution of perceived social location, 
presented in Chapter 2, has the same limitations as the Gini coefficient for the 
distribution of actual income. For instance, the Gini coefficient for income inequality 
is a middle-sensitive index, which is considered as its main shortcoming (Mulé 1998, 
4). There is thus an alternative indicator of inequality that is a top- and bottom-sensitive 
measure; it is the Palma ratio, which compares the share of the top 10% to the share of 
the bottom 40% (Palma 2006; 2011). Cobham and Sumner (2013) argued that the 
Palma is more intuitively interpretable and policy-relevant than the Gini, although they 
also demonstrated that there is a close fit between the Palma and the Gini. However, 
for the sake of efficiency, we did not attempt to calculate the Palma using the 
distribution of perceived social position and compare it to the Gini for the analysis in 
this chapter. 
Last, there is an issue of endogeneity between dependent and independent variables 
in Chapters 2 and 3. Specifically, perceived inequality and individuals’ perceptions of 
inequality are likely to be simultaneously endogenous to redistributive preferences, and 
these preferences might also have an endogenous relation with redistribution, albeit not 
simultaneously.82 To deal with the causality between the variables that might run in 
                                           
82 This endogenous relationship is similar to the link between public opinion and public policy in 
the thermostatic model of Soroka and Wlezien (2010). 
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both ways, a range of instrumental variables estimations were used in the second and 
third chapters. However, there should be more discussions on the appropriateness of 
the instrumental variables and estimation techniques employed in the thesis. In the case 
of 2SLS and cmp estimations, for instance, we accepted Staiger and Stock’s (1997) 
suggestion of using the first-stage F-statistic to test whether or not the given instruments 
are weak; meanwhile, Stock and Yogo (2005) further explored the Staiger-Stock rule 
of thumb and claimed that this rule of thumb does not provide sufficient assurance of 
the absence of a weak instruments problem when the number of instruments is not very 
small. 
 
Policy implications 
The main findings and new empirical measures from this thesis have important policy 
implications for making advanced democracies more democratic, more equal, and more 
redistributive. First, the DPI as a measure of democratic performance, constructed in 
Chapter 1, has the potential to be used as a policy evaluation tool, albeit an indirect one, 
to address many challenges that contemporary democracy faces and to provide a guide 
to promoting more democraticness in various dimensions. Specifically, this measure 
enables us to assess the levels of performance in each dimension of democracy in a 
country and to compare them to those of other countries. Evaluating more precisely 
where a democracy is placed in a template of democratic performance can help 
facilitate mutual learning from democracies, thus advancing democracies further, as 
Campbell (2008, 8) stressed. This new analytic tool not only contributes to bridging the 
divide between theoretical and empirical research in the study of democracy, but it also 
offers citizens an opportunity to rethink modern democracy. 
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Second, the disconnect between policy preferences and policy outcomes, which is 
one of the important findings from Chapter 2, paradoxically requires us to connect them 
in one way or another because this finding implies that policy outcomes are not 
responsive to the public. No one denies that making democracy more responsive is 
important, as responsiveness mostly means ‘doing what the citizens want’ (Powell 2005, 
74). Dahl (1971, 1) also famously argued that ‘a key characteristic of a democracy’ is 
‘the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, 
considered as political equals’. The translation of policy preferences into policy 
outcomes, however, is not straightforward because of the complex political processes 
placed between them. Nevertheless, we need to try to reduce wide discrepancies 
between citizens’ demand and policy makers’ supply by realigning and innovating both 
institutional and non-institutional arrangements. 
Third, the finding of Chapter 3 that individual preferences for redistribution reflect 
subjective social position more strongly than objective social position leads us to take 
a closer look at how people perceive their social position. There exists a well-known 
explanation in social psychology that people tend to situate themselves in the middle 
of the social hierarchy. The magnitude of this psychological effect, however, varies 
across countries, and the prevailing explanation of this variability focusses on cultural 
dimensions. By contrast, Loughnan et al. (2011) provided evidence that socioeconomic 
differences, such as income inequality, are more firmly related to biased self-perception 
than cross-cultural differences. That is, their finding indicates that there exists less 
biased self-perception in a more equal society. This, in turn, leads us to take notice of 
the active role of policy changes that can remedy unequal socioeconomic structures for 
citizens to perceive their social position more accurately. 
Last, the fact that citizens’ inequality norms more strongly influence preferences 
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for redistribution than do their perceptions of actual inequality, as evidenced in Chapter 
3, reminds us of the importance of social interventions targeting norm perceptions. A 
better understanding of the inequality norms that people hold through further 
exploration will enable us to find out a more effective way of changing these norms in 
order to boost redistributive preferences. Although it is not guaranteed that an increase 
in preferences for redistribution leads to more redistribution, as shown in Chapter 2, 
conventional wisdom says that, where there is a demand, there will be a supply. Thus, 
if we pursue more redistributive policies, it is important to mobilise support for 
redistribution as well as to promote democratic responsiveness.   
 
Recommendations for future research 
This thesis opens up new avenues for empirical research as well as theoretical 
discussions on the link between democracy, inequality, and redistribution. The 
following topics are recommended for future work. First, the associations amongst both 
the democratic principles and dimensions in the first chapter need to be explored in 
depth. A more coherent and systematic way of conceptualising democracy and its 
components (principles and dimensions) is also necessary. In doing so, we may 
elucidate the linkages or trade-offs amongst the dimensions as well as principles of 
democracy, which would serve as a basis for a higher level of aggregation if a strong 
theory for a summary measure exists, as discussed. 
Second, the finding of the second chapter that preferences for redistribution do not 
translate into any type of redistribution requires an alternative theoretical explanation 
of the relationship. It might be one of the cases in which policy outcomes do not reflect 
public opinion (Page and Shapiro 1983, 189). There are also two strands of 
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explanations for limited redistribution in a democracy: First, the political process is 
biased towards the rich; second, the poor tolerate some inequality and reject radical 
redistribution (Harms and Zink 2003). Furthermore, unequal responsiveness to policy 
preferences of the wealthy has recently become an emerging subject of scrutiny (Page, 
Bartels, and Seawright 2013, 66); from this perspective, the principal assumption in 
previous studies on redistributive politics is no longer tenable—namely, that 
individuals’ policy preferences have equal political influence, regardless of their 
socioeconomic status, in shaping policy outcomes.83 
Third, it would be fruitful to explore the causes and consequences of inequality 
perceptions, both of which are separate but interconnected topics. For this thesis, only 
the effects of inequality perceptions on redistributive preferences were examined, but 
we can expand the horizon of empirical research by turning our eyes not only towards 
other dependent variables but also towards factors driving perceived inequality. 84 
Doing so is expected to result in a more substantial model of perceived inequality by 
clarifying the causal directions of relevant variables. 
Last, the linkage between democracy, inequality, and redistribution could be 
extensively examined through the new measures of democratic quality and perceptions 
of inequality constructed in this thesis. However, it would be productive to explore a 
specific relationship between them if there is a strong theoretical argument about the 
                                           
83 In relation to this, Hungerford (2015) presented the elites model of redistribution, against the 
median voter model, in which a greater concentration of income at the top leads to a lower 
redistribution. Furthermore, Hacker and Pierson (2014) pointed out that policy-making is more 
complicated than suggested by the median voter model of redistribution, and they proposed a 
paradigm shift from a Downsian perspective towards a Schattschneiderian perspective in the study 
of political economy. 
84 Gimpelson and Treisman (2015, 26–7) offered several plausible hypotheses about what causes 
perceptions of inequality: the role of reference groups, media influence, ideological legacy, and 
other psychological effects (a desire to blend in and self-enhancement bias), for instance. 
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relationship. Furthermore, it is still an open question whether or not it is viable to 
construct an aggregate measure of democracy that can be used as a structural factor in 
an analysis. Even if it is feasible to do so, in some cases, it might be appropriate to 
consider more disaggregated measures of democracy to capture the dynamic and 
detailed features of the relations between democracy and other variables. 
The main objective of this thesis is to provide the foundations of empirical research 
on the dynamics of democracy, inequality, and redistribution in advanced democracies. 
The three essays critically review a wide range of existing measures of democracy and 
inequality, including perceptions of inequality, and suggest new approaches to produce 
more valid measures for empirical studies. With the new measures of democracy and 
perceived inequality, the thesis also provides relevant theoretical discussions that cast 
doubt on the conventional theories or assumptions embedded in the democracy-
inequality-redistribution triad. It is hoped that this thesis will enhance our 
understanding of the dynamic relation between democracy, inequality, and 
redistribution. In view of the negative implications of thinning democracy, increasing 
inequality, but limited redistribution even in established democracies, of which many 
people have been aware in recent decades, research on the relationship between the 
triad is, and will be, crucial and urgent to remedy the issues that we still face.  
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